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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I discuss media representations of social class. My particular focus is on 
entertaining television formats and as an empirical example, I analyse the BBC Three 
docusoap People Like Us (2013l). To explore how social class is reflected in and impacts on 
the production of the programme, I conduct interviews with people participating in it, carry 
out a discourse analysis of its content and also attempt a small-scale audience research to 
get an understanding of how the programme was perceived. Theoretically, my research is 
framed by a Bourdieusian conception of social class and relevant related concepts like 
habitus, doxa and symbolic violence. I come to the conclusion that class divisions are clearly 
reflected and played out in the media field in multiple, interlinked ways. In the discourse 
analysis of People Like Us (2013l) I show how negative working-class stereotypes structure 
the programme narratively. I demonstrate how these stereotypical and reductionist images 
are artificially constructed and how they are linked with contemporary political discourses 
around class. Furthermore, I discuss how class hierarchies structure access to and power over 
the production of media output and underpin a division of labour that divides people into 
subjects and objects of representations largely along class lines. In the analysis of my 
empirical example, I explore the exploitative nature of this constellation and also the (moral) 
value that is attached to the respective class positions. Bourdieu makes the point that media 
representations are part of a wider class struggle. The analysis carried out in this research 
very much confirms this assessment, however, in the field of large-scale cultural production 
these battles are fought with very unequal weapons. The discourse analysis of my chosen 
empirical example explores, in connection with the conducted interviews with participants 
of the programme, a number of instances of very manipulative editing that cannot just be 
explained by the genre-typical requirements and the intention of the programme to 
entertain.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Debates around state welfare, traditionally a particularly passionate concern for 
sections of the newspaper market, have, well and truly, arrived on British TV screens 
in 2013. Of course, social security is not a new issue as such and has always had its 
place in news reporting as well as fictional and non-fictional genres; however, in 2013 
a large number of docusoap programmes that portray people living in deprived 
communities hit the screens and clearly added another dimension to public 
discourses around state welfare.  
This new trend was kicked off on BBC Three by the rather light-hearted, humorous 
and seemingly apolitical People Like Us (2013l) in February and March of 2013. It 
received a more sober and politicised treatment on BBC One in Nick and Margaret: 
We All Pay Your Benefits (2013k) in July 2013, was picked up by the commercial 
broadcasters with programmes like Channel 4’s Skint (2013i) in May and June 2013, 
Channel 5’s On Benefits & Proud (2013h) in October 2013 and, in a sense, culminated 
in Benefits Street (2014d) in January and February 2014. Of course, the first series of 
People Like Us (2013l) was not the first docusoap to portrayed working-class life and 
neither was the first series of Benefits Street (2014d) the final chapter of this 
particular subgenre of documentary filmmaking. However, I would argue that the 
former started off a wave of popularised documentaries that were set in deprived 
communities and the latter was, to-date, the biggest rating success and, arguably, the 
programme that caused the greatest controversy and generated the most resistance 
to it (The Media Show, 2014e). The second series of People Like Us (2014a), Skint 
(2014b), and Benefits Street (2015b) were, comparatively speaking, low-key affairs as 
they consisted of fewer episodes, were met with much less interest (reflected in 
considerably lower viewing figures) (BARB, 2015) and did certainly not cause a similar 
reaction in the media. Furthermore, the production of these programmes was 
significantly hampered by local resistance (Conlan, 2014), and the filming of 
Immigration Street (2015a), for instance, was cut short due to, at times militant, 
community protest (BBC, 2015).  
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Building on the work of scholars like Skeggs (1997b), Wood (Wood and Skeggs, 2004) 
and Lawler (2005), sociological research has started to analyse and make sense of this 
new wave of, as it sometimes is referred to, ‘poverty porn’ (MacDonald et al., 2014; 
Jensen, 2014; Allen et al., 2014). In this thesis, I will aim to contribute to an analysis 
of contemporary struggles over cultural representations by focussing on one 
empirical example, the first series of the aforementioned People Like Us (2013l). Of 
course, connections to other, related programmes will be made; however, I expect 
an in-depth analysis of one particular docusoap to be a fruitful way of exploring the 
complexities, the context of the production, the specific content and also the 
perception of contemporary cultural representations of social class.  
I will frame my analysis theoretically by discussing terms and concepts fundamentally 
important to this thesis in chapters two, three, four and six. Firstly, I will explore how 
the concept of class can be useful in exploring hierarchies and power relations in 
contemporary Britain. I will go back to its Marxist and Weberian foundations and 
discuss how postmodern critique and Bourdieusian contributions shape class analysis 
anno 2015. In the literature review, I will discuss the most central lines of argument 
of a critique of non-fictional representations of social class in a television context. 
Some of these considerations will be further explored in an analysis of the genre 
People Like Us (2013l) is located in. A particular focus will be put on the material 
conditions (classed) representations are produced under. I want to discuss how 
programmes like the one under consideration developed historically and in what 
ways the style and content of docusoaps is shaped by general developments in the 
media field. Throughout these chapters, I intend to demonstrate why I regard 
Bourdieusian concepts like habitus, doxa and symbolic violence as very useful tools 
to make sense of classed media representations and their function and role 
concerning political and social structures. Also my explorations of the media field will 
be informed by Bourdieu’s understanding of the logic of the media field and its 
interdependencies.  
The empirical analysis of my chosen example is threefold. Firstly, I will explore the 
perception of the programme by analysing how the programme was discussed in the 
online world. I aim to discuss how these debates comprehend and frame the 
programme and how People Like Us (2013l) is related to wider social and political 
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discourses. As I will discuss, this part of my analysis is not likely to produce a 
conclusive and comprehensive understanding of how the programme was generally 
perceived, but is intended to point to a number of possible readings and explore the 
ways in which the programme is made sense of. Following from my explorations of 
the wider genre, I will discuss the content as well as the used filming techniques and 
production methods in People Like Us (2013l) using Critical Discourse Analysis. I will 
identify the main themes and discuss how these were visually presented and 
narratively framed. The critique of the programme will, as the third element of my 
empirical analysis, be informed by interviews with participants of the programme. I 
will present and discuss their views on the most pertinent questions of this research. 
Accordingly, the focus will be on questions of authenticity, truthfulness and 
representativeness as well as the production process, the interviewees’ roles in it and 
considerations regarding access, control and exploitation. In this context it will also 
be discussed if and how wider power relationships are reflected in this process and 
whether it is indeed sensible to speak of classed representations. Finally, I want to 
discuss the significance of a programme like People Like Us (2013l). It is naturally 
difficult to pin down and isolate the specific impact of one particular programme or 
even a genre as a whole. Nevertheless, I will attempt to relate theoretical discussions 
of stereotyping, othering, and other forms of symbolic violence to the content and 
the empirically explored perception of the programme.  
The empirical findings of the analysis of the production process (from the perspective 
of the participants), the content (and its visual and narrative presentation) and also 
the perception of the programme will be discussed using the aforementioned 
methodological and theoretical tools and will allow me to come to a conclusion 
regarding the interconnectedness of social structures and media discourses. In other 
words: I intend to discuss how social hierarchies are reflected in my empirical 
example, how they shape its production process and also matter in terms of the 
perception of the programme. I will argue that the significance of, supposedly light-
hearted and benign, media representations lies exactly in this linkage and the way 
they do not just reflect but contribute to the reproduction of (class) inequalities.  
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2. Concepts of Class 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Defining and problematising the term ‘class’ is, I would argue, necessary groundwork 
that needs to be carried out before analysing classed media representations. 
Discussing how the concept of social class can be grasped and worked with in 
contemporary sociological debates is a vital and hopefully illuminating exercise that 
will allow me to arrive at an understanding of the term that the ensuing 
considerations and analyses can be based on. Marxist and Weberian conceptions of 
class will be explored and links to Bourdieu’s understanding of class and inequality 
made explicit. Following that, I want to utilise postmodern interventions as well as 
debates around recognition and redistribution to explore the focal points of 
contemporary class analysis, and, more importantly in the context of this research, 
develop an understanding of how class and culture are linked and how this linkage 
can be made sense of theoretically.  
 
2.2 The Marxist perspective 
 
Starting with a summary of the central elements of the Marxist conception of class is 
a rather obvious, yet (hopefully) productive starting point for this research. It is no 
exaggeration to claim that Marx’s concept of social class forms the basis and 
reference point for all following theories of class and stratification. Marxist class 
analysis is the most influential and enduring contribution and hardly any approaches, 
even those that completely disagree with Marxist premises, do not relate to the 
Marxist take on class in one way or another. Here, I want to outline the key aspects 
of the concept and also allude to the most central Neo-Marxist debates and attempts 
to address post-industrial societal developments from a Marxist point of view. 
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2.2.1 Marx 
 
Class relations are, according to Marx, structured by the organisation of the economy. 
Throughout history, different forms of production have divided the respective 
populations into groups, in accordance with their role in the production process. For 
Marx, the pivotal criterion is the possession of productive resources. In capitalist 
societies, the main dividing line runs between the owner of the material means of 
production and those who solely ‘own’ their labour power. It is not ownership as such 
that is crucial, but the associated control over the means of production and the 
unequal power relation between the ‘owner’ and the ‘buyer’ of labour (Wright, 
2005). Production is a social process with defined role allocations.  
Marx, despite it being often alleged, did not imply that in capitalism only two large 
and opposing groups exist. His class analysis is considerably more nuanced and 
differentiated. Marx acknowledged that not all members of society can be classed as 
either bourgeois or proletarian and that there are ‘middle and intermediate strata’ 
and groups whose class positions are complex and ambivalent (McLellan and Marx, 
1995:183). Marx speaks of  
 
… the constantly growing number of the middle classes, those who stand 
between the workman on the one hand and the capitalist and the landlord on 
the other hand (McLellan and Marx, 1995:184).  
 
Nevertheless, it is the classes at the opposing ends of the spectrum (of the production 
process) that Marx is most interested in and that he regards as most relevant in terms 
of historical and social change. 
As previously mentioned, production is in Marx’s view a social process, but one that 
is inevitably conflict-laden. The opposing roles of bourgeoisie and proletariat in the 
production process mean that their relationship must be antagonistic. Marx regards 
exploitation as the structuring principle of social relations (Savage, 2000). The private 
ownership and the power over the means of production, allow the bourgeois ruling 
class to exploit the surplus-producing working class. Following their diametrically 
opposing locations in the production process, the two main societal groups inevitably 
have contrasting class interests. However, these interests are not only antagonistic, 
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they are also inter-dependent. As Wright (2005:29) points out, some degree of 
cooperation of the subordinate class is needed due to their ‘capacity to resist their 
own exploitation’. This cooperation is ensured by coercion, but also by the use of 
consent-producing measures. It is important to stress that Marx regards the 
proletariat as potentially politically powerful, as makers of history. 
Conflict plays a central role in Marx’s view of society. He sees conflict as the driving 
force of historical development. For Marx ‘the history of all hitherto society is the 
history of class struggles’ (Marx et al., 2002:219). For a class to gain agency in terms 
of social change it is however necessary to develop class consciousness. This does 
not, according to Marx, automatically derive from a shared class location. Marx 
(1963:173) famously distinguished a ‘class in itself’ from a ‘class for itself’ and is of 
the opinion that material and economic structures structure society, but that for the 
realisation of shared interests, a political process has to take place. Individuals ‘find 
their conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their position in life ... 
assigned to them’ (Marx et al., 1994:82) however, individuals only form a class that 
is conscious of its existence in political battle (Marx et al., 1994). Marx argues that 
objective conditions (like class location) play a significant role in the formation of 
(subjective) consciousness, but as mentioned, this should not be interpreted in a too 
mechanistic or deterministic way. For Marx, economic conditions alone do not 
explain human behaviour and neither does class struggle simply occur as a result of 
antagonistic interests (Crompton, 2008). From a Marxist point of view, political 
practice is not reducible to class structure (Johnston, 1986). Class struggle must be 
preceded by the development of class consciousness and the process of class 
formation (Wright, 2005). 
Also, in this political, ideological struggle, class conflict and the unequal distribution 
of power come into play. Marx acknowledges that those in control of the material 
means of production also rule  
 
… as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and 
distribution of ideas of their age: Thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the 
epoch (Marx et al., 1994:64).  
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This means that the ruling class can assert influence over the political and intellectual 
process beyond the boundaries of their own class. As mentioned above, this is of vital 
importance to guarantee a degree of loyalty of the exploited class and ultimately to 
secure the power division in capitalist societies. 
 
2.2.2 Neo-Marxist contributions 
 
Marx’s class analysis is routinely accused of not being able to reflect the radical 
changes that have taken place in the world of work since Marx’s lifetime. Neo-Marxist 
thinkers therefore developed numerous ways of reformulating and updating Marxist 
class analysis. In the following, I want to briefly depict their central lines of argument 
to gain an understanding of the central themes of contemporary Marxist class 
analysis. 
The most critical and most obvious challenge for a Marxist class analysis in post-
industrial times is the question of how classes can be defined in a coherent and 
meaningful way. As mentioned, Marx himself addressed the existence and the 
growth of the middle classes, but the decline of manual labour and the 
differentiations in forms of employment potentially call the traditional class divisions 
into question. Also improvements regarding working conditions, general living 
standards and workers’ participation appear to have softened the conflict between 
capital and labour. Finally, the emergence of non-manual labour poses a challenge to 
the theory of labour as ‘non-productive work’ appears to partly replace ‘productive 
work’.  
Initially, Neo-Marxists like Poulantzas, Carchedi and Wrigth responded to this 
challenge by developing complex models of class location that accounted for new 
groups of employees (Savage, 2000). More recent approaches tend to be less 
concerned with the class locations of specific groups or with the value of labour 
theory. The existence of surplus value is not denied, but it is less seen as the central 
mechanism of exploitation (Savage, 2000). Instead, the focus has shifted to structures 
of ownership and power (Bradley, 1996). With regards to white-collar work and the 
middles classes, this means that it is less their particular contribution in the 
production process that is relevant, but more their (lack of) autonomy and access to 
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power. In those regards, white-collar employees are in a comparable situation to 
blue-collar workers. Both groups need to sell their labour and are ultimately excluded 
from decision making (Bradley, 1996). From a Neo-Marxist perspective, the processes 
of democratisation did not alter the societal power distribution in a fundamental way. 
According to Wright (2005), the distribution of rights and powers nowadays is not as 
polarised as in the early stages of industrialisation, but must still be regarded as highly 
unequal and accordingly class relations are still organised in a capitalist fashion. 
Nevertheless, Wright is among those Neo-Marxists who acknowledge that some class 
locations cannot be described in traditional Marxist terms, as they show a greater 
level of complexity. These ‘contradictory class locations’ (Burris, 1987:72) are 
prevalent in the higher spheres of white-collar work. Managers and professionals in 
a sense hold contradicting class positions as they exercise a degree of control and 
play a part in the decision-making process, but are on the other hand also in a position 
of dependence and their labour is exploited (Wright, 1979).1 
Finally, it is the question as to what extent economic conditions determine 
consciousness that has inspired debate among (Neo-)Marxist thinkers. Since this 
issue is of central relevance for this research, I will discuss it in more detail. As 
mentioned above, Marx himself did not advocate an overly deterministic view on this 
relationship, but, refining Gramsci’s approach, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) try to 
encourage Marxist debate to acknowledge non-class-centred explanations of culture 
and ideology. Class struggles in this sense are not (inevitable) products of the 
respective economic conditions, but, like all political struggles, are informed by 
specific discourses of politicised subjects (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
                                                          
1 Another aspect contemporary Marxist class analysis has to come to terms with is the 
diversification of ownership. Unlike in the early stages of industrialisation, the ownership of 
the means of production is not as easy to assign to and, as I have alluded to above, to some 
extent, control appears to be uncoupled from ownership. In particular, stock corporations 
can be seen as forms of collective ownership. Nevertheless, Neo-Marxists like Wright 
(2005) insist that these developments do not constitute a qualitative change and that 
ownership (and ultimately control) of the means of production are still concentrated in a 
small section of society. Empirical evidence confirms that in the last two decades, a process 
of polarisation has taken place and inequalities have grown instead of levelling out (Devine 
and Savage, 2000; Ramesh, 2011). Structures of ownership show a greater complexity, but 
its relative distribution is still highly unequal and can be described in class terms. 
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Gramsci (1971) and Althusser (2001) have both contributed greatly to advance the 
Marxist understanding of how economic conditions translate into political and 
cultural realities. Despite being the intellectual fathers and figureheads of two 
opposing streams within Marxism, both thinkers can be mentioned in the same 
breath as they both recognise and emphasise the central importance of ideology for 
the reproduction of class structures, and both reject an economistic interpretation of 
the relationship of economic and social conditions. 
Gramsci introduced the term ‘hegemony’ to explain the relative persistence of the 
societal distribution of power (Gramsci et al., 1971). More precisely, Gramsci aimed 
to explore how the consent of the subordinate class is achieved with, most of the 
time at least, relatively little (obvious) violence and coercion (Crompton, 2008). 
Hegemony can be regarded as the ‘organisation of consent’ (Barrett, 1991:54). For 
Gramsci, culture and in particular popular culture is of vital importance for this 
process. Class struggle in Gramsci’s sense is always also a cultural struggle (Crompton, 
2008). Ideology is therefore principally contested and not simply determined by the 
ruling class. Not that Gramsci regarded the superstructure of a society as irrelevant, 
he emphasised however that ideological and cultural dominance is not necessarily an 
exact reflection of economic power. 
Althusser (2001) focuses on structures and how they are central to the reproduction 
of power relations. He points out that for power relations to remain stable; it is not 
only the productive forces that need to reproduce, but also the relations of 
production. On an individual level, this means that the division of labour has to be 
accepted just as much as the assigned position in the production process (Carnoy, 
1984). Here, ideology comes into play. Ideology is the mechanism by which the 
members of a society subjugate themselves to its structures even if this means 
accepting an underprivileged position. For Althusser (2001), ideology works in a 
similar way to Gramsci’s hegemonic consensus – unequal economic and non-
economic distributions are made to be accepted by the disadvantaged who are 
exploited without the use of blunt force. 
Althusser (2001) regards societal structures as crucial. For him the state and state 
institutions are central for the definition and implementation of ideology. The 
ideology of the ruling class does not automatically become the ruling ideology, rather: 
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It is by the installation of the ISAs (ideological state apparatuses) in which this 
ideology is realized and realizes itself that it becomes the ruling ideology 
(Althusser, 2001:125).  
 
Althusser crucially distinguishes between the repressive state apparatus (RSA) with 
its organs (police, army, courts, prisons etc.) that, at least ultimately, ‘functions by 
violence’ (Althusser, 2001:96) and the ISAs that mainly ‘function by ideology’ 
(Althusser, 2001:97).2 Although ISAs appear diverse, they are unified by the ruling 
ideology. Ideological control of the ISAs is, according to Althusser, vital for the ruling 
class as their power largely depends on ‘exercising its hegemony over the state 
ideological apparatuses’ (Althusser, 2001:98). Each ISA contributes to the 
reproduction of the relations of exploitation in their specific way. The role of the 
communications apparatus most commonly associated with political indoctrination, 
nevertheless it is the educational apparatus that is of paramount importance to 
Althusser (2001). Again, the focus is more on the relational aspect than on the 
content of the ideological messages. Both, schools and mass media, do not only 
reproduce the relations of exploitation by defending them as just or by teaching 
particular skills or attitudes, more importantly ISAs reproduce ‘subjection to the 
ruling ideology’ (Althusser, 2001:89). The division of labour and the general power 
structure of a society are upheld, as Althusser (2001:89) puts it, by ideology and ‘the 
mastery of its practice’. Ideology therefore works not only by influencing conscious 
political views, but also by turning individuals into subjects: ‘People are recruited into 
identity positions’ (Joseph, 2006:74). This process happens largely on an unconscious 
level, but as a result, people consciously recognise themselves in identities according 
to their class position. 
However, as mentioned, ISAs are, unlike the RSA, not under direct control of the 
ruling class and neither are they organised in a contradiction-free manner. The 
ideological function of the ISAs can be contested and therefore turned into a site of 
                                                          
2 The ISAs include the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the political ISA, the 
cultural ISA etc. Whereas the RSA is, according to Althusser, relatively directly controlled by 
the ruling class and at the same time public, the ISAs appear relatively independent and 
privately controlled and owned. However, for Althusser it is not the directness of influence 
or mode of ownership that matters, but the function that is crucial. 
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class struggle. The ruling class relies on a degree of control over the ISAs, but the 
subordinate classes can develop a counter-ideology that challenges the claims and 
the function of the ISAs (Carnoy, 1984). Both Gramsci and Althusser analyse the 
means of the ruling class to secure societal structures that support and reproduce 
their privilege. Ideology plays a major role in this process; however it is not only 
understood as an instrument of suppression, but also as a potential tool for 
emancipation.  
 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
 
Marx’s take on class has inspired generations of sociologists (and others) and their 
work has covered a wide range of aspects and led to an array of theories producing a 
multitude of, partly contradictory, conclusions. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
axiomatic key features that distinguish Marxist class analysis from rivalling 
approaches. The most fundamental of these is the view that production processes 
structure social relations. As economic production under capitalist circumstances is 
based on exploitation, the relationship between the two most significant classes is 
necessarily antagonistic. Marxist class analysis is therefore focused on societal 
conflicts and questions of power. Class is, in a Marxist sense, above all, a relational 
matter. Classes can only be understood in relation to each other.  
As the breadth of work and the continuing presence and relevance of (Neo-)Marxist 
considerations show, the Marxist approach has a lot to offer for an understanding of 
the emergence and persistence of societal structures and their connectedness to 
economic processes.  
 
2.3 The Weberian perspective 
 
Max Weber’s (1976) concept of social class is commonly regarded as a refinement of 
the Marxist approach that shares some of the basic assumptions, but comes to 
distinctly different conclusions. Here, I intend to discuss the key issues of a Weberian 
class analysis and how they relate to Marxist approaches. 
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2.3.1 Appeal 
 
Weberian class analysis appears appealing for the same reasons that Marxist 
approaches can be regarded as dated. Weber’s comparatively differentiated and 
open analysis seems to be better suited to analyse the alleged diversity and 
fragmentations of contemporary capitalist societies (Bradley, 1996). Overall, the 
Weberian concept and its specific vocabulary show a greater compatibility with a 
view that emphasises the significance of individualised class positions. 
 
2.3.2 Key issues 
 
A central aspect in Weber’s class theory is the idea of market-determined life 
chances. Weber (as cited in Giddens and Held, 1982:62) points out that:  
 
The kind of chance in the market is the decisive moment which presents a 
common condition for the individual’s fate.  
 
One’s opportunities to be successful in the market depend on an individual’s 
resources in the form of skills and education as well as material assets (Breen, 2005). 
The specific composition of skills and material assets enable the individual to 
compete in the market for scarce goods. The value of all assets is not objective, but 
depends on the context of the market. 
The potential and factual diversity of assets and the focus on individual life chances 
suggest a highly individualised view of society. However, Weber acknowledges that 
life chances are similar for groups of people. Classes in his view do not exist a priori 
(Savage, 2000), but the market produces a number of economic classes (Breen, 
2005). People with similar sets of assets, and accordingly similar life chances, can be 
grouped as economic classes. This large number of economic classes can again be 
summarised into four large social classes. The membership of these social classes is, 
however, not only defined by the individual’s set of assets, as cultural aspects come 
into play as well. Superficially regarded, Weber’s division into 
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(a) the working class as a whole (b) the petty bourgeoisie (c) technicians, 
specialists and lower-level managers; and (d) the classes privileged through 
property and education (Weber cited in Crompton, 2008:33)  
 
is similar to Marx’s classification, but as Crompton (2008) points out, the sources of 
class structuring are very different. Whereas Marx regards the position and function 
in the production process as crucial, Weber sees market processes and relationships 
as structuring factors. According to Weber, members of classes are not bound 
together by their shared position, but by a (coincidentally) similar composition of 
immaterial and material assets. The relative transitoriness of class membership and 
the potential for social mobility is reflected by Weber’s use of the expression ‘class 
situation’ (Giddens and Held, 1982:61). Nevertheless, Weber acknowledges that the 
market is not a level playing field and favours those who have already accrued a 
wealth of assets. Weber sees little cohesion within social classes and does not regard 
a social class as a collective or community (‘Gemeinschaft’) (Giddens and Held, 
1982:63). 
Since Weber regards social classes as potentially very fragmented and transitory 
entities, it is not surprising that he is rather sceptical regarding the idea of class 
consciousness. Weber argues that while shared class positions make it likely that 
individuals act in a similar way, class positions do not automatically generate a 
specific consciousness. The formation of class consciousness depends on a number 
of factors and in particular on the (collective) insight into the relatedness of causes 
and consequences of class situations. Furthermore, Weber is of the opinion that 
other social groupings are more likely to stimulate identification and collective action 
(Breen, 2005). 
For Weber, status groups offer in many ways more engaging forms of identification. 
Unlike social classes, he regards status groups as actual groups or communities and 
emphasises that, unlike with social classes, the defining criterion is not property but 
honour (Giddens and Held, 1982). Weber acknowledges that more often than not 
status and material wealth are linked, but is adamant that this is not necessarily the 
case:  
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Both propertied and propertyless people can belong to the same status 
group, and frequently they do with very tangible consequences. (Weber cited 
in Giddens and Held, 1982:65)  
 
Weber (as cited in Giddens and Held, 1982:65) also talks about a ‘style of life’ that is 
expected of the members of the respective status groups.3 Finally, parties are 
relevant and distinct social groupings that must, in Weber’s view, be distinguished 
from social classes and status groups. The membership of the respective groups 
overlap, but none of them can be reduced to the other (Breen, 2005). There is no 
hierarchy in the sense that one of these groupings has general supremacy, however, 
as mentioned, Weber is of the opinion that collective action is more likely to originate 
in status groups than in social classes. 
From a Weberian point of view, historical development and social change cannot be 
described as a consequence of class struggle. Weber not only regards social classes 
as not necessarily in antagonistic opposition to each other and also lacking social 
agency, he regards the Marxist model of social change as too economistic. Weber 
sees social change as a highly complex process that is driven by a number of factors 
and not least by the ideas of a time. In ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism’ Weber (1976) famously describes the influence of Calvinist ideology on 
the development of capitalism. He argues that certain elements of Protestantism 
helped the development of capitalism insofar as their rules of living supported the 
development of a capitalist spirit. Nevertheless, Weber did not intend to replace 
what he regarded as the Marxist ‘one-sided materialistic’ view of historic 
development with ‘an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture 
and history’ (Weber, 1976:183). As I have discussed above, Weber regards collective 
action as significant, but not exclusively linked to economic positions. 
The power distribution within society is, according to Weber, not a mirror of the 
distribution of wealth or the class structure. Not only social classes, but also all other 
social groupings, namely parties and status groups, hold specific amounts of power. 
Weber unambiguously makes clear that power, which he sees as ‘the chance of a man 
                                                          
3 This ‘style of life’ also lays down rules of social interaction and restrictions regarding 
members of different status groups. 
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or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the 
resistance of others’ (Weber cited in Giddens and Held, 1982:60) is unequally 
distributed. Weber’s intention is not to deny that economic wealth generally 
translates into power, but to draw attention to social prestige and political parties as 
other areas of power (Crompton, 2008). 
 
2.3.3 Convergence 
 
Overall, there are a number of very significant differences between the classical 
Marxist and the classical Weberian account of social class. Nevertheless, it is also 
fairly obvious that Weber did not dismiss Marx’s central premises, but set out to 
refine them. Both approaches regard the economic structures as central and society 
as divided into interrelated, hierarchically organised groups. Neo-Marxist 
developments have blurred the dividing lines between both concepts of social class 
even more. Burris (1987) argues that Neo-Marxist theorists have addressed a number 
of the most contested issues and opened up Marxist debate. Individual and collective 
agency features much more prominently in Neo-Marxist debates around social class. 
This becomes perhaps most apparent with regards to class consciousness and class 
action, or respectively, the lack of it (Wright, 1985). Secondly, and possibly even more 
importantly, Neo-Marxists have acknowledged that class-based oppression is not the 
only form of oppression. Most forms of oppression and discrimination have a link to 
class, however, not all forms of injustice and exclusion are based on class 
membership (alone). Marxists still uphold that economic injustice has some sort of 
primacy and that class relations shape other forms of inequality, but concede that 
racism, sexism, religious discrimination etc. cannot be reduced to class conflicts 
(Burris, 1987). The Marxist and the Weberian concepts of class are undoubtedly 
separate and distinguishable approaches and I have no intention to gloss over their 
differences. However, in a greater context, they share a number of very central 
assumptions that, as I will discuss in the following, make it possible for Bourdieu to 
draw on both approaches. 
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2.4 The Bourdieusian perspective 
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of social class is clearly based on Marxist and 
Weberian ideas as well as a critical examination of Althusser’s structuralism and 
therefore Bourdieu can hardly be identified with a single ‘father figure’ (Weininger, 
2005:82). In the following, I try to demonstrate how Bourdieu’s concept of social class 
links two central dimensions of class analysis: economic structures and cultural 
manifestations of inequality. I will argue that Bourdieusian class analysis offers insight 
into the subtleties, complexities and unconscious psychological aspects of social class 
without turning its back on the material and economic basis of inequality. Bourdieu’s 
sociological contributions are, in my opinion, often reduced to questions of identity 
formation and his concept of different types of capital. I intend to show that Bourdieu 
views these processes as related to social structures and, despite at times it being 
overlooked, he is very much concerned with economic structures and ultimately the 
power structures that uphold and perpetuate inequalities in all their different 
manifestations.  
 
2.4.1 Social Space 
 
Bourdieu regards the social world as a multi-dimensional and structured space. He 
‘breaks with Marxist theory’ (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:239) to emphasise 
relations over structure. This means that for Bourdieu the focus is much more on the 
relations within a social space, than on the concrete specifics of social groupings. 
Whether this constitutes an actual ‘break’ with Marxism is debateable4. A different 
disagreement with Marxism is clearer: Bourdieu’s emphasis on symbolic struggles 
over economic struggles. Bourdieu speaks of ‘objectivism’ and ‘intellectualism’ that, 
together with a narrow focus on economics ‘leads one to overlook the symbolic 
struggles that take place in different fields’ (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:239).  
The relation between the economic and the symbolic is very central in Bourdieu’s 
theory. He regards Weber’s distinction between class and status group as a purely 
                                                          
4 Marx, as discussed in chapter 2.2.1, also recognises the interconnectedness and 
hierarchical structure of classes in capitalist societies. 
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analytical one. Accordingly, Bourdieu sees social classes as not reducible to economic 
relations, but always also products of symbolic relations and symbolic struggles 
(Weininger, 2005). Nonetheless, and here the parallels with Althusser (2001) become 
apparent, Bourdieu distinguishes a number of social fields that all have their own 
distinctive rules and logic and are to some degree autonomous (Swartz, 1997). The 
cultural and the educational fields for instance, can, in Bourdieu’s view, not be seen 
as completely determined by the economic or political field, despite a hierarchical 
order and varying distributions of power between social fields. The forms of capitals 
that Bourdieu distinguishes, which will be addressed shortly, are connected in a 
similar way than the social fields they mainly relate to. 
Classes exist in Bourdieu’s view not as actual groups. ‘What exists is a space of 
relations’ (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:232) with varying degrees of proximity of 
the respective individuals. Accordingly, classes can be constructed along different 
lines of demarcation. These theoretical classes are not necessarily real classes. For 
Bourdieu, the defining aspect is what Marxists would call ‘class consciousness’ and 
what Bourdieu describes as follows: 
 
… groups made of individuals united by the consciousness and the knowledge 
of their commonality of condition and ready to mobilise in pursuit of their 
common interest (Bourdieu, 1987:7).  
 
So structure alone does not make classes, they are always the result of a historical 
process. Bourdieu speaks of a theoretical class as a ‘class on paper’ (Bourdieu, 1987:7) 
that transforms into a real class by the political process of ‘classmaking’ (Bourdieu, 
1987:8). This is similar to the Marxist distinction between ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for 
itself’ and also in Bourdieu’s concept, classes are ‘collectives having an economic and 
social base’(Bourdieu, 1987:9). Despite this agreement, there are considerable 
differences to the classic Marxist view. As I will show later, Bourdieu sees classes as 
interrelated and hierarchically structured, the nature of this relationship is, however, 
not necessarily based on the respective positions in the production process. The same 
can be said about domination and exploitation – their existence is not disputed, but 
is not interpreted in a predominantly economic way. Bourdieu is less interested in 
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the economic structures that define classes, but more in their political cultural and 
psychological aspects. 
 
2.4.2 Habitus 
 
For Bourdieu, societal structures are partly upheld and reinforced through processes 
that can best be understood with reference to psychological concepts, or more 
precisely with the utilisation of the idea of an individual and collective 
unconsciousness. Bourdieu uses the term ‘habitus’ to describe the unconscious 
aspects or as the internalisation of societal structures. The habitus reflects the 
position of an individual or of groups in the class structure, and at the same time 
refers to collective and individual practice that is shaped by the individual’s or group’s 
position in social space. The habitus therefore embodies the ‘indirect causal link 
between position in social space and practices’ (Weininger, 2005:90). Habitus not 
only intends to explain attitudes, beliefs and concepts of self and the world, but also 
individual and collective action. For Bourdieu these two spheres are closely linked. 
Bourdieu intends to explain how the ‘outer’ becomes the ‘inner’ (Moore, 2008), and 
speaks of the ‘incorporation of the objective structures of the social space’ (Bourdieu 
and Thompson, 1991:235). This happens largely on an unconscious level as social 
structures are usually not consciously analysed or verbally expressed by the 
individual. Bourdieu refers to Goffman’s (1951:297) idea of the ‘sense of one’s place’ 
which he translates into the ‘practical mastery of the social structure’ (Bourdieu and 
Thompson, 1991:235).  
Similar to Althusser’s understanding of the effect of ideology, this ‘mastery’ is 
acquired, not predominantly through active reflexion or explicit tuition, but through 
experience. Individuals experience themselves in social structures and power 
relations and derive their sense of place from this. The perception of the social world 
and the production of meaning are therefore structured. How the social world is 
perceived ‘beyond the directly visible attributes’ (Bourdieu and Thompson, 
1991:235) is influenced by one’s position in the social space which is in turn informed 
by past (symbolic) struggles and characterised by a certain vagueness. 
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The link between position and disposition is crucial in this context. As mentioned, 
Bourdieu does not suggest that a given position in social space determines an 
individual’s habitus, he instead claims that positions in relationships of power relate 
to specific dispositions with regards to the habitus (Crossley, 2008). Positions (of 
power) tend to be closely related to more general life conditions and therefore 
Bourdieu see a strong link between position (in social space) and disposition (of the 
habitus).  
The habitus also informs individual and collective practice and serves Bourdieu as a 
concept of practice that neither relies on objectivism, that understands action as 
mere reaction to circumstances, nor on subjectivism that overly emphasises 
conscious intentions (Wagner and McLaughlin, 2015).5  
 
2.4.3 Forms of Capital 
 
To be able to analyse how economic inequalities effectively translate into social 
inequalities and social hierarchies, Bourdieu went beyond the psychoanalytically 
inspired concept of habitus and famously distinguished several forms of capitals. In 
his understanding, capital ‘is the set of actually usable resources and powers’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984a:114). These resources and powers can be analytically divided into 
three dimensions. Next to the economic capital (all sorts of property), Bourdieu 
regards cultural capital and social capital as crucial determinants of the social 
structure. Cultural capital is closely linked to education and could be termed 
‘informational capital’ (Bourdieu, 1987:4). Social capital, on the other hand, is based 
on group membership and social connections. Symbolic capital, unlike the other 
forms of capital, is not a set of resources in itself, but an indicator of the value of the 
different forms of capital. Economic, social and cultural capital are converted into 
                                                          
5 As mentioned, Bourdieu is rather reluctant to speak of social groupings as classes and 
therefore it is questionable whether it is advisable to speak of a ‘class habitus’ in a 
Bourdieusian sense. Nevertheless, habitus is a collective as much as an individual concept. 
When the habitus becomes objectified as lifestyle, there are clearly collective processes at 
play (Moore, 2008). The social aspects of the concept become apparent when lifestyles get 
categorised in hierarchical order. This order reflects their origin in the social space as well as 
their proximity to legitimate culture.  
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symbolic capital when they are regarded as legitimate (Bourdieu, 1987). No form of 
capital, even economic capital, equals social status and power without legitimation 
and recognition.6 Nevertheless, it is the social structure that is the source of power. 
Capital needs to be validated to become effective, but this validation operates in 
accordance with the social structure of a society. Power cannot be reduced to any 
one form of capital and neither to symbolic systems or beliefs. Power originates in 
the uneven distribution of capital combined with the ability to convince others of its 
legitimacy.  
Bourdieu regards social space as structured according to the (legitimate) forms of 
capital. It is, however, not only the total volume of capital that matters, but also the 
composition and the trajectory of the overall capital. Individuals, as well as groups of 
individuals, are assigned a position in a hierarchical order according to these three 
dimensions of capital.  
Bearing this in mind, it becomes clear why Bourdieu sees ‘taste’ as a powerful and 
politically charged category and not a matter of benign and insignificant individual 
preference. The sphere of consumption mirrors the sphere of production and the 
hierarchical order of the production process is not only reiterated in the distinction 
between highbrow and lowbrow taste, it is reinforced by the normative 
interpretation as legitimate or illegitimate (Swartz, 1997). Bourdieu states that ‘taste 
classifies, and it classifies the classifier’ (Bourdieu, 1984a:6). So it is not only the 
object that is judged as tasteful or not, it is also the individual that makes the 
judgement that is, wittingly or not, rated according to the legitimacy of their taste. 
Taste, as a component of the habitus, is not a solely individual quality. It may be 
expressed on an individual level, but clearly relates to the (class) structure of a 
society. 
Cultural capital structures and divides in a similar way. This becomes clear when 
looking at how Bourdieu defines the different states of cultural capital. ‘Embodied’ 
cultural capital describes the outcome of an on-going process of accumulation of 
cultural knowledge. Bourdieu claims that the ‘investment’ of pedagogic action 
‘returns dividends in schools’ (Swartz, 1997:76). Pupils from privileged backgrounds 
                                                          
6 The term ‘parvenu’ for instance reflects this phenomenon. 
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and with access to objectified cultural capital (books, works or art etc.) are more likely 
to attain cultural capital in its institutionalised form. These educational credentials 
are of critical importance for the allocation of life chances. Through this mechanism, 
the social class structure reproduces itself. Investments in education can be seen as 
conversions of different forms of capital (Swartz, 1997).7 Bourdieu sees cultural 
capital as increasingly the bedrock of social stratification. Still, it is economic capital 
that is at the root of all other forms of capital. The social and the cultural fields are, 
despite a degree of autonomy, ultimately subordinate to the economic field. Of 
course, the conversion of forms of capital via education is not an automatic, 
contradiction-free process and there is a degree of vagueness, but it is not only 
Bourdieu’s own research that confirms the links between wealth and educational 
achievement (Dyson et al., 2010; Sodha and Margo, 2010). 
Bourdieu’s model offers an approach that combines different dimensions of social 
classification and allows us to analyse their interrelatedness. At the heart of this 
examination of inequalities and injustice is the concept of symbolic capital that 
validates or invalidates all forms of capital. Symbolic capital translates economic, 
social and cultural capital into power, but also disguises precisely this relation. 
Differences in educational or professional achievement for instance are misperceived 
as their real basis is obscured. In that sense, the conversion into symbolic capital not 
only validates other forms of capital, it also increases their potency by obscuring the 
unequal distribution of opportunities.  
 
2.4.4 Symbolic violence & symbolic struggles 
 
Bourdieu uses the term ‘symbolic violence’ to express the systematic disguise of 
power relations. Although it is not necessarily perceived as such, the 
misrepresentation of power structures is a means of domination and suppression. 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991) argues that the misrecognition of power 
as legitimate and just, forecloses critical debate and leads to an acceptance of societal 
structures as taken for granted. The political and material interests of those who 
                                                          
7 Economic capital can be converted into cultural capital and this, in turn, can be used to 
further gain economic capital. 
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benefit from the specific power distribution are concealed (Swartz, 1997). Social 
categorisations have a history, but are ultimately completely arbitrary.8  
For Bourdieu, symbolic systems are politically powerful as they construct reality 
(Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991). As mentioned, symbolic capital validates and 
therefore reinforces other forms of capital by disguising interest. Furthermore, the 
ideological effects of symbolic systems lie in their potential to bring about consent 
and acceptance among the dominated. Ideology in capitalist societies functions to 
support a culture that unifies and separates at the same time (Bourdieu and 
Thompson, 1991). Consent and classifications are two sides of the same coin.  
Symbolic systems shape the individual and collective perception in a way that the 
objective structures become, similar to the habitus, incorporated into the 
unconsciousness and are therefore no longer open to conscious critique. Bourdieu 
regards the access to means of mass-communication as crucial in that respect. In his 
view, perceptions are greatly shaped by the ability to influence public discourse. For 
Bourdieu, political power depends greatly on the ‘virtue of naming’ (Bourdieu and 
Thompson, 1991:236). This virtue 
 
… represents a formidable social power, that of bringing into existence groups 
by establishing common sense, the explicit consensus, of the whole group 
(Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:236). 
 
This power of naming, categorising and classifying is performed continuously. 
However, it is important to note that Bourdieu, similar to Althusser, does not regard 
ideological influence as a simple, straightforward, top-down process. Social groupings 
that are in a position of power clearly are in an advantaged position to establish a 
worldview that supports their position of privilege, but generally, the process of 
                                                          
8 This is probably most apparent in the already discussed context of taste. What qualifies as 
good taste, and therefore legitimate culture, is subject to constant change and hardly 
justifiable in any objective sense. The same logic can be applied to other areas of the social 
world. For instance, it can be argued in a Bourdieusian sense that the value that is attached 
to different forms of work have developed historically, but reflect more distributions of 
power and influence than their intrinsic worth. Again, underlying interests remain 
unchallenged and power is misrecognised. Exactly in this legitimation of an arbitrary, 
unjustified order lies what Bourdieu regards as violence. 
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production of meaning is contested. The field of cultural production is a field of 
political struggle, just as all the other fields that contribute to the construction of 
meaning. Bourdieu leaves no doubt that the struggle over meaning has very palpable 
political and societal consequences:  
 
What is at stake in the struggle about the meaning of the social world is the 
power over the classificatory schemes and systems which are the basis of 
representations of the groups and therefore of the mobilization and 
demobilization (Bourdieu, 1984a:479).  
 
There is the very real possibility of challenging dominant interpretations of the social 
world. Hierarchies are reproduced to the degree that powerful groups succeed in 
portraying the actual systems of domination as legitimate (Schubert, 2008). This, 
however, also implies that hierarchies are only stable inasmuch as the production of 
meaning is successfully controlled by the social grouping in power. Consensus, 
produced in the political and cultural field, can be called into question by subordinate 
groupings. Inequalities that are maintained by forms of symbolic domination can be 
challenged not least in the field of cultural production.  
Symbolic domination, or maybe more precisely, the struggle for symbolic 
domination, is everywhere and nowhere (Schubert, 2008). It is everywhere in the 
sense that we all live in hierarchically structured social systems. Symbolic domination 
is nowhere, because it remains largely unrecognised and it is exactly that which 
contributes to the authority of embodied social structures. Nevertheless, the effects 
of these structures are very real, or as Schubert (2008:193) puts it: ‘The violence 
might be symbolic, but the suffering and the reproduction of class hierarchies are 
very real’. 
 
2.4.5 Class 
 
Bourdieu’s concept of social space to some extent contradicts the Marxist notion of 
classes as historically formed entities with specific roles and inherently antagonistic 
interests. For Bourdieu, social space consists of a multitude of invisible relationships. 
Each position in this space is defined by the relative location and the distance to other 
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positions. This assumption, similar to Weber’s view, implies a very individualistic view 
of society as a conglomeration of atomised individuals in a hierarchical order. 
Bourdieu (1987:3) expresses this view explicitly: ‘From a scientific standpoint, what 
exists is not “social classes” ... but rather a social space’. Nevertheless, Bourdieu, 
again like Weber, acknowledges that similar positions in social space and the 
experience of similar living conditions and relative power(lessness) can bring people 
closer together and can lead to a potentially strong and potent group identity. The 
commonality of experience happens intrinsically (in terms of material conditions) and 
relationally (in terms of relative position to other members of society) (Bourdieu, 
1987). Classes are for Bourdieu (1987:5) analytical constructs, ‘but constructs well-
founded in reality’.  
As discussed earlier, it is the process of classmaking that turns a ‘class on paper’ 
(Bourdieu, 1987:7) into a real class. Classmaking is a political process that critically 
involves symbolic struggles and has the struggle over representations at its heart. For 
Bourdieu, classes are defined by position as much as by perception. The ‘being’ is 
equally important as the ‘being-perceived’ and therefore the ‘classification struggles 
aimed at transforming the categories of perception and appreciation of the social 
world’ are, for Bourdieu (1984a:483), ‘a forgotten dimension of the class struggle’. In 
that sense, class struggle is also the struggle over the legitimate vision of the social 
world and not least over the representation of classes themselves. The contestation 
of boundaries is a central element of the class struggle. Crossley (2008:97) sums up 
the importance of symbolic struggles for classmaking as follows: 
 
What finally transforms these fuzzy lines of division into historically effective 
class groups ... are representations of class which both resonate with the ... 
practical sense that individuals have of their position and serve ... to organise 
individuals as groups.  
 
Bourdieu is interested in the interrelatedness of different spheres of the social 
structure as well as the relationship between socials structure and their perception. 
As I have discussed, for Bourdieu, social structures and power structures can, in 
democratic societies at least, only be upheld if they are largely perceived as 
legitimate. This focus on the struggles for legitimacy makes Bourdieu’s concept of 
class very valuable for the objective of this research.  
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2.5 Postmodern and contemporary perspectives 
 
Summing up the views of social theorists who regards social class from a postmodern 
vantage point is a rather ambitious enterprise and certainly beyond the scope of this 
research. Even more than the above discussed approaches, a postmodern 
perspective is hard to pin down in a coherent manner as, maybe apart from a general 
scepticism regarding Marxism, there appear to be few central, axiomatic assumptions 
that would unify a postmodern concept of social class. However, there are clearly 
identifiable common themes, and, in particular, a specific way of challenging 
traditional stratification research that runs through many postmodern contributions. 
In the following, I will focus on postmodern approaches that directly address the 
perceived flaws and alleged obsolescence of traditional concepts of social class, but 
at the same time heavily draw on Bourdieu’s theory. I do not attempt to (in-)validate 
postmodern concepts, but intend to use the postmodern critique constructively to 
further develop an understanding of social class that takes relatively recent social and 
sociological developments into account. An exploration of postmodern contributions 
is also beneficial insofar, as the postmodern critique points to crucial frictions and 
focal points within contemporary class analysis.  
 
2.5.1 The death of class 
 
In 1996, Pakulski and Waters (1996) famously declared the ‘Death of Class’. They have 
repeated and substantiated this claim ever since, and Pakulski (2005) argues that 
class as a concept has ceased to be both relevant and valid as it is neither able to 
reflect the actual structure of today’s society nor is it a category central to people’s 
lives. At the centre of this reasoning stands the claim that society is too fragmented 
to be understood in class terms. Lash and Urry (1987) also regard the postmodern 
world as one of increasing fragmentation which does not offer collective (class) 
identities anymore. Due to the emergence of an increasing number of ‘new class 
fractions’ (Lash and Urry, 1987:287), identification with larger social groups is 
increasingly unlikely. The authors refer to Bourdieu’s idea of habitus, which they 
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interpret as ‘cognitive structures’ (Lash and Urry, 1987:292), and argue that 
processes of fragmentation lead to a dissolution of collective identity. Interestingly, 
this fragmentation of society leads, according to Lash and Urry (1987:297), to a 
‘breakdown of particularist identities’ and therefore to the decline of boundaries and 
even social hierarchies. Also Pakulski and Waters (1996:4) come to the conclusion 
that ‘the most advanced societies are no longer class societies’. 
None of these authors however assumes that postmodern societies are equal 
societies. In particular Pakulski (2005:176) is keen to stress that class divisions were 
largely replaced by other social differentiations; he speaks of ‘complex (classless) 
inequalities’. Pakulski and Waters (1996) state that social struggles still exist, but 
argue that they are based on different dimensions such as ethnicity, sexual 
preference, gender, environmental protection, religious beliefs etc. They explicitly 
make clear that ‘these issues have little or nothing to do with class’ (Pakulski and 
Waters, 1996:26). Also, Lash and Urry (1987:301) conclude that stratification in 
postmodern society is based on individual achievement and speak of ‘new cross-
cutting forms of social division’. So while class has lost its significance in terms of 
collective identity and social analysis, other categories have gained relevance and 
recognition. Both sets of authors argue that issues of ‘race’, sex, gender etc. are now 
more meaningful to the individual and more likely to prompt collective action.9 This 
peculiar conception of political progress will be returned to shortly, but before that I 
want to discuss how contemporary class analysis works with and makes sense of the 
above mentioned social and political developments. 
                                                          
9 The alleged fragmentation of society is, for Lash and Urry as well as for Pakulski and Waters 
nothing to be mourned. Quite the opposite; they regard fragmentation as an opportunity 
and argue that the decline of collective identity opens up the possibility to reach a greater 
degree of rationality and reflexivity. Lash and Urry (1987) emphasise that a more open and 
rational subjectivity has an anti-hierarchical element and could ultimately lead to a radically 
democratic society. Also Pakulski is optimistic about the impact of fragmentation and points 
to the potentially increased reflexivity and awareness with regards to social boundaries. He 
claims that discrimination is increasingly impossible to justify and that the collective struggle 
for equality has already succeeded to some extent. Interestingly, he mentions racial, ethnic, 
gender etc. discrimination, but omits class. Furthermore, Pakulski (2005:178) points out that 
these struggles are largely fought on ‘the moral, political, and symbolic levels’. Class struggles 
and demands for economic redistribution, unsurprisingly, do not feature in this vision of 
postmodern political engagement. 
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The fragmentation of social structures is one of the central findings of the Great 
British Class Survey (GBCS), that was conducted by Savage et al. (2013) in cooperation 
with the BBC. According to the GBCS, a model of seven classes is needed to grasp the 
fragmentation and polarisation of contemporary British society. Also the well-
established, occupation-based, National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-
SEC) scale of the Nuffield Institute led by John Goldthorpe works with a larger 
number, in this case 17, distinguishable categories (Rose et al., 2005). However, the 
similarities with the postmodernists are of a rather superficial nature and almost end 
there. With regards to identity formation, the Goldthorpe school makes rather 
limited claims about the links between class position and social identity (Bottero, 
2004). Also Savage et al. (2013) come to the conclusion that class membership does 
not necessarily result in a tangible class identity. However, unlike in the above 
explored postmodern line of argument, many contemporary class analysts do not 
regard class consciousness as a condition for the existence of classes. Bottero 
(2004:989) sums up this view as follows:  
 
People do not have to explicitly recognize class issues, or identify with discrete 
class groupings, for class processes to operate. All that is required is for 
specific cultural practices to be bound up with the reproduction of hierarchy. 
The emphasis in not on the development (or not) of class consciousness, but 
rather on the classed nature of particular social and cultural practices.  
 
So for class analysts like Savage, class and identification is more about creating (or 
reproducing) difference than recognising commonalities. So neither the Goldthorpe 
school nor the newer generation of class analysts deny that processes of 
differentiation and individualisation have taken place. However, compared to the 
aforementioned postmodernists they clearly arrive at very different conclusions 
regarding their significance. Class, in this view is not dead, it just operates in a 
different way. Collective identities play a less significant role, but people still do make 
sense of their social position in relational ways and in class terms. As Borudieu argues, 
and the GBCS picks up, this process is mediated by culture. Again, postmodernist 
considerations are helpful in turning the gaze to another crucial focal point in 
contemporary debates around social class.  
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2.5.2 The cultural turn 
 
As social classes are, according to postmodern critique, dissolving, their relevance for 
the process of identity formation is alleged to decline as well. As discussed above, 
class positions and economic distribution are being superseded by culture. Social 
groupings are formed not on the basis of employment positions or wealth, but in 
relation to cultural aspects of life. Pakulski (2005) points out that these new 
formations tend to be very volatile. Since they refer to areas of life that are more 
likely to change than a person’s economic status, this makes perfect sense, as it is 
compatible with the postmodern emphasis on the reflexivity of the individual. 
Membership in these kinds of social groupings is much more a question of choice 
than class membership in a traditional sense ever can be. Lash and Urry (1987:287) 
stress the importance of consumption to establish distinctions between ‘class 
fractions’; the consumption of cultural goods has the potential to question traditional 
structures and hierarchies in the cultural as well as in the social world.  
Also Pakulski (2005:177) points to the centrality of consumption and explicitly states 
that the symbolic power of (cultural) consumption is detached from 
‘production/employment relations, material needs and interest’ and operates as 
‘autonomous social-structuring systems’.  
Interestingly, Lash and Urry, as well as Pakulski, draw on Bourdieu’s theory of 
symbolic power but with a distinct twist. Whereas Bourdieu is interested in the 
mechanisms of power and oppression and more specifically how cultural 
consumption and the normativity of taste deepens the divide between the 
economically advantaged and the disadvantaged, the postmodern interpretation of 
symbolic power seems to be much more optimistic. Lash and Urry and Pakulski and 
Water regard culture as a means of bridging social divisions and of transcending 
hierarchical order. When Pakulski (2005:177) claims that ‘such structuring 
contributes to social differentiation rather than stratification’ he is in clear opposition 
to Bourdieu’s conception of the legitimising or de-legitimising force of culture. 
However, it appears that he fails to acknowledge that. Also, Lash and Urry (1987) 
regard cultural consumption as connected to an individual’s status, but crucially more 
in the sense of a conscious attempt of challenging societal structures.  
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Again, this line of argument appears to resonate with the theoretical approach of the 
GBCS in that it also puts an emphasis on cultural consumption. Social and economic 
capital are not brushed under the carpet, but the difficulty of operationalising and 
measuring both are evident.10 Mills (2014) is very critical of this way of measuring 
class and, in defending his institute's occupation-based NS-SEC approach, he claims 
that Savage et al. (2013) produce a theory-free conception of class that is not helpful. 
Leaving the struggle over the validity (or monopoly) of the NS-SEC scale aside, Mills' 
(2013) critique that the GBCS overly focuses on (largely age-related) patterns of 
consumption appears very plausible.  
However, I would agree with Savage et al. (2014) that the GBCS must be seen in the 
context of the research that has previously been carried out by the sociologists 
around Savage and, equally important, that the analysis of the data is still in a rather 
early stage and only a few initial findings could be presented in the report published 
in 2013. Furthermore, it is important to point out that the ‘de-classing of culture’ 
(Bottero, 2005:130) is framed significantly differently by Savage et al. (2013) 
compared to the above discussed postmodern perspective. Whereas the importance 
of cultural practice as a source of identity is acknowledged, Savage et al. (2013) 
clearly do not regard cultural consumption as detached from economic relations, 
quite the opposite. One of the central objectives of the GBCS is to demonstrate how 
culture and taste are bound up with class positions. Some of the earlier work of 
Savage and Le Roux et al. (2008) clearly shows empirically how cultural activity is still 
very much based on class position. Where some critiques of Savage et al. (2013), 
unjustifiably I believe, put them in the postmodern camp that overstates the de-
classing of culture, Savage criticises the Goldthorpe school for an approach that de-
cultures class (Bottero, 2005). His central argument in that respect is that the 
contemporary class structure cannot be comprehended by an occupation-based 
measure alone. Class divisions for Le Roux et al. (2008) are produced through the 
interplay of economic, cultural and social capital. They are naturally correlated to the 
different occupational spheres, but cannot solely be explained by them.  
                                                          
10 This is particular true for the web-based ‘Great British Class Calculator’. See: Atherton et 
al. (2013). 
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Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that in a Bourdieusian sense, differences in 
cultural consumption do not just reflect the hierarchical order; culture plays a key 
role in reproducing class differences. Bourdieu has a double understanding of culture 
and class as intertwined at the structural level, but also at the level of symbolic 
practice (Sommer Harrits, 2013). The culture-class-nexus will be further discussed 
throughout this thesis, at this point however, it needs to be pointed out that some of 
the critique of the GBCS from a Bourdieusian perspective appears to be concerned 
that Savage et al. (2013) largely remain at the descriptive level and pay too little 
attention to the function of culture in the reproduction of power. The clarifications 
of Savage et al. (2014) are very helpful in that context as they point to the divisions 
and economic differentiations that capitalism creates in a much more explicit way.  
One final point of contention that is worth exploring in the context of this chapter is 
the question of power. Bradley (2014) and Skeggs, on Thinking Allowed (2013f), 
criticise the GBCS for not adopting an understanding of class that, by being overly 
concerned with cultural aspects of class, ignores how classes are related to each 
other in terms of economic advantage and political power. Bradley (2014:430) argues 
that the ‘culture-led version of Bourdieu’ of Savage et al. (2013) underplays the 
economic inequalities that are still at the centre of the social structure. Class, 
according to Bradley (2014) needs to be understood as a relation and not a 
conglomeration of attributes. This critique clearly resonates with a Marxist 
understanding of class that attributes class differences and class conflict to the 
necessarily antagonistic class interests that are based on the respective roles in the 
production process. Skeggs, in similar vein, notes that power and exploitation are lost 
in the largely descriptive micro-analysis of the GBCS. Furthermore, Skeggs is critical 
of the omission of symbolic capital that is in Bourdieu's conception of class essential 
in explaining the way in which power is exercised and reproduced. Classes are related 
to each other in a hierarchical sense. This view is expressed by Skeggs (1997b:133) as 
follows:  
 
Class positions are not just relative forms in social space, they are 
institutionalized positions: the cultural capital of the middle class can offer 
substantial rewards in the labour market. 
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And later:  
 
I purposely choose to use the singular—‘working class’ or ‘middle class’ rather 
than ‘classes’—to make a political point. The use of the singular is to 
emphasize that class is about conflict, power and opposition rather than just 
sites of differences. I am aware that there are many different ways of being 
of either class but what is fundamental is not lifestyles or the numerous 
proliferations of distinctions (cf. Bourdieu, 1986) but the issue of access to 
material and cultural resources (Skeggs, 1997b:138). 
 
In this instance the disagreement between Savage et al. (2013) and their 
Bourdieusian and/or Marxist critics can, in my opinion, not just be explained by the 
embryonic state of the analysis, as Savage et al.'s (2014) clarifications also indicate a 
degree of disagreement with Skeggs' and Bradley's critique. Savage et al. (2014) make 
clear that classes only exist in relation to each other, and they insist that even 
referring to classes as classes (and not simply as groups or categories) indicates that 
they are structurally in conflict. However, Savage et al. (2014) argue that speaking of 
exploitation in a Marxist sense (in terms of surplus value) is difficult to operationalise 
and also slightly missing the point. Savage et al. (2014:7) therefore refer to 
‘mechanisms of accumulation’ that are not exclusively linked to the labour market. 
So classes are related in the sense that there are privileged or disadvantaged 
positions with regards to the accumulation of all forms of capital, but, according to 
Savage et al. (2014), it cannot be assumed that one class directly gains from the 
exploitation of another class. Again, the difference to the above discussed critique 
should not be overstated. Skeggs, Bradley as well as Savage et al. (2014) acknowledge 
that class position as well as the relating economic and cultural capital are key in the 
reproduction of power, the disagreement appears to concern the specific 
mechanisms of the process. The difference to the NC-SEC school are however more 
pronounced and of a more fundamental nature. Despite its foundation in 
employment relations, the conventional class analysis of Goldthorpe is not interested 
in exploitation and does not comprehend the respective classes as in structural 
conflict with each other. So despite appearing more compatible with orthodox 
Marxism (due to the central role employment plays in the definition of classes), 
culture-based class analyses that, like the mentioned examples, acknowledges the 
economic basis of social divisions can in fact be more helpful in exploring social and 
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economic inequalities and contemporary class conflict. Whereas postmodern 
thinkers claim that cultural consumption replaces class as a meaningful category, 
Bourdieusian class analysis explores the different dimension of their relatedness. To 
conclude this chapter, I now want to explore the relationship between economic and 
cultural aspects of inequality (and their connectedness) from one further perspective. 
 
2.6 Recognition vs. redistribution 
 
The relatedness of cultural and economic dimensions of inequality is at the very heart 
of the Bourdieusian concepts that centrally inform this thesis. However, at this point 
it is beneficial to make this linkage explicit, not least to demonstrate how the 
discussed conceptions of class relate to each other. Or, in other words, I intend to 
emphasise that contemporary class analysis that focuses on cultural dimensions of 
class cannot produce meaningful conceptions of difference and power if the material 
and the economic foundations of the class structure are overlooked or treated as 
secondary to cultural aspects. Nancy Fraser’s (1995) explorations of the different 
dimensions of injustice and her distinction between claims for recognition and claims 
for redistribution appear very useful in this context. Her conception of justice does 
not pit culture against economy, but convincingly demonstrates how both 
dimensions of social divisions are linked dialectically.  
For Fraser, misrecognition and misdistribution are sources of suffering that need to 
be distinguished analytically (Fowler, 2009). In contrast to Axel Honneth, whose 
extensive debate with Fraser does not need to be traced here (Fraser and Honneth, 
2004), Fraser is of the opinion that ‘the cultural’ is not just an expression of ‘the 
material’ and that both spheres need to be comprehended as linked, but 
distinguishable and not reducible to one another. For Honneth, (as cited in Fowler, 
2009:145) economic reward is an expression of ‘a deeper moral grammar’ and 
economic injustices are experienced first and foremost as misrecognition. Economic 
injustices are for Honneth largely perceived as a lack of social recognition (Lovell, 
2007). Fraser, in contrast, sees the danger that such a focus on recognition leads to a 
problematic understanding of inequality as being disconnected from economic 
structures. In her view, the turn to culture has led to a neglect of material 
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maldistributions. Debates around symbolic and cultural expressions of inequality 
have to a degree replaced debates around material and structural inequality.11 For 
Fraser (1995), this is particularly problematic as remedies for the respective types of 
injustice potentially interfere with each other, not least because their somewhat 
contradictory needs to acknowledge difference on the one side or to emphasise 
commonalities on the other side. So for Fraser there is, also in practical terms, the 
danger that politics of recognition supplants politics of redistribution.  
The relevance of this debate for the conception of social class is obvious. Identity or 
group identities supplant class interest and the struggle for cultural recognition 
replaces the fight against economic exploitation. Fraser’s concerns with identity 
politics are shared and developed further by other critical academics. Crompton and 
Scott (2005:200), for instance, see the battle for recognition as problematic, as its 
concern with identity resonates with the individualising tendencies of neoliberalism 
and therefore warn against the danger of ‘winning cultural battles but losing the class 
war’. In similar vein, McNay (2008) argues that if inequality is comprehended as a lack 
of recognition, it can easily be misunderstood in a solely interpersonal sense and as 
a psychological problem, open to therapeutic interventions. Furthermore, there is 
the danger of displacing political struggles into the realms of culture and to 
depoliticise oppression by only comprehending power differentials as (individually 
felt) pain and suffering. McNay (2008:10) states that ‘recognition claims derive their 
legitimacy from a certain sentimentalized discourse of suffering’. Of course, this 
constitutes a very narrow and (potentially) depoliticised interpretation of inequality 
and oppression. And, as Skeggs (2004) points out, not all underprivileged groups can, 
or even want to comprehend themselves as suffering, either because they regard 
their everyday experience as unexceptional or they lack access to arenas in which 
these discourses are played out. Skeggs (2004:59) summarises her view as follows:  
 
Identity politics has thus served to reinforce bourgeois individualism that 
renders some groups outside of the need of justice and places others at the 
centre of moral authorization.  
 
                                                          
11 Ironically (?), this happened in a period of escalating economic inequality. 
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So struggles for recognition that are detached from material inequalities can set up 
their own hierarchies of suffering that privilege some groups and exclude others. 
Structural inequalities and questions of class membership are therefore not 
necessarily part of discourses of suffering. Furthermore, as this research intends to 
demonstrate, access to public discourse and the arenas in which identity claims are 
negotiated is bound up with class position:  
 
... the working class (women and men, black and white) have always had 
restricted access to where these claims are most frequently made (Skeggs, 
1997b:127).  
 
Fraser (1995) adds to this that distributive injustice is not always felt as personal 
injury and shame and therefore is difficult to make sense of in discourses based on 
recognition claims alone (McNay, 2008).  
However, I would argue that it is important not to overstate these contradictions. 
Recognition and redistribution can be analytically distinguished, but in reality they 
very much tend to be connected and interwoven (Fowler, 2009). Sayer (2005), for 
instance, makes the point that egalitarian politics of redistribution require a 
recognition of the involved groups as of equal moral worth and therefore as equally 
deserving. Sayer (2005) does not go as far as Honneth and regards distribution as an 
expression of recognition, but clearly as its condition. He makes the very illuminating 
point that class inequality is not just reflected in unwarranted attributions, but also 
in unequal access to practices that generally result in respect and recognition. Again, 
the difference to Honneth’s argument becomes clear: recognition alone is not 
enough, as access to recognised practices is bound up with material inequalities. In 
contrast to ‘race-’ and gender-based differences for instance, Sayer (2005) argues 
that class differences cannot be resolved through recognition alone. Of course class, 
gender and race intersect and racism and sexism have economic and material 
dimensions, but I would agree with Sayer (2005) that possible remedies for the 
respective forms of inequality are of different qualities. Also Fraser (1995) argues that 
economic and cultural injustices form a vicious circle and tend to reinforce each other 
dialectically. Accordingly, redistributive remedies need to be regarded as legitimate 
and based on a degree of positive valuation or at least on the general 
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acknowledgement of principal deservedness, otherwise, there is the risk that 
redistributive remedies exacerbate misrecognition.12  
The complexities of the recognition vs. redistribution debate cannot be explored in 
its entire depth in this thesis, I will, however, come back to some aspects that are 
pertinent in the context of this research later by addressing some relevant and 
plausible points of critique levelled at Fraser and by relating Bourdieusian 
conceptions to the debate. In the context of this chapter the condensed summary of 
the central arguments of the debate shall suffice to establish the underlying basic 
assumption for the ensuing empirical analysis that acknowledges the 
interconnectedness of economic and cultural dimensions of (class) inequality.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
A sociological approach that promises to address the supposedly fundamental 
developments in the world of employment and the relating social developments is 
undoubtedly appealing. However, it is probably fair to say that much of the optimism 
concerning a postmodern, classless society, has evaporated in the last decade in the 
light of empirical evidence of the limits of social mobility and the general persistence 
of social inequality. If anything, the gap between the top and the bottom is widening 
(Ramesh, 2011), and educational achievement for instance is still largely determined 
by a person’s social background (Taylor, 2006). Empirical evidence to support the 
claim of a more egalitarian society, not only with regards to material distribution, 
seems scarce. It does indeed appear that the claimed 'death of class' was based on 
rather thin and selective evidence (Bottero, 2005). 
Postmodern sociology, as presented by the aforementioned authors, is to some 
extent aware of this, and therefore declares economic inequalities as of less 
relevance compared to cultural aspects of inequality. It is striking how partially 
Bourdieu’s findings are presented by Lash and Urry (1987) as well as Pakulski and 
                                                          
12 A rather obvious example would be state welfare that, if perceived as unjust and 
undeserved, can act to aggravate the stigmatisation of the poor. So cultural disrespect and 
economic disadvantage are inevitably linked. 
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Waters (1996). Whereas Bourdieu sees economic and cultural inequalities as two 
sides of the same coin, many postmodernists pit one against the other. Arguing that 
social classes lost significance due to indirect and non-economic forms of 
stratification and exclusion is in sharp contrast to Boudieu’s understanding of the 
social structure. Furthermore, the structural relationship between production and 
consumption is of great relevance to Bourdieu, but treated as almost non-existent by 
proponents of class analysis that is solely based on culture and consumption.13 
Nevertheless, the postmodern critique of the Marxist understanding of class poses 
some very relevant questions that can help to further contemporary class analysis. I 
hope to have shown how a Bourdieusian conception of the culture-class nexus can 
be useful in coming to terms with the structural and symbolic struggles in the 
economic and cultural sphere. Social inequality is structured by the distribution of 
material goods, but as Bourdieu shows, non-material manifestations of inequality 
cannot be ignored by contemporary class analysis.  
Class appears to be very much on the sociological agenda again, and despite the 
necessary critical interventions, the GBCS has invigorated very relevant debates 
around class and culture. The call of Savage et al. (2014) to focus on the extremes of 
the class spectrum has already been put into practice and some of the related 
contributions reached the mainstream of sociological publishing. Savage et al. (2014) 
convincingly make the point that in contemporary Britain, division in the middle play 
a less significant role than the cleavage between the elite and everybody else. The 
need to explore the extremes of the class spectrum is reflected in a wealth of 
publications that focus either on the elite, like for instance O. Jones (2014), or 
(ethnographic) explorations of people and communities living in precarious positions 
(e.g. McKenzie, 2015; Tyler, 2013; O'Hara, 2014). The popularity of these publications 
and the huge academic and also public interest in the GBCS clearly show that stating 
the ‘death of class’ was very premature.  
                                                          
13 That this issue is not even addressed on the superficial level of the position in the 
production process and the accordant financial means is rather telling and an indication 
that the mentioned authors do not necessarily have the poorer members of society in mind 
when declaring social groups as structured by choice through consumption. 
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As discussed, postmodernists stress the importance of (cultural) consumption for the 
formation of individual and collective identity and the cohesion of social groups. 
Research by Skeggs (1997a) and Walkerdine et al. (2001) for instance, indicates that 
this is largely true for their respective sample groups, although in a more serious, less 
playful way than alleged by postmodernists. Most proponents of contemporary class 
analysis acknowledge the importance of cultural consumption and representations. I 
therefore intend to explore how culture, taste and consumption are used as means 
of distinction and to what extent this is exercised as a conscious and deliberate 
choice. Furthermore, I will analyse how popular media representations of class are 
structured, how they repeat or challenge stereotypical images of social class and how 
their production is in itself shaped by contemporary social inequalities.  
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3. Literature Review / Grasping class  
 
In this chapter, I will review studies that use a Bourdieusian framework to explore 
matters of class and in particular representations of class. I will cluster the arguments 
around the central Bourdieusian concepts of habitus, doxa and symbolic violence as 
these will, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, inform my analysis of classed 
representations and their social and political context. The purpose of this literature 
review is to provide an overview of the relevant research and to define my research 
question more specifically. However, this literature review is by no means 
comprehensive and I will refer to further relevant empirical studies and theoretical 
concepts in the ensuing chapters. By, for now, focussing on the most seminal studies, 
I want to explore the most pertinent themes relevant to my research area. This rather 
compact literature review is meant to introduce theory and to identify areas that this 
thesis can add to. 
 
3.1 Bourdieusian Theory 
 
Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus offers a way of coming to terms with the 
complexity and the different facets, nuances and dimensions of social class. Bourdieu 
frames class as a social phenomenon with very real, palpable, individual and social 
implications. Indeed, he goes one step further and attempts to bridge the dualism of 
‘the individual’ vs. ‘the social’ as well as the supposed polarity of a sociological 
understanding of class versus an (individual-)psychological understanding of class. 
Habitus can be comprehended as the internalisation of social structures. Despite this 
psychoanalytic dimension, the formation of the habitus is for Bourdieu a collective as 
well as a reciprocal process (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992).  
Bourdieu aims to challenge the dichotomy between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ or ‘individual’ 
and ‘social’, but does so without damaging the analytical integrity of structure and 
agency (Maton, 2008). Bourdieu accepts that, for analytical purposes at least, 
structure and agency can be treated as separate entities, but encourages social 
research to relate the two terms to each other. Accordingly, it makes little sense to 
talk about the habitus in isolation, i.e. without talking about the relating field at the 
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same time. Doing so would ‘fetishize’ (Maton, 2008:61) the habitus and ultimately 
reduce it to a rather detached, superficial and ahistorical analysis of habits. Bourdieu 
suggests a relational mode of thinking that links visible empirical practice to 
underlying structural and structuring principles. Reay (2004) therefore concludes, 
that using the concept of habitus as a research tool necessarily encourages a rather 
broad focus that relates individual behaviour, attitudes etc. to social structures. The 
social actor is free to make his choices, but the context of these choices is predefined 
by classed (and gendered) relations.  
These constraints are however not usually evident to the individual. On the contrary, 
they tend to be perceived as normal and therefore not open to conscious analysis. 
Shared, but nevertheless class and gender specific ‘assumptions that “go without 
saying” determine the limits of the doable and the thinkable’ (Maton, 2008:59). The 
habitus can consequently not be seen as a concept solely referring to conscious, 
intellectual aspects of human existence. Habitus should rather be understood as 
‘embodied’ – a way of acting as well as thinking and feeling. Hence, habitus informs 
practice not in a direct, straightforward fashion, but as implicit knowledge of what is 
appropriate and not, as ‘practical mastery‘ (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991) or, as a 
‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1990b:61). Again, Bourdieu neither regards the 
respective (class) habitus as essential nor as natural, but as conditioned by an 
arbitrary social structure. Finally, it should be mentioned, that Bourdieu 
acknowledges the possibility of individuals and collectives to transcend the social 
conditions under which their habitus was formed. The dynamic and reciprocal 
relations of structure and agency allows for this possibility. 
All this makes the habitus a rather broad, one could even say messy, concept. 
However, Reay (2004) argues that it is exactly this indetermacy that makes the 
concept of habitus a very appropriate tool to explore the complex messiness of the 
real world.14 In the following, I want to discuss attempts to translate the messy 
concept of habitus into research practice. 
                                                          
14 Habitus as a concept clearly does a lot of work in Bourdieu’s theory of the social world by 
drawing together a number of highly complex ideas – from psychoanalytical internalisation 
to the possibility for social change. How the ‘outer’ becomes the ‘inner’ is at its core, just as 
much as how the ‘upper’ rises and remains above the ‘lower’. But at the same time Bourdieu 
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3.2 Research Practice 
 
Despite the discussed contestation to the contrary, class remains a meaningful and 
powerful category for the way people make sense of the social world and their own 
place in it. This however happens not in a straightforward and contradiction free 
fashion. Boundaries appear to be more fluid or at least more contested and the 
traditional Marxist distinction between ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’ seems ever 
more relevant (see chapter two).  
 
3.2.1 Habitus 
 
A number of relatively recent empirical studies confirm that class is a meaningful 
concept, that is not easily talked about. Savage (2001) points to the ambivalence of 
contemporary class identities. His findings confirm a continuing acknowledgement of 
class as a relevant category and a readiness to identify oneself in class terms. 
However, Savage (2001) also states that the majority of the respondents in his study 
preferred to talk about class as a category ‘out there’ and felt less comfortable to talk 
about how their own lives were influenced by class membership. Class is a very 
ambivalent, emotionally charged concept that is, in a wider sense, political, as well as 
loaded with meaning and normativity. Savage (2001) concludes that class identities 
are generally rather weak, which however does not suggest that class ceased to 
matter to his interviewees. On the contrary, the acknowledgement that social class 
is of significance combined with the reluctance to discuss social class on a personal 
level might point to the complexity and emotional ambivalence of class in 
contemporary Britain rather than to the alleged anachronism of the concept. From a 
Bourdieusian perspective, it can be questioned whether the concept of ‘identity’ is 
best suited to grasp the social character as well as the different layers and dimensions 
on which class is played out. The habitus concept goes well beyond (conscious) self-
concepts and cannot be easily equated with the idea of individualised identity 
                                                          
accounts for the possibility of the ‘inner’ shaping the ‘outer’ and the ‘lower’ challenging the 
‘higher’. 
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formation (Wagner and McLaughlin, 2015). Equally, I would challenge Savage’s 
conclusion that the tendency of his participants to present themselves as ‘ordinary’ 
(as opposed to ‘distinct’) necessarily contradicts Bourdieu. Leaving the possibility of 
a skewed sample aside15, I would argue that it is exactly the normalisation of middle 
class lifestyles that creates divisions and ultimately distinctions. The wish to appear 
‘ordinary’ can in itself be seen as a way of distancing oneself from those excluded 
from the ordinariness of social mainstream. I will return to the normativity of 
normalised middle-classness later, but clearly, what Bourdieu means with habitus 
cannot solely be understood as conscious identification with one’s respective class.  
As Skeggs (1997a) points out, and Savage (2001) acknowledges, the dis-identification 
with class proves the continual power and relevance of the concept. In her 
longitudinal study with girls and women in the caring profession, she finds a general 
refusal to be regarded and judged in class terms. Indeed, a majority of the 
participants make a conscious effort not to be identifiable as working-class. Whereas 
the existence of different classes is widely accepted, classifications are resisted on a 
personal level. This refusal or resistance strongly indicates that class plays a role in 
the lives of the young women in Skeggs’ study. Class clearly informs their identity 
formation, but, as Skeggs (1997a) emphasises, class position and class identity are 
not the same. There is not necessarily a fit between position and disposition. The 
resistance to (self-)identification in class terms is for the participants in Skeggs’ 
(1997a) study a consequence of hierarchical order of different types of habitus and 
their own experiences of the ever present social order and power relations. Similar 
to Savage’s (2001) findings, class is more easily talked about in others16. Nevertheless, 
class is lived, despite, in some quarters, being rejected as a category and despite the 
difficulty to verbally define and express its essence. Skeggs (1997a) argues that 
Bourdieu does not sufficiently account for the possibility of resistance to labelling, 
hierarchisation and judgement. The possible underlying reasons for this refusal can 
however in my opinion very well be analysed within a Bourdieusian framework. 
                                                          
15 Chorlton, Cheadle, Wilmslow and Ramsbottom, the areas where the research was 
conducted, are hardly representative of the North West of England, the area where the 
study locates itself. 
 
16 not least because of the contradictions that, as experienced by many of the participants, 
inevitably occur when attempting to pass as middle-class. 
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Exactly the widely differing valuations of the respective forms of habitus, and the 
according lack of a positive discourse around (female) working-class identity for 
instance, are likely to play a role. This argument will be further developed later in 
connection with the resulting symbolic violence.  
The overall economic trend over the last two decades of ever widening income gaps 
(Ramesh, 2011) seems generally strangely overlooked in contemporary debates 
about class, despite not being a very recent phenomenon. Reay (1998) refers to the 
growing inequalities in the area of paid work when stating that the economic class 
structure in the UK is increasingly polarised. In her study of mothers of different class 
backgrounds, she illustrates how class shapes the subjectivity of her participants and 
influences their actions and attitudes. Reay (1998) concludes that class is central to 
people’s lives and to the way they make sense of the world. Whether people identify 
themselves in class terms or not, they tend to use the concept of social class to locate 
and position themselves as well as others. Class is ‘powerfully internalised and 
continually played out in interactions with others’ (Reay, 1998:265). Reay (1998) 
emphasises that class is not only a social, political and theoretical concept, class is 
‘done’, it is lived and performed on a daily basis and shapes attitudes and practice. 
Acknowledging this is not meant to essentialise class but to advocate a broader 
understanding of class along Bourdieusian lines. Habitus incorporates psychological 
aspects and the psychoanalytical concept of internalisation without psychologising 
social class. Haylett (2003) describes the dialectical nature of the habitus as produced 
by divisions in society and at the same time reproducing those divisions. Class is, for 
her, as it is for Bourdieu, a ‘matter of embodied social practice’ (Haylett, 2003:62). 
Bourdieu follows the Marxist premise that classes must be understood as relational 
and therefore cannot be comprehended in isolation. Inequalities between social 
groups and the according power structures are reflected in the habitus. As Lawler 
(2004:113) points out, the habitus explains how the social is incorporated and 
therefore the habitus is a tool to analyse how the central social inequalities ‘are made 
to inhere within the person’. Again, this is not to say that this is a straightforward, 
inevitable and unopposable process. However, as Lawler (2004) adds, the possibility 
to resist does exist, but not for every individual to the same extent. For Bourdieu 
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(1984a), class is less about choices or conscious identity and more about inequalities 
and divisions and those are reflected in the habitus.  
Walkerdine et al. (2001) examine the myriad of everyday manifestations of class in 
the lives of female teenagers. Similar to the aforementioned authors, they 
acknowledge the multiple levels on which class is played out. Furthermore, they 
discuss how sensitive their participants were to signifiers of social class. Difference is 
produced and (involuntarily) displayed through accents, style, housing etc. The girls 
in this study were very competent in sensing these ‘micro-distinctions’. But not only 
that, they also were perfectly aware of the (implicit) social hierarchy and therefore 
able to precisely judge the value of the respective expressions. Of course, this process 
is, for young people maybe in particular, emotionally charged and potentially a 
source of great concern and anxiety. If class positions are seen as easily identifiable, 
each individual is under constant scrutiny and the object of social projections and 
judgements. Walkerdine et al. (2001) point out that subjectifications of class not only 
influence conscious thoughts, but also desires, wishes and anxieties. These valuable 
insights can, in my opinion, help us to come to terms with questions of subordination 
and resistance. Again, I do not regard class mainly as a psychological concern, but as 
one that goes way beyond economic inequalities. Finally, Walkerdine et al. (2001) 
make the point that as much as class is naturally a collective concept, in the 
understanding of their participants, (class related) classifications were made based 
on the characteristics of the individual person. Accordingly, it was the individual that 
was being rated and judged. And, as Tyler (2008) adds, this judgement is often 
emotionally mediated. 
Looking at class from a Bourdieusian perspective clearly suggests a rather broad 
interpretation of the concept. Class forms identity beyond conscious affiliations and 
political attitudes. Therefore, I prefer the term ‘class habitus’ to the term ‘class 
identity’ as the former points to a more comprehensive understanding of class. 
Habitus includes very relevant unconscious elements of classed being, and also 
examines the dialectical relation between the material reality and (unconsciously 
formed) attitudes.17 This way of thinking appears very much confirmed by the pieces 
                                                          
17 Bourdieu (1984a:471) illustrates this nexus with the example of perceived limits and 
confined expectations; through the process of internalisation ‘social divisions become 
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of research discussed above. ‘Knowing one’s place’ (within a hierarchical structure) 
was a theme that showed in most of the mentioned studies.18 Thinking ‘habitus’ 
instead of ‘identity’ brings into focus processes of domination and in particular their 
invisibility.  
Finally, I would argue that habitus, as abstract and overly complex as it might appear, 
is a concept that research can successfully fill with life. After all, social class is, and I 
would say that the research previously outlined clearly illustrates this, a lived 
concept. Despite having been declared dead for a while now, class is still very much 
an idea people can relate to. Questions of class are debated as well as experienced 
and for all their alleged irrelevance still very much a topic of great intellectual and 
emotional engagement. Using the concept of habitus can help to come to terms with 
these complexities and grasp the (inseparable) individual and social dimensions of 
class. 
In the following, I will turn to representations of social class in popular media. Again, 
I will use Bourdieusian concepts to structure the review of the relevant literature. 
Whereas ‘doxa’ will functions as a point of reference for the analysis of the content 
of (classed) media representations, ‘symbolic violence’ will inform reflections on the 
logic of media production, which mirror the highly unequal distribution of economic 
and political power within society. In the following, I intend to identify general 
themes that run through the cited studies of media representations of social class. 
 
 
                                                          
principles of division’. The perception of the social world is shaped by mental structures 
that are themselves greatly influenced by the (power) structure of the social world. 
Therefore, social realities, like the unequal distribution of power, for example, appear 
natural or self-evident. This means that dominated social actors perceive their role as 
justified, or as Bourdieu puts it, the ‘embodiment of the objective laws’ results in 
individuals ‘adjusting their expectations to their chances, defining themselves as the 
objective order defines them’ (Bourdieu, 1984a:471). 
 
18 As Walkerdine et al. (2001) point out, this applies to members of the middle-class as well, 
who are faced with specific (more prestigious, but possibly equally limiting) expectations. 
Positions of privilege are accordingly expected to be upheld and reproduced similar to 
positions of exclusion and submission. 
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3.2.2 Doxa 
 
Bourdieu uses the term doxa to address shared assumptions that tend to be absent 
from public discourse. As I have discussed above in connection with the habitus 
concept, this has largely to do with the perceived universality and ordinariness of 
these phenomena. Doxa, as a central element of the habitus, describes unscrutinised, 
even unconscious knowledge that is based on the (individual and collective) 
experience of social actors in the respective fields. Doxa describes a set of 
assumptions of a specific epoch, a reality that ‘goes unanimously unquestioned 
because it lies beyond any notion of enquiry’ (Deer, 2008:120). Despite referring to 
specific fields, those assumptions can have a very high degree of authority and 
general acceptance beyond the boundaries of the individual field. This is, for obvious 
reasons, particularly true for the media field as its explicit purpose is to be heard and 
to exert influence. Apart from that, I would argue, doxa is a very suitable framework 
for the analysis of class bias in popular media as class is only rarely talked about 
directly. The pieces of research that will be discussed shortly confirm that 
assumptions about social class tend to be picked-up, repeated and reinforced in 
popular media, but are rarely talked about explicitly, let alone challenged. Research 
along Bourdieusian lines should therefore open up the ‘the universe of that which is 
undiscussed’ (Bourdieu, 1977:170) for scrutiny and to question its implicit 
assumptions.  
Broadly speaking, an analysis of representations of social class in popular media, and 
Reality TV in particular, shows a marked difference between middle-class and 
working-class representations. Difference is generally conveyed implicitly and not put 
into larger social contexts, but are generally portrayed and discussed on an individual 
level. As Lawler (2005:437) points out, social factors, let alone questions of hierarchy 
or power, tend to be absent from the portrayal of supposedly problematic behaviour 
of working-class people, which is instead presented ‘as the outcome of individual and 
family pathology’. Middle-class representations tend to be equally individualised 
albeit with a different angle. As Walkerdine (2003) notes, the aspiring, upward mobile 
middle-class subject forms an ideal image for the new labour market. This image of 
modern middle-class professionals emphasises and promotes reflexivity and 
skilfulness (Skeggs, 2009) which are acquired by the middle-class subject on their 
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individual journey, driven by the intrinsic motivation for self-improvement. Agency 
tends to be ascribed much more to the middle-class subject who, in stark contrast to 
their working-class counterpart, successfully takes on the task of self-management. 
Skeggs (2004) adds that it is generally only middle-class subjects whose ‘life stories’ 
portray them as reflexive and in control of their destiny whereas working-class people 
are presented as not able to reach similar psychological depths or degrees of control. 
Those stereotypical accounts justify and reinforce ‘the division of society into those 
who can speak, act, feel and those who are “spoken for”’ (Tyler, 2008:32). 
Skeggs and Wood (2012b) show that class inequality offers a convenient shortcut to 
conflict-laden and entertaining narratives, and that exactly these predictable and 
stereotypical narratives reinforce doxic beliefs. Therefore, media productions need 
not have a specific political agenda to effectively influence public opinion. Exactly the 
absence of (politically informed) critique of ideological conditions lends doxic beliefs 
their potency. 
A common focal point for class distinctions is the notion of mobility. Whereas 
working-class subjects are portrayed as inflexible and fixed, both in terms of social 
position and actual physical space, middle-class subjects are portrayed as aspiring, 
intellectually flexible and cosmopolitan (Skeggs, 2004). This can be regarded as 
particularly cynical, because, as Skeggs (2004) further points out, the ability to move, 
connect or withdraw is closely related to economic factors, and control over one’s 
mobility is not equally granted to all members of society. Mobility is portrayed as a 
generally desirable good without further debate.  
Another area of discourse in which the working class is depicted as backward and a 
barrier to progress is the discourse around racism and multiculturalism. Bonnet 
(1998) shows how whiteness is not a fixed category, but historically variable and 
constantly developing in the context of wider social and economic conditions. He 
warns against drawing parallels with US-American developments too freely, and 
therefore ‘White Trash’ and ‘white working-class’ cannot be used interchangeably, 
but both expressions indicate that white identities have (changing) class 
connotations. Haylett (2001) points to the interesting contradiction that despite the 
fact that multiculturalism is predominantly lived in working-class areas, white 
working-class culture is routinely portrayed as intrinsically racist. Therefore, the 
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white working class is seen as in conflict with the modern capitalist project of equality 
and multiculturalism and as a symbol of backwardness. For the context of this study, 
this is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, discourses around multiculturalism cement 
the supposed moral superiority of middle-class liberalism (Haylett, 2001) and 
secondly, the racialised othering of the white working class helps to uphold the 
notion of an inclusive society. In a sense, the perceived failing of the white working 
class supposedly proves that race and ethnicity ceased to matter and that the 
increasingly severe economic inequalities are not down to (ethnic) privilege, but 
merit. 
When collective explanations enter the discourse, it is generally not in relation to 
economic or social inequalities, but with regards to matters of culture. Haylett (2003) 
shows for example how the political and economic condition of unemployment is 
reframed as ‘worklessness’ and hence portrayed as a cultural rather than economic 
characteristic. However, not only unemployment, but also poverty in general is 
construed as a predominantly cultural matter and as caused by certain traits of those 
living in poverty (e.g. violence, lack of striving, family instability etc.). A curtailed, and 
ultimately distorted, interpretation of Bourdieu’s forms of capital is, as I would add, 
often (mis-)used to seemingly substantiate arguments along these lines. In particular, 
when social security is talked about, a normative distinction between the deserving 
poor and the undeserving or the ‘underclass’ is generally suggested (Haylett, 2001). 
Benefit recipients are portrayed as excluded from mainstream society and therefore 
fundamentally culturally different. Here, media representations fall back on an 
outdated discourses of ‘poor culture’. Accordingly, it is, as Skeggs (2004:80) points 
out, not structural inequalities that are to blame for social ills, but an ‘individualised 
form of cultural inadequacy’. Consequently, possible remedies are social integration 
and education rather than economic redistribution.  
I finally want to mention one more, overarching tendency of class representation in 
popular media; as I have already alluded to, middle-class experiences and lifestyle are 
generally conceptualised as norm-setting (Reay, 1998). The above described aspects 
of class representations (aspiration, self-management, multiculturalism etc.) are 
emotionally and morally loaded categories and tend to be presented accordingly, 
hence increasing their authoritativeness. This development, as Savage (2003:536) 
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points out, is embedded in a wider societal trend that resulted in the middle class 
becoming the ‘particular-universal’ class; a particular class whose practices came to 
be accepted as universally binding. Accordingly, only some types of performing 
selves, those resembling the ideal type of a middle-class self, are positively valued 
(Skeggs, 2009). From a Bourdieusian perspective, this is probably not surprising, as 
Bourdieu identifies a clear hierarchy of different forms of habitus. What is remarkable 
however, is that Reality TV in particular appears to have taken the distinction 
between high and low culture a step further by suggesting a generally desirable 
lifestyle and demanding assimilation to a normalised middle-class style. Ironically, or 
perfidiously, attempts by people with working-class backgrounds to pass as middle 
class are mocked as pretentiousness (Lawler, 2005). This follows, according to Lawler 
(2005), the peculiar logic of the identity formation of social groups. As she 
demonstrates, representations of social class are less about actual distinct forms of 
behaving or about lifestyles, but first and foremost about creating difference and a 
system of inclusion and exclusion (Lawler, 2005). The middle class ascertains its 
identity and its position of relative power by othering the working class as not just 
below normalised middle-class ways of thinking and doing, but by excluding the 
working class from the societal mainstream altogether. The doxic character of this 
process is summed up by Lawler (2005:438):  
  
Indeed, contemporary ‘public’ representations seem to be marked by a 
notable lack of reflexivity, and there is virtually no real problematization of a 
normative and normalized middle-class position (emphases in original) 
 
To conclude, class relations, inevitably, still very much inform contemporary media 
production. Be it as a cheap and easy way to produce narratives of conflict or as a 
way of judging allegedly despicable behaviour. Normalised middle class-culture is 
routinely contrasted with a working-class culture supposedly in need of 
improvement. Interestingly, these debates, as much as they are about social and 
cultural phenomena, are almost always played out on the individual level. As Skeggs 
(1997a) rightly points out, these discourses of individualism are in the interest of the 
powerful. Privilege is not part of this debate, and therefore social status, wealth etc. 
has to be understood as individual achievement. The hierarchical order of social class 
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clearly informs class representations, but does so in a very intransparent way. Exactly 
therein lies the doxic nature of class representations. The normativity of normalised 
middle-class lifestyles and the fundamental arbitrariness of this attribution are not 
part of the media discourse. What is under scrutiny is individual behaviour that is 
informed by an allegedly deficient culture, but only remotely, if at all, by economic 
and social inequalities and exploitation. Class representations recreate doxic beliefs 
regarding the social structure and, by and large, do not challenge their foundation.  
 
3.2.3 Symbolic violence 
 
Having discussed aspects of class representations in terms of content, I will now turn 
to underlying structures as well as possible effects of classed media portrayals. 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991) uses the term symbolic violence to refer 
to public discourses that fail to acknowledge the unequal distribution of power within 
society. Accordingly, violence is done to those without power, whose suppression is 
not recognised or is even portrayed as justified and the natural order of things. These 
doxic beliefs favour the powerful. As I have explored these hidden mechanisms in the 
context of habitus and doxa, I will now focus more specifically on how this insight can 
be applied to the structure of the media field.  
Bourdieu unambiguously states that relations of communication are always power 
relations and that the different social classes continually fight out a symbolic struggle 
over the definition of the social world (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991). At stake are 
interpretations of the social world that are best suited to the interests of the 
respective classes as well as the legitimacy of (symbolic) violence. The channels of 
this discourse owe their credibility to the fact that the way they are shaped by 
relations of power is generally not recognised (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991).19 The 
argument that power structures can be upheld because they are not perceived as 
such, runs through much of Bourdieu’s writing and he also applies this reasoning to 
the media field. Popular media are instrumental to the authority of symbolic power 
by ‘constituting the given’, by ‘making people see and believe’ (Bourdieu and 
                                                          
19 Were popular media mainly understood as a tool in the class war of the privileged against 
the oppressed, they quickly would cease to be popular media. 
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Thompson, 1991:170) and ultimately by bringing about or preventing social change. 
The media’s role in all this, or more precisely their partiality, is only rarely discussed. 
 
3.2.3.1 Misrecognition  
 
A central aspect of the misrecognition of power relations in contemporary media 
products is that social class is very much an issue, but very rarely talked about 
explicitly. Some sub-genres of reality television almost exclusively feature working-
class people or exploit conflicts that arise through class differences (Tyler, 2008), but, 
as I have already outlined, do so without mentioning class, let alone relational aspects 
or wider social and political implications of inequality. Lawler (2004), using Bourdieu’s 
habitus model, states that class is still very relevant and visible in representations of 
the social world, but routinely displaced. What is a social, collective and political 
concept is reduced to characteristics of individuals or families. Exactly in this 
individualisation of the social lies the doxic nature of class representations. As Reay 
(1998) point out, this alleged ‘classlessness’ is part of the class struggle. Individualistic 
discourses tend to obscure power relations. I do not want to imply that this is part of 
a wider conspiracy or that there is an over-arching ‘hidden agenda’ of the media field, 
but there seems to be a clear tendency to present social class in a depoliticised 
manner and this constitutes symbolic violence in a Bourdieusian sense. The omission 
of class from public discourse and the according delegitimation of class as a relevant 
concept plays into the hands of those who benefit from an unequal distribution of 
wealth and power. Representations are therefore political in their content and their 
effect and hence should be seen in the context of class struggles.  
Class formation is a continuous, dynamic process that not least takes place on the 
level of the symbolic. The classed self is formed under the influence of popular 
representations and discourses of inclusion and exclusion (Skeggs, 2004). What is, 
somewhat misleadingly, called Reality TV does not portray social realities, ‘but is 
fundamentally constitutive of contemporary social life’ (Tyler, 2012:212). Class 
identities as well as class relations are influenced by the normative persuasiveness of 
cultural production in general and Reality TV in particular.  
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3.2.3.2 Judgment & taste 
 
A central mechanism that produces normativity is the, at least in the realm of Reality 
TV, ever-present judgment. There appears to be a doxic consent that popular media 
products have the remit to pass judgment and can do so with a great degree of 
authority. As Couldry (2012:37) points out with reference to Reality TV, judging is 
done by experts and viewers alike, but is carried out in a persuasive, yet intransparent 
way as judgment in Reality TV is ‘doubly mystified’. Firstly, because the foundations 
of these judgments are not openly declared and secondly, because the relevance and 
the validity of these judgments are portrayed as not limited to the specific context of 
Reality TV, but to be of general authority. What Couldry (2012) also makes clear is 
that the described judging has a clear class bias. Class differences are not challenged, 
but reinforced, as it is usually working-class participants who are judged by middle-
class experts who apply middle-class norms. This not only generalises (class-)specific 
norms, but also legitimises the hierarchical order that puts the members of different 
classes in their respective positions. The working class are therefore always subject 
to judgment, not only as differing, but as inferior (Skeggs, 1997a). As I have already 
discussed, classed judgment is often based on matters of taste, which Bourdieu 
(1984a:511) expresses as follows:  
 
If there is any terrorism, it is the peremptory verdicts which, in the name of 
taste, condemn to ridicule, indignity, shame, silence … , men and women who 
simply fall short, in the eyes of their judges, of the right way of being and 
doing.  
 
Representations and their associated judgments attribute value to individuals as well 
as classes and define specific cultures as worth having or not worth having (Skeggs, 
2004). Through the mechanism of taste, class positions become charged with 
normative valuations. Those norms are however not agreed upon democratically, but 
to a great degree set by those in positions of influence and power and therefore 
middle-class norms tend to be binding and authoritative. Class, from a psychological 
point of view, can be seen as a category that regulates normality and pathology 
(Walkerdine, 1996). As much as this is a wider social process, media representations 
tend to focus on the individual, so again it is individual behaviour and individual 
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characteristics that are approved or disapproved, normalised or pathologised 
(Lawler, 2004). 
 
3.2.3.3 Control & access 
 
When exploring the symbolic violence that occurs in popular media, questions of 
access and control need to be discussed. Who gets to speak and who is denied a 
voice? Walkerdine (1996:356) therefore rightly asks why it is that ‘everything ever 
written about class is always targeting one class, (usually written by the other)’. 
Hence, she goes on to suggest that media portrayals of the working class tell us more 
about bourgeois fantasies of the working class than about actual working-class 
subjectivity. The working class rarely get to choose the settings, topics and contexts 
in which they are expected to position themselves (Reay, 1998). The media sphere 
mirrors the power distribution in the wider social world by granting privileged access 
to those already in a position of (relative) power (Couldry, 2012). Accordingly, 
working-class people are vastly underrepresented in the media industry and, because 
of that, the production of representations of working class culture usually do not 
happen in conditions of their protagonists’ choosing (Skeggs, 2004). 
Therefore, working-class people tend not to be in control, but rather the object of 
classed representations.20 The editing as well as the specific context, in which Reality 
TV participants are asked to perform, is beyond their control (Skeggs and Wood, 
2012b).21  
Bourdieu (as cited in Couldry, 2003:15) argues that the increasingly open access to 
television is offset by what he calls ‘a powerful censorship, a loss of independence 
linked to the conditions imposed on those who speak on television’. Modes of 
ownerships, outside influences as well as the working conditions in the media field 
                                                          
20 Tyler (2012) for instance illustrates the lack of control of participants of a particular 
Reality TV programme have over the editorial process. 
 
21 Empirical findings in both of the aforementioned studies confirm that participants felt 
controlled and instrumentalised during the filming and not happy with the aired 
programmes. Furthermore, and that might well be the most significant aspect, they felt 
that they were not in a position to enforce their objections. 
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shape its output. Bourdieu substantiates these claims with empirical examples from 
the French media industry. I will expand on the above listed axiomatic assumptions 
and discuss whether they translate into the contemporary British context in chapter 
six of this thesis.  
I would argue that the, in class terms, massively skewed composition of people 
working in the media field goes a long way to explain its prevailing class bias. Middle-
class norms may to a large extent be the yardstick everything and everyone is 
measured against, mainly due to middle-class writers, producers etc. never having 
experienced anything else and hence taking them for granted. As I have alluded to 
earlier, there are indications that common narratives that portray society in a 
stereotypical way are repeated due to a lack of originality or complacency and 
possibly less due to an intentional political project to vilify the working class. 
Problematic in this context is, however, the lack of a powerful and influential counter 
discourse that offers a different (class) perspective. This, at this point somewhat 
speculative, assumption will be further discussed and substantiated in chapter six. 
 
3.2.3.4 Exploitation 
 
Being vastly underrepresented behind the scenes and being rarely in positions of 
influence, does not mean that the working class is absent from the television screens. 
To the contrary, as I have mentioned earlier, whole subgenres of Reality TV almost 
exclusively feature working-class people. Working-class subjects are therefore, 
arguably in a rather limited and limiting context, very much present and integral part 
of the shared cultural imagination (Haylett, 2003).22 Working-class characters are 
utilised to speak emotions in a way that would not be plausible for characters guided 
by the restraint of middles-class norms (Skeggs, 2004). The portrayal of the working 
class in popular media therefore does not only serve to validate and mark-off the 
middle-class, but also to entertain. 
                                                          
22 It is also probably no coincidence that the longest running and most popular British soap 
operas are set in working-class areas. 
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This entertainment aspect can of course be seen critically, in particular if the lack of 
control of the portrayed subjects is taken into account. Reality based entertainment 
programmes have to face up to the charge of exploiting their subjects. Walkerdine 
(2012:229) states that ‘reality television works on emotion, affect and intimacy’ and 
one could add that this happens on both sides of the screen as emotional reactions 
are provoked from the participants and the viewers alike. As discussed before, in 
Reality TV programmes social problems tend to be individualised and treated as 
predominantly matters of (individual) education and culture and presented as 
emotionally charged game-like challenges (Couldry, 2012). At the heart of those 
Reality TV narratives is often the, supposedly evident and hence unquestioned, need 
for self-betterment.  
Popular class representations recreate class narratives and exploit (staged) conflicts 
that arise due to differences in terms of cultural capitals (Wood and Skeggs, 2004). 
Class conflicts offer easy, convenient and predictable narratives. A host of reality 
based TV programmes is based on these conflicts. Again, middle-class values are the 
unspoken norm participants have to aspire to. Class differences frame normative 
challenges that put participants of Reality TV shows or chat shows on the spot by 
offering (morally charged) choices and the opportunity to redeem themselves (Wood 
and Skeggs, 2004). Making the right choices, of course an individual, psychological 
process, offers a way to transcend one’s actual class position. 
It could be argued that reality-based TV genres have to some extent opened up and 
democratised access to means of mass communication. As the discussed pieces of 
research confirm, there is however plenty of evidence that suggests that this access 
is a rather limited one and that working-class subjects generally are only granted 
access to discourses and in conditions not of their own choosing. There is generally 
little to no debate over the authority and validity of middle-class norms. This lack of 
openness (both in terms of access and discourse) renders many representations of 
the working class in popular media exploitative.  
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3.3 Conclusion 
 
Bourdieu is very clear that symbolic violence and power are closely linked to non-
symbolic, actual violence and power. Symbolic struggles are fought over the 
legitimacy of power structures and their means of enforcement. 
As the pieces of research discussed here indicate, media representations of social 
class pick up common stereotypes and only rarely aim to challenge them. According 
to Bourdieu, the reasons for these unimaginative narratives are rooted in specific 
mechanisms of the media industry. Repeating ‘received ideas’ (Bourdieu cited in 
Couldry, 2003:29) makes programmes accessible as viewers roughly know what to 
expect. Furthermore, programmes that follow tried and tested paths are faster, 
easier and cheaper to produce and therefore suit the high pressure of the production 
process very well. Unsurprisingly, Bourdieu (as cited in Couldry, 2003:29), is very 
critical of programmes that just repeat clichés about the social world: ‘The exchange 
of commonplaces is communication with no content other than the fact of 
communication itself’. Media output becomes an end in itself – airwaves need to be 
filled. 
Nevertheless, Bourdieu does not conclude that media output is a benign, ultimately 
self-serving enterprise. As much as he aims to analyse how specific (working) 
conditions and economic pressures shape media production, as much is he interested 
in their effects – intended and non-intended. The above discussed imperative of 
mainstream televisions programmes to dumb down the discourse of complex social 
issues, leads to superficial analyses and judgements:  
 
Our news anchors, our talk show hosts, and our sport announcers have turned 
into two-bit spiritual guides, representatives of middle-class morality 
(Bourdieu cited in Couldry, 2003:46).  
 
Moreover, Bourdieu is critical of the tendency to individualise social issues as this 
depoliticises a discourse that needs to take place not (only) on an individual, but on 
a more global, social and political level.  
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The ideological effect of classed representation is first and foremost that they 
produce normativity and moral value. They legitimise one class position and vilify the 
other. The discourse of class itself is challenged by individualising narratives that 
portray class as nothing but an individual responsibility. Class becomes a label and a 
means of social regulation (Walkerdine, 2003). As several of the discussed empirical 
examples confirm, representations of class assign roles. With regards to Reality TV, 
these are often the roles of the judge and the judged (Couldry, 2012). This attribution 
of power and value might not necessarily follow a political agenda, but, as the 
discussed analyses suggest, has the ideological outcome of reinforcing social divisions 
and hierarchies. Symbolic struggles can become institutionalised through policy. 
Popular media discourses inform political discourse and, in some cases, policy 
making. Of course, this relationship is reciprocal and rather complex, but, from a 
Bourdieusian point of view, symbolic struggles, most powerfully fought out in the 
media field, are of significance in the political process.  
Bourdieu (1977) is rather sceptical about the idea of an overarching ideological 
apparatus that directly controls the media sphere and, similar to Althusser (2001), he 
grants the relating institutions a degree of independence. Bourdieu regards ideology 
as working in a rather indirect way. Ideological beliefs that are best suited to the 
interest of the dominant class are not conveyed as purposeful political indoctrination, 
but more as the implicit ‘practical justification of the established order’ (Bourdieu, 
1977:188). So it is not only necessary to understand what ‘legitimating discourses’ 
are about, but also to problematise the corresponding ‘complicitous silence’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977:188). I would argue that the above discussed media products can be 
seen as practical justification of hierarchies largely by repeating as opposed to 
challenging them. The established order is reaffirmed by mirroring societal power 
distributions. Furthermore, I would argue that hierarchies find their expression not 
just in the content, but are also reflected in the production process of Reality TV 
programmes. I intend to explore this matter empirically in the analysis of my chosen 
example. 
A number of authors point to the possibility of resistance and Bourdieu acknowledges 
that no domination or form of control can be complete. People can refuse the labels 
they are assigned (Skeggs, 1997a). This, of course, does not necessarily challenge 
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underlying power structures, but members of all classes can refuse (aspects of) 
classed identity formation. With regards to media consumption, there is evidence 
that viewers do not automatically take up the suggested middle-class gaze (Skeggs 
and Wood, 2012b) and at times even identify with the vilified (Tyler, 2012). Bourdieu 
(1977:170) argues that in times of crises, doxa tends to be challenged. Crises disrupt 
the taken-for-granted, the fit between everyday order and ‘the language of order’. 
The limits of critique are set by the objective conditions and therefore political, 
economic or social upheavals broaden the scope and the possibilities of critical 
discourse. However, Bourdieu is, unsurprisingly perhaps, not overly optimistic about 
the possibility of social change and points out that crisis is a necessary precondition 
for the disruption of doxic beliefs, but not in itself a sufficient condition for the 
emergence of critical discourse, let alone (large-scale) social change (Bourdieu, 1977). 
As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, my aim was not to conduct a 
comprehensive literature review, but to produce an overview that points to the most 
pertinent challenges a Bourdieusian analysis of contemporary representation of 
social class poses. Doxa appears as a very useful theoretical tool to analyse the 
content of classed representations and to critically discuss their ideological and 
stereotypical nature. What this literature however clearly indicates is, that an analysis 
of the content of media representations needs to be framed not only with regards to 
a theoretical concept, but also in terms of specific cultural and political 
circumstances. It needs to be taken into account under what conditions 
representations of social class are produced and consumed. Therefore, I intend to 
discuss the working conditions in the media field, the requirements of the specific 
genre (chapter six) as well as ways in which the programme is made sense of (chapter 
five). The normative dimension of symbolic struggles will be explored in the context 
of their production and consumption. 
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4. Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I intend to set out my methodological approach. I will explain which 
methods I intend to use for my empirical research and how these methods relate to 
the theoretical foundations of my research. I will particularly focus on potential 
frictions and inconsistencies to discuss whether it is possible to combine qualitative 
interviews with Critical Discourse Analysis and, crucially, if these methods fit into a 
Bourdieusian framework. I will address these issues on a theoretical as well as on a 
practical level and also with regard to ethical considerations. These will be followed 
by an assessment as to what extent it was possible to put these ambitions into 
practice. So subchapters 4.1 – 4.4 discuss the used methods on a more theoretical 
level, whereas in subchapter 4.5 their practical realisation will be discussed. The 
former subchapters were indeed written before the data collection was conducted 
and subchapter 4.5 after it was completed (hence the switch from present and future 
tense to past tense).  
 
4.1 Discourse and ideology 
 
To begin with, I want to discuss the relationship of ideological superstructures and 
their discursive manifestations. As shown in chapter two, ideology is a key element 
of the theories that form the theoretical foundation of this research. Both Marxists 
and Bourdieusians regard ideology as a central mechanism in the capitalist 
reproduction system and as a part of the class struggle. Gramsci (Gramsci et al., 1971) 
and Althusser (2001) refine this assumption as they aim to theorise how ideological 
principles translate into social and political practice. Bourdieu furthers these 
considerations with the analysis of struggles that take place on a symbolic level, but 
are crucial for the reproduction of systems of power (see chapter two, three and six).  
Whereas ideology clearly is at the core of the theories that underpin my research, 
‘discourse’ is not explained explicitly by them. I would argue that the content of public 
discourses cannot simply be derived from assumptions about ideology and that it is 
therefore necessary to discuss the relationship between ideology and discourse. 
Althusser (2001) and Gramsci (Gramsci et al., 1971) show that the superstructure 
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does not simply define the ruling ideas of an epoch, and Bourdieu’s theory of 
symbolic struggles suggest a more complex relationship between economic as well 
as political power and ideological outcomes. Accordingly, I would argue, it would be 
problematic to assume that a prevailing ideology (however that might be grasped) 
automatically produces certain discursive manifestations.  
MacDonald (2003) asks whether ideology is still a concept that can be applied to 
contemporary social formations and to today's media in particular. The postmodern 
critique that suggests that we now live in post-ideological times is in my opinion 
clearly contradicted by the economic and political developments of the last decade 
(see sub chapter 2.5). However, the objection that ideology is too broad and too rigid 
a concept (MacDonald, 2003) to deal with today's fragmented media landscape and, 
supposedly, individualised consumption has to be taken seriously. It appears that the 
analysis of individual discourses can be more adequate and fruitful as it becomes 
arguably more and more problematic to identify and locate the overarching 
ideological influence of political actors, not least because of the sheer number of 
channels of communication. This development is clearly amplified by the possibilities 
of lay persons to broadcast to potentially huge audiences that is being realised by 
recent technological developments. To suggest a great degree of state control or 
ideological influence of specific players, appears in this context increasingly more 
farfetched.  
I would however argue that ideology in a Marxist and also in a Bourdieusian sense 
has always been dealt with in a less formalistic and more complex way than the 
critique alluded to above implies. Althusser, for instance, regarded the ideological 
state apparatuses (ISAs), other than the name suggests maybe, not as a monolithic 
entity that is directly shaped by state control. The ISAs are not unified by active 
interventions, but by their ideological function. Also Bourdieu's concept of doxa does 
not regard ideological influence as intentional manipulation by those in positions of 
power (see subchapter 3.2.1). Similar to Althusser, he regards doxic beliefs as 
ideological, but as generally contested and therefore as a field of struggle. Those 
actors in positions of power, and the state is certainly one of them, are in a privileged 
position regarding the symbolic battles over the authoritative interpretations of the 
social world. However, ideology in a Bourdieusian sense, also has a strong 
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unconscious element. As I have already discussed, the ‘taken-for-granted’ or the 
‘common sense’ element is central to Bourdieu's understanding of ideology. 
Therefore, I would argue, ideology and discourse should not be pitted against each 
other. Ideology informs discourse in a very subtle manner. Terry Eagleton, apparently 
agreeing with Bourdieu, states that ideology is often not recognised as such, exactly 
because it entails what is commonly regarded as self-evident truths (MacDonald, 
2003). So ideological beliefs necessarily inform socially and politically relevant 
discourses and at the same time those discourses reinforces ideology. 
The analysis of discourse needs to be related to ideological frameworks. As Fairclough 
(2001) points out, there is an order of discourse and it is necessary to distinguish 
mainstream discourses from alternative or marginal discourses. Relating discourses 
to wider ideological questions can help to analyse how the order of discourses is 
connected to the social order of a society. Furthermore, discourses have an 
ideological function insofar as they help to uphold specific relations of domination 
and suppression (Fairclough, 2001).  
Finally, I would argue that ideology cannot be reduced to discourse and therefore 
Discourse Analysis needs to be supplemented by considerations about ideology. 
MacDonald (2003:28) argues that ideology as a concept is helpful in order to locate 
discourses with regards to power:  
 
Without the ability to relate discourse to ideology ... the relative position of 
discourse in the spectrum of powerfulness cannot be analysed.  
 
Bourdieu, clearly concerned with questions of ideology, is rather reluctant to use the 
term ideology as he is of the opinion that ideology as a concept is too vague (Bourdieu 
and Eagleton, 1992). I would argue that Bourdieu's concept of doxa comes close to 
what Marxism describes as ‘false consciousness’ or ideology. However, a relevant 
distinction has to be made: Bourdieu regards ideological or doxic effects not as 
primarily working on the level of consciousness, but on the level of practice (Bourdieu 
and Eagleton, 1992). This is probably not too surprising since Bourdieu's ambition 
was to formulate a theory of practice, and also, for instance, habitus, another of his 
key concepts, is to be understood not only as an intellectual, but as an embodied 
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concept (see sub-chapters 2.4.2 & 3.2.1). I will discuss later whether this is mainly a 
terminological issue or indication of a disagreement between Bourdieu and those 
who strive to locate Discourse Analysis within the broader framework of ideology. 
To summarise, the analysis of discourse and considerations regarding ideology 
operate on different levels and therefore should not be pitted against one another. 
On the contrary, they are complementary insofar as critique focussing on ideology 
can help to frame and to locate the analysis of discourse, whereas Discourse Analysis 
can address the question of how wider ideological principles translate into (political, 
journalistic, social etc.) practice. Ideology is a framework necessary to understand the 
power structures that inform discourses. However, this mechanism is, and Marxist 
critique has always been aware of this, hugely complex, contested and contradictory. 
In the following, I aim to discuss how Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) deals with 
these complexities and more specifically how I intend to use CDA for my empirical 
research.  
 
4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
According to Wodak (2001:10), CDA aims to ‘demystify discourses by deciphering 
ideology’. She regards the establishment and the reproduction of inequalities as the 
main function of ideology. Accordingly, discourses are ideological inasmuch as they 
contribute to sustain an established social and political order that is based on 
inequality. Ideological discourses are deceptive with regards to agents' interests in a 
hierarchically structured society. By analysing underlying interests, CDA aims to 
locate discourses. 
One of the central critical features of CDA is therefore the interest in the 
interconnectedness of discourse and social structures. For Fairclough (2001), 
discourses are diverse representations of social life. As such, they are necessarily 
located according to the social actor's position. CDA acknowledges that these 
positions are principally not equal and that the validity or currency of a specific 
discourse is related to the actor's position in a hierarchical order. Therefore, the social 
order shapes the order of discourse. Powerful positions in the social order tend to 
62 
 
result in a greater degree of discursive power. However, it is important to register 
that this relationship is not deterministic (Wodak, 2001). As much as discourse is 
historically produced, structured by ideology and power, it still cannot only be 
explained by social structures alone. Not least, and this will further be discussed later, 
because there is always the potential for resistance. CDA is interested in where and 
how power structures shape discourse, but it generally acknowledges that this is a 
complex process and one that is certainly not free from contradictions.23  
Social power is enacted as well as resisted in texts. CDA comprehends discourse as 
an instrument of power, in the sense that dominant discourses powerfully influence 
the construction of reality (Wodak, 2001). The struggle over the validity of specific 
discourses is the struggle over the interpretation of the world and is therefore of 
great significance. According to van Djik (2001), the control over influential discourses 
is a power resource in itself. He is of the opinion that one of the most basic questions 
that CDA has to ask is how powerful groups control public discourses and hence exert 
power over other social groups.24  
Access to and control over public discourses is regarded as a crucial area of analysis 
for most proponents of CDA. Access is to be understood as twofold: access to 
channels of information in terms of consumption, on the one side, and access to, and 
influence over, the production of discourses on the other side. CDA largely focuses 
on the latter. For van Dijk (2001), special attention has to be given to influential 
discourses, which are those discourses that are most closely connected to the 
execution of power, namely the political and scientific discourse, as well as 
overarching media discourses. Control has, in that respect, to be understood not so 
much in a very direct sense. The proponents of CDA do not assume that specific 
                                                          
23 For example, dominance in discursive terms does not work on suppression alone. 
Alternative discourses regularly enter the mainstream and as Wodak (2001:35) points out 
with reference to Foucault: ‘Dominant discourses disarm their opponents by taking on board 
surface aspects of their formulation without making genuine concessions to alternative ways 
of thinking.’  
 
24 Van Dijk (2001) points out that discursive power is not absolute and that not all members 
of a dominant group necessarily are in a more powerful position than all members of a less 
powerful group. He insists however that, among other factors, because of huge differentials 
in terms of access to influential discourses, the social power structure of a society is played 
out in the arena of public discourse. 
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discourses are (or even can be) determined by a group of individuals, but argue that 
certain groups of people are in a privileged position when it comes to influencing 
what enters socially and politically relevant discourses in the first place. This agenda 
setting power is as difficult to grasp as it is potent. Elites, organised around ‘centres 
of power’ (van Dijk, 1996:84) like law, politics, media etc. are in a position to put 
topics on the agenda that suit their interest. This stands, according to van Dijk (1996), 
in stark contrast to the influence ethnic minority groups for instance can exert. Their 
specific issues tend to get less coverage and minority speakers tend to get quoted 
less. Van Dijk (1996) makes the useful distinction between having passive access, as 
a topic, and being in a position of control regarding one's representation. Access as a 
topic is probably already stretching the meaning of the word ‘access’ to some degree 
as it could be argued that representations over which individuals have little control 
makes them objects rather than the subjects of representations.25 Therefore, I would 
argue, it is necessary to take into consideration members of which communities / 
classes gain active access and positions of control in the media sphere. 
The mechanisms through which elites control discourses are not limited to the 
regulation of access and the according control over what people regard as relevant. 
Also the ‘communicative events’ (van Dijk, 1996:88) themselves are regulated by a 
set of rules that appear to confirm existing power structures. The specific role 
allocation in discourses matter greatly as roles reflect social power. Media discourses 
tend to assign roles in accordance with social status. The empirical part of this 
research will discuss this issue with regards to a specific example. Overalll, CDA claims 
that societal power structures not only regulate access, by doing so they become 
reinforced and institutionalised (van Dijk, 1996).  
Discourse therefore reproduces social power. Privileged access to powerful fields of 
discourse functions as a means of control. It gives, van Dijk (2001) argues, powerful 
groups the capability to control other, subordinate social groups. As I have already 
alluded to, this linkage is not one free from contradictions and frictions, and neither 
                                                          
25 Van Dijk's (1996) empirically analyses patters of access with regards to immigrants 
and the Muslim population of the UK. My research intends to explore to what 
extent similar patterns emerge if access is analysed in connection with social class 
(acknowledging that class and ethnicity intersect to some extent). 
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does CDA argue that ‘the elite’ is in absolute control over all relevant spheres of 
discourse and public life. What CDA states as one of its key premises, however, is that 
access to and control over discourses and the media field in particular is not 
distributed evenly and that it would be very naïve to assume open and democratic 
access for all members of society. Societal power differentials crucially shape 
discourses and most significantly those discourses that help to reinforce and 
reproduce power structures. 
 
4.3 Critical Discourse Analysis and Bourdieu 
 
In the following, I will discuss the commonalities as well as the frictions between CDA 
and Bourdieu’s theory of power and media power in particular. I intend to come to a 
conclusion as to whether CDA is a suitable method within a Bourdieusian framework. 
On a surface level, there are, of course, a number of obvious commonalities that 
suggest that CDA is a method well suited for an analysis along Bourdieusian lines. A 
closer look however reveals a number of discrepancies and even open disagreement 
between Bourdieu and the discourse analytical method. I intend to discuss the 
commonalities as well as the disagreements and aim to assess the significance of the 
frictions. 
 
4.3.1 Commonalities 
 
On a basic level, the most obvious commonality between CDA and Bourdieu is an 
interest in power and the premise that there is a hierarchical order that structures 
social life in numerous aspects. I would argue that this general commonality can be 
further developed in three main research interests of CDA. 
Firstly, the above-discussed agenda setting power can certainly be related to 
Bourdieu's idea of distinguishable, but nevertheless related forms of capital. 
Economic capital tends to be transferable into social and cultural capital. This model 
is, in my opinion, very suitable to grasp how economic inequalities influence other, 
non-economic spheres and, more specifically, this Bourdieusian concept can inform 
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an analysis of the mechanisms that translate economic power into wider influence. 
Both, social and cultural capital play a role in explaining the influence privileged social 
groups can exert. Cultural capital relates, for instance, to van Dijk's (van Dijk, 1996) 
discussion of the regulation of communicative events. Specific types of knowledge 
become validated through discourses or are even a prerequisite to participate in 
them. The idea of social capital as an expression as well as self-reinforcing 
consequence of economic capital can, in my opinion, add to the analysis of power in 
a discourse analytical sense. CDA is interested in the processes of accumulation of 
power. Social capital can, to some extent, help to explain how power in one field, the 
political field for example, can be translated into another field, like the media. It 
would certainly be short-sighted to reduce this linkage to personal relationships, but 
within a wider political framework it can be a useful addition to the critical analysis 
of power structures. Both Bourdieusian analysis and CDA regard power as a complex, 
multi-faceted phenomenon that has to be analysed on several, interconnected levels. 
In that respect, I would see both approaches as compatible or even complementary. 
Another relatively obvious parallel between Bourdieusian theory and CDA is the 
assumption that in capitalist democracies power appears to be perceived as natural. 
Van Dijk (2001:355) speaks of the ‘taken-for-granted actions of everyday life’ in which 
power is enacted. Power is not only integrated into laws and rules, but also into 
consciousness and into praxis. The commonalities with Bourdieu's approach are 
clear. Bourdieu is also interested in the ‘taken-for-granted’ that informs the habitus 
on a cognitive as well as on a unconscious and practical level. CDA and Bourdieu agree 
that open resistance to oppression is complicated by the fact that inequalities and 
power differentials are often not perceived as such. Media representations help to 
sustain an image of the social world that depicts inequalities as generally justified. 
However, and this will be discussed in more detail shortly, both approaches are 
generally mindful not to exaggerate the influence of media representations. In 
particular in the habitus concept, media influence is regarded as one of a number of 
fields that are relevant for the concealment and reproduction of power. 
One final, closely related, parallel between Bourdieu's approach and CDA is the 
interest in the discursive mechanisms that legitimise existing power relations. By 
their naturalisiation, power relations become opaque and potentially critical 
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discourses are foreclosed. The interests, be it of a political and/or material nature, of 
those who benefit from the specific power distribution are concealed (Swartz, 1997). 
The misrecognition of power constitutes symbolic violence in a Bourdieusian sense 
(see sub-chapter 2.4.4). CDA, as already alluded to, is interested in how power 
relations inform discourse, or more specifically, how for instance inequality is 
expressed and legitimised though language (Wodak, 2001). Both approaches 
therefore see power as legitimised in a rather indirect and non-transparent way.  
 
4.3.2 Differences 
 
I will now turn to frictions, differences and disagreements between CDA's and 
Bourdieu's understanding of matters relevant to this research. This is necessary to 
assess whether CDA can be applied in this research in a meaningful way.  
 
4.3.2.1 Language 
 
One of the more salient disagreements between Bourdieu and CDA revolves around 
the function and the character of language. I will discuss this in greater detail, as I 
regard this tension as very illuminating and very relevant in the sense that 
fundamental disagreement regarding the function and the character of language 
would render CDA unemployable within a Bourdieusian framework. Applying CDA in 
a piece of research that focuses on media representations and largely follows 
Bourdieusian social theory requires, I would argue, a shared understanding of 
language. 
One main criticism that some proponents of CDA level at Bourdieu is that he 
overemphasises structural aspects and as a result loses the meaning aspect of 
language (Myles, 2010). Bourdieu is interested in language mainly in practical terms 
and in particular in how social inequalities are expressed in and reinforced by 
language. CDA, is also concerned with social and structural aspects, but grants 
language a greater degree of autonomy and sees the relationship between social 
realities and language as a more reciprocal one, rather than language ‘always being 
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secondary’ (Myles, 2010:34) to social relations. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (2000) 
argue that language can be constitutive of social relations. They therefore refer to 
(yet) another form of capital, the ‘linguistic capital’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 
2000:401) which is instrumental even beyond discursive struggles. Language, 
according to this view, can powerfully shape social relations and is not just an 
expression of them.26 
According to this view, Bourdieu underestimates the autonomy and also the force of 
language. Lovell (2003:3) claims that Bourdieu ‘reduces the power of words to the 
power of social institutions’. According to Lovell (2003), words can have impact, 
irrespective of the social position of the speaker.27 Bourdieu's understanding of the 
character of language stands in sharp contrast to the views outlined above. For him, 
langue is an instrument of symbolic social power. He is mainly interested in language 
on a practical level and in particular ‘in the social conditions of the production of 
utterances’ (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992:111). Language is, on a very fundamental 
level, shaped by the social structure and is therefore by no means a set of neutral 
signifiers (Grenfell, 2013). For Bourdieu, a critical analysis of discourse needs to go 
beyond the text itself and look at the authority that legitimises discourse (Bourdieu 
and Eagleton, 1992). Accordingly, Bourdieu is rather sceptical with regards to the 
autonomy of language and sees power as not inherent in language, but in social 
structures. Standardisation is crucial in that respect. The arbitrary fixation of a specific 
language variant as the authoritative and legitimate one echoes structures of 
domination (Hanks, 2005). But also, and maybe more importantly, the access to those 
standard variants is regulated through education and non-standard variants continue 
                                                          
26 ‘In focussing on symbolic struggles as struggles for access to legitimated capital ... 
Bourdieu essentially plays down the crucial issue that linguistic capital per se (emphases in 
original), in the form of discourse as representations of social processes and relations, is 
part of the struggle for the constitution and classification of social (field) relations’. 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2000:401). 
 
27 Butler agrees with this view, as for her language is constitutive of the body and shapes the 
individual's ability to be reflexive and hence to take part in discourses. She stretches this 
argument even further, possibly beyond what most proponents of CDA would go along with, 
by stating that class, race and gender are products of ‘naming’ (Myles, 2010:40).  
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to be suppressed. Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:49) therefore speaks of 
a ‘hierarchy of linguistic practices’.28  
As mentioned, Grenfell (2013) does not regard language as set of neutral signifiers. 
Words always imply a relationship, namely the relationship between social agents 
and their environment. Arguing along Bourdieusian lines, this assumption goes 
beyond the observation that communication necessarily has a (social) context. 
Language is shaped by social structures and hierarchies on a very fundamental level. 
Grenfell (2013) agrees that meaning is always contested, but states that it gravitates 
towards the dominant. Power structures inform discourse; the social use of language 
reproduces a system of social differences (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991). 
Also, Lawler (2013) is rather critical about the emancipatory potential of language. 
For her, language has no agency on its own and it would therefore be problematic to 
remove language from the user. All language is used and reproduced by embodied 
social actors. Lawler (2013) does not deny the possibility of language use to escape 
its constraints, but she asks to what extent this happens in real life. Are the effects of 
inequality alleviated and undone through language or does language in reality tend 
to ‘instantiate exclusion’ as it ‘marks out users as knowing or unknowing, worthy or 
unworthy’ (Lawler, 2013:276)? Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:55) points 
out that speakers lacking the required linguistic competence are ‘de facto’ excluded 
from certain social domains. Following this argument and Bourdieu's rather practical 
understanding of language, Lawler (2013) makes the important differentiation 
between speaking and being heard. Social actors have widely differing potentials to 
make their voices heard. And even if social actors succeed in making their voices 
heard, it is to a great degree their respective social position that lends (or denies) 
their arguments authority. Again, language use must not be seen in isolation, but with 
reference to the social actor who speaks and therefore as closely linked to wider 
social structures and practices.  
                                                          
28 Hanks (2005:76) puts this concisely and also refers to the unconscious, doxic nature of this 
process: ‘Standardization and legitimation sanction certain ways of speaking, rewarding 
some while silencing others. The effect is to intimidate and censor speech without any 
discrete acts of intimidation and censoring. ... the sanctions of the field become part of 
linguistic practice itself, not external conditions but internal elements.’  
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Finally, Bourdieu (1984a:113) warns against  
 
…the mistake of inventing as many explanatory systems as there are fields, 
instead of seeing each of them as a transformed form of all the others.  
 
Accordingly, linguistic capital must be seen as an expression of and in connection with 
cultural capital which is in turn an element in a net of social and economic relations.  
Despite some salient, and maybe at times over-pronounced, differences, I would 
argue that Bourdieu's understanding of language is not fundamentally incompatible 
with CDA. I believe this can be illustrated with reference to the aforementioned 
linguistic capital. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (2000), for instance, borrow a 
Boudieusian concept, emphasise its significance, but appear to neglect its place in 
Bourdieu's theory of forms of capital. I would argue that linguistic capital clearly has 
to be regarded as a sub-category of cultural capital. As with all other forms of capital, 
the relationship to economic capital is not a deterministic one, but neither can it be 
ignored. Hence, as much as some proponents of CDA would like to see language as 
relatively independent and potentially emancipatory, the unequal distribution of 
linguistic capital plays its role in the reproduction of inequalities. As discussed above, 
grammar, like other forms of cultural knowledge and expertise, arbitrarily defines 
certain forms as legitimate and worthy and therefore functions as a tool of exclusion.  
What is needed to further explore this nexus is a ‘duality of focus’ (Fairclough, 
1998:143). Fairclough suggests that, to reconcile CDA and Bourdieusian theory, 
Discourse Analysis should not restrict itself to the analysis of communicative events 
by taking the order of discourse into consideration. By order of discourse he means 
the enduring and overarching structure of political discourses. However, the order of 
discourse is not defined by the political field alone. Discursive practice therefore 
should, according to Fairclough (1998:143), be ‘properly integrated with other forms 
of social analysis’. Discourse Analysis needs to locate communicative events in social 
practice. Kögler (2013:303), in a similar vein, suggests that a ‘conceptual mediation 
between the power-expressive and the power-transcending dimensions of 
communicative practice’ is needed. He acknowledges the criticism that Bourdieu 
over-emphasises the former, but points out that every inter-subjective encounter 
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reflects wider (social and political) power relations. Parker (2005) offers a similar view 
that can be seen as bridging the differences between Bourdieu and CDA. For him, 
language does not only describe, but helps to keep ‘dominant forms of cultural 
identity’ (Parker, 2005:90) in place by the ways in which the dominant categories are 
repeated. Discourse is, for Parker (2005), the organisation of language into bonds 
that include and exclude and function ideologically by presenting ‘an oppressive 
version of the world ... which shows no way out’ (Parker, 2005:90). The challenge for 
Discourse Analysis therefore has to be to analyse how forms of language organise 
certain bonds. 
In my opinion, these considerations and suggestions indicate that it is possible to 
reconcile Bourdieu's theory of language with the views of the proponents of CDA. The 
differences appear to be of a gradual rather than fundamental nature. The question 
as to what degree language can be seen as independent of societal power structures 
and, therefore, be a transformative force, should not be brushed under the carpet, 
but I would argue that there are vast commonalities that make the described 
attempts to bring CDA and Bourdieusian theory together look very feasible. As 
described above, the shared aim to deconstruct ideology and the interest in the 
interconnectedness of discourse and social structures is a very significant common 
ground and I would argue that CDA is well equipped to meet the aforementioned 
‘demands’ of Fairclough (1998), Kögler (2013) and Parker (2005). In my opinion, the 
differences regarding the character and function of language between Bourdieu and 
CDA have to be taken seriously and therefore have to be addressed, but for the 
purpose of this thesis, do not render the two approaches incompatible.  
 
4.3.2.2 Agency 
 
A further, yet related, point of disagreement between Bourdieu and proponents of 
CDA revolves around the question of individual agency. Again, Bourdieu is accused of 
adopting a position that is too much focussed on structure, ignoring degrees of 
freedom. More specifically, it can be asked whether Bourdieu is too preoccupied with 
the authoritative effect of hierarchies and systemic relations to acknowledge the 
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potential for social change or to be able to address individual responsibility (Couldry, 
2005). 
According to Myles (2010), Bourdieu has come under attack from Critical Discourse 
Analysts (among others) as he is perceived to put an unreasonable emphasis on social 
structure and its reproduction and consequently ignores potential and actual social 
change. MacDonald (2003:21), with no direct reference to Bourdieu though, points 
to the according problematic implications in the media field as ‘vagueness about 
agency does … prevent clarity about responsibility’. Responsibility, according to this 
view, generally lies with the producer as well as the consumer of media products. If 
Bourdieu indeed did not account for the possibility of individual agency, this would 
fundamentally put (conventional) media critique into question. MacDonald (2003) 
adds to this by referring to Eagleton’s objection that theorists claiming that subjects 
are passively positioned by discourse can somehow escape this positioning 
themselves and formulate their critique.  
It does appear that there are tangible reasons to assume that Bourdieu sees 
individual agency as severely limited. For instance, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992:144) is of the opinion that reality ‘resides in structures that are 
transcendent to the interaction they inform’. It unquestionably curtails any potential 
agency if reality is principally impenetrable by the individual. In ‘Distinctions’ 
(1984a:461) Bourdieu underlines this view by stating that ‘the dominated … are at 
the mercy of the discourses that are presented to them’. Furthermore, Bourdieu 
argues that interpersonal relationships are never individual-to-individual 
relationships even if they appear to be so. Seemingly individual action and interaction 
is always informed and shaped by objective structures. Again, this does not suggest 
a great belief in personal agency and Bourdieu is explicitly critical of scientific 
methods like ethnomethodology which he perceives to rely too heavily on the 
characteristics of interactions and situations at the expense of structural 
considerations (Myles, 2010). Finally, Bourdieu is rather circumspect when it comes 
to the possibilities of resistance. Ideology for Bourdieu is not be understood as 
predominantly intellectual manipulation, but as functioning on a subconscious and 
bodily level. Resisting power structures and inequality therefore is all the more 
difficult as these are not only misrepresented as natural and just, but also, crucially, 
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not predominantly dealt with on an intellectual, and therefore principally accessible, 
level.  
 
In fact, I think that in terms of symbolic domination, resistance is more 
difficult, since it is something you absorb like air, something you don’t feel 
pressured by; it is everywhere and nowhere, and to escape from that is very 
difficult (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992:115).  
 
However, I would argue that a more thorough analysis reveals that Bourdieu is not as 
pessimistic about human agency as the above suggests. First of all, as Couldry (2005) 
points out, Bourdieu acknowledges the complexity of human existence and does not 
suggest a simplistic model of cause and effect. Human agency is in his view certainly 
influenced by objective structures, but not in a simplistic or deterministic way. As 
much as he regards economic capital as a significant factor, Bourdieu distinguishes a 
multitude of different competing (yet interrelated) fields. Those fields have varying 
degrees of freedom and autonomy as well as distance or proximity to the economic 
field. Individual action can therefore only be understood as shaped by a number of 
different, potentially contradictory, structural positions. Furthermore, Bourdieu 
‘rejects any abstract notion as social structure as a determining force in itself’ 
(Couldry, 2005:356) as social structure is reproduced or contested by individual 
action.29 For the objective of this research, it is relevant to point out that this is 
particularly true for human communication. As discussed above, Bourdieu sees the 
linguistic field as semi-autonomous and therefore neither fully determined by social 
nor political structures. Hence, Bourdieu argues that it is possible for the individual 
to break with doxic beliefs and to recognise the arbitrariness of symbolic power 
(Myles, 2010).  
Without doubt, Bourdieu is very interested in structuring principles and therefore 
critical of concepts and methods that suggest a great degree of individual agency. 
However, a closer examination of the concept of habitus shows a rather complex 
understanding of agency that does account for the possibility of social change. 
                                                          
29 As discussed with reference to the habitus concept, the link between position and 
disposition is a strong one and therefore can rightly be seen as an explanation for the 
relative stability of social structures, but Bourdieu is quite clear about his ambition to move 
on from objectivism. 
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Habitus links structure and agency. Through the habitus, agency is always related to 
structure, but, importantly, in a reciprocal way which means that individuals and 
collectives have the ability to transcend and transform the social conditions under 
which their habitus was formed.30  
It is understandable that critics argue that Bourdieu is overly pessimistic with regard 
to agency, and indeed his social theory seems better suited to explain the relative 
stability of social and political circumstances than the possibilities of social change, 
but it is also clear that Bourdieu does regard change as inevitable and is interested in 
its preconditions. 
Therefore, I would argue, a Bourdieusian framework by no means contradicts the 
endeavour of CDA to critically analyse the reciprocal interconnectedness of discourse 
and social structure. Theory that regards this relationship as mechanistic or 
deterministic, would render this question almost meaningless. However, Bourdieu 
sees the media field as partly autonomous and sees agency on the side of the 
producer as well as the consumer. Therefore, CDA’s main research interest is highly 
relevant from a Bourdieusian point of view.  
 
4.3.2.3 The role of the media 
 
Bourdieu's media critique appears greatly influenced by Weberian thoughts and is 
hence strongly focused on specific conditions of production (see chapter six). The 
internal relations and the structural patterns within this semi-autonomous field are 
of great relevance to Bourdieu. Media production is largely shaped by the internal 
logic of the media field (Bourdieu, 1998). This is very much in line with the above 
described reluctance of Bourdieu to assume rather general ideological effects within 
                                                          
30 Kögler (2013:304) sums this nexus up as follows: ’In other words, while habitus “reflects” 
the objectivity - and, thus, power - of a social setting quasi as a placeholder in the agent, the 
agent activates, and thereby also adjusts, transforms, interprets and redefines the habitus in 
light of the situation. The habitus equips every agent with a socially structured pre-
understanding of the situation, but the situation also forces the agent to make a specific use 
of the habitus, to employ and re-employ the resources given and acquired by previous 
endless encounters with social reality that formed a habitus in the first place.’ 
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capitalist societies. Furthermore, Bourdieu seems to regard the media field as of 
surprisingly little significance and accordingly, media analysis is relatively scarce in his 
oeuvre. From a methodological point of view, there is little guidance as Bourdieu’s 
media analysis is not characterised by his usual empirical diligence (Benson and 
Neveu, 2005). Bourdieu (1998) gives weight to the fact that the media field is limited 
both by internal and external factors. Media production largely has to follow market 
imperatives and therefore generally has to construct its output in a populist fashion. 
However, outside forces also impact on the media field. Bourdieu sees the influence 
of advertisers as well as of political players as crucial in that respect.31  
Several key proponents of CDA are critical of Bourdieu's media theory for a number 
of reasons. First of all, Couldry (2003) and MacDonald (2003), amongst others, 
criticise Bourdieu for being is too focused on the analysis of field forces. In their 
opinion, he exaggerates the significance of the field-specific logic of media 
production as well as the outside influence of the political and the economic field and 
underplays the actual power of the media field. Couldry (2003), for example, sees the 
media as absolutely key as to the formation of the habitus in modern societies. For 
him, symbolic power is to a great degree expressed through mass media and 
therefore does not just affect what people do, but also their ability to make sense of 
the world they live in. Couldry (2003) goes as far as to reverse the relationship 
between the media field and the political and economic sphere. Media power, he 
argues, is a ‘trump card’ (Myles, 2010:30) that works beyond the limits of the media 
sphere.  
Another major point of critique follows from Bourdieu's appraisal of the media field 
as dependent on other fields. Fairclough (1998), for instance, points out that the 
media are a much more active player than Bourdieu's theory claims and, more 
specifically, television greatly contributes to the constitution of social realities. Media 
productions always create a vision of reality as opposed to just reflecting it. However, 
MacDonald (2003) is equally clear that Discourse Analysis should not fall for the 
temptation of exaggerating and isolating the role of the media. Assuming that media 
                                                          
31 In his essay ‘The Power of Journalism’ Bourdieu (1998:68) is clear that his analysis is less 
interested in the alleged power of the media as the ‘fourth estate’, but in ‘the mechanisms 
(emphasis in original) of a journalistic field increasingly subject to market demands (through 
readers and advertisers)’. 
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products merely reflect reality by transmitting information would be just as naïve as 
to assume that they were the sole discourse setter. Simplified models of discourse 
are not helpful in analysing the complex, reciprocal relationship between media 
discourse and public discourse. Fairclough (1998) therefore suggests to analyse 
media texts on the level of production, distribution and consumption and hence to 
take into consideration how social and cultural practice frame discourses.  
To conclude, I would argue that there a very valid reasons to come to the conclusion 
that Bourdieu's media theory is rather patchy and hence can be supplemented both 
in terms of theoretical underpinning as well as methodology. In my opinion, 
Bourdieu's approach is still extremely valuable and an analysis of (economic and 
political) dependencies as well as of the internal logic of the media sphere can prove 
very beneficial. However, overly focussing on these relations might indeed risk 
underestimating the power and also the relative independence of the media field. 
Considerations regarding the interconnectedness of media, economy and politics, as 
well as the specific logic of the media field should be complemented with an analysis 
of the impact of media production that critically assesses how public discourse and 
media discourses are linked. CDA offers the methodological tools to do this by, as I 
will demonstrate, furthering and complementing Bourdieusian premises.  
 
4.3.2.4 ‘Internal analysis’? 
 
One final disagreement between CDA and Bourdieu that I regard as relevant in the 
context of this thesis revolves around the question whether CDA takes the social 
context of discourse sufficiently enough into consideration. Bourdieu is of the opinion 
that Discourse Analysis falls short in this department as expressed in the introduction 
to ‘Language and Symbolic Violence’ (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:28-29):  
 
... it would be superficial (at best) to try to analyse political discourse or 
ideologies by focusing on the utterances as such, without reference to the 
constitution of the political field and relation between this field and the 
broader space of social positions and processes. This kind of ‘internal analysis’ 
is commonplace in the academic literature, as exemplified by the numerous 
and varied attempts to apply some form of semiotics or ‘discourse analysis’ 
to political speeches. The difficulty with all such attempts is similar to the 
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difficulty that vitiates all ‘formalist’ approaches to language: they take for 
granted but fail to take account of the social-historical conditions within 
which the object of analysis is produced, constructed and received.  
 
Fairclough (1998:4) agrees that this sort of ‘internal analysis’ would be of limited 
value. However, it is certainly debateable whether Bourdieu's critique does justice to 
the methodology that is CDA. As discussed above, Fairclough (1998) recommends 
meeting Bourdieu's critique by locating discourse in fields of practice, but it appears 
that as far as CDA is concerned he might to some extent be preaching to the already 
converted. The main proponents of CDA agree that the analysis of the relationship 
between discourse and power is an indispensable part of the discourse analytical 
project. Considerations on the micro level (language), have to be complemented by 
studies of the macro level (social inequalities) (van Dijk, 2001). Despite not 
necessarily being a unitary theoretical framework (van Dijk, 2001) there seems to be 
consensus that CDA regards the link between text and society, between discourse 
and power as of fundamental importance. Wodak (2001) adds to this basic 
assumption that every discourse is historically produced but also analysed in a 
historic context.  
So it appears that Bourdieu's critique is either missing the point, outdated or maybe 
never directed at that particular strand of Discourse Analysis in the first place. 
Discussing this would probably be a rather futile debate, but what makes Bourdieu's 
critique valuable, relevant and timely is to interpret it as a reminder, not least for this 
research, to take context seriously and to not just address it on a superficial level or 
pay lip-service to the rather obvious fact that discourse has to be analysed with 
regards to its specific context. CDA has to take its premises seriously and to make 
efforts to critically engage with the relationship of discourse and social, political, 
economic etc. contexts. Of course, this poses a huge challenge, particularly if one 
strives to address this nexus on the fundamental level that Bourdieu suggests. 
Nevertheless is it the intention of this piece of research to explore the contexts of the 
chosen empirical example in terms of production, consumption and in relation to 
wider political discourses.  
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4.3.3 Conclusion 
 
As the conclusions of the respective sub-chapters already indicate, I would argue that 
CDA is by no means incompatible with Bourdieu's social theory. In general, I see the 
discussed differences as one of focus rather than fundamental disagreements. The 
most notable discrepancies revolve around questions of agency. CDA and Bourdieu 
clearly have a differing understanding of the degree of freedom and agency of 
language, of individual agency as well of the influence and independence of the 
media field. I do not intend to brush these disagreements under the carpet, but my 
intended rather pragmatic use of CDA as a methodological tool and Bourdieu’s social 
theory as a theoretical framework can, in my opinion, work with these differences. In 
some respects, as demonstrated, the two approaches even seem complementary. 
Clearly, the vast commonalities and the shared interest in the reproduction of 
inequality, the interconnectedness of discourse and power etc. outweigh the 
discussed gradual differences. In this research, I intend to use the strengths of both 
approaches and I have shown that it is possible to do so without doing violence to 
either of them.  
 
4.4 Practical considerations 
 
In the following, I want to discuss methodology in more practical terms and also with 
specific reference to my research project. 
 
4.4.1 Discourse Analysis 
 
In this section I want to explore the potential and benefits as well as pitfalls of Critical 
Discourse Analysis on a more practical level. These reflections will be supplemented 
with considerations about Documentary Research and Case Study Research that are 
very relevant for the in-depth analysis of a single document like, in this case, a TV 
programme. 
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For May (2011), document research can help to uncover social power relations in a 
depth that quantitative empirical research might struggle to reach.32 He also points 
to the fact that the perception of the audience of any text that is being researched 
might differ significantly from the researcher's perception. I regard these thoughts as 
helpful reminders not to commit similar mistakes by assuming that the audience or 
in fact the participants of People Like Us (2013l) make sense of the programme in an 
identical way to myself. I therefore intend to be mindful of the complexity of the 
programme and the multitude of possible readings. More specifically, I should, for 
instance, not assume exploitation of the participants only because it would, on a 
superficial level at least, fit my theoretical assumptions. May (2011:200) regards 
documents not as neutral artefacts, but as expressions of social power and as 
‘attempts at persuasion’. As such, they might reflect the marginalisation of particular 
groups. This is exactly what this research sets out to explore and fits nicely with the 
methodological and theoretical issues discussed above. And finally, May (2011) 
points to the interconnectedness of the social world and discourse by stating the 
need to analyse how texts seek to assert power over the social world. Of course, this 
is a hugely ambitious research aim and I expect to be able to address this question in 
a rather preliminary and possibly speculative way, but nevertheless, as discussed 
above, critical research should not shy away from this endeavour. 
Flyvbjerg (2006) convincingly makes the point that it is possible to generalise from a 
single case study and demonstrates that the most common objections against case-
study research, namely the lack of generalisability, the tendency towards verification 
and a general contemptuousness for context-specific knowledge, appear plausible, 
but are ultimately flawed. This is particularly true if one regards case studies more as 
a learning opportunity than irrevocable proof. This view is very much in accordance 
with the ambition of my research project. It lies in the nature of the topic, and maybe 
also the subject area as a whole, that the interconnected manifestations of power 
structures and their implications cannot be proven with absolute certainty. However, 
Flyvbjerg (2006:226) is equally clear that a ‘strategic choice’ of a case will greatly 
increase its generalisability. A wisely chosen case can highlight characteristics of a 
                                                          
32 This has largely to do with the fact that quantitative empirical research has the tendency 
to over-simplify data and to ignore findings that do not easily fit into predefined categories 
(May, 2011). 
79 
 
general problem. In the case of my chosen example, People Like Us (2013l), I intend 
to discuss to what extent the programme is representative for the genre as well as 
more general structures of production and consumption. Flyvbjerg (2006:237) speaks 
of the ‘rich ambiguity of real life’ and this resonates a lot with my own understanding 
of social life as well as the complex assumptions of Bourdieu's social theory. Finally, 
Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that, while a single case study might be lacking in terms of 
breadth, it is a very suitable method to provide great depth and insights into subtle 
and hidden aspects of the chosen example.  
I now want to turn to aspects significant for the practical application of the above 
outlined methods. To begin with, there is, according to Burman and Parker (1993), 
the danger that Discourse Analysis becomes too academic, too abstract and therefore 
removed from social practice. This can lead to a misconception akin to empirical 
research that treats its measurements as if they were not images of reality, but reality 
itself. Similarly, Discourse Analysis can mistake discourse ‘as the total sum, rather 
than the manifestation of, structural relationships’ (Burman and Parker, 1993:162). 
This underlines the necessity to go beyond the text and to search for connections to 
social structures as well as social practice. This is where Discourse Analysis comes into 
its own, but also where the method poses the most challenging questions to the 
researcher. Burman and Parker (1993) point to the fact that power is (re)produced in 
discourse, but is also still of relevance in the structural positions independent of the 
text: ‘Power relations endure when the text stops’ (Burman and Parker, 1993:158). If 
Discourse Analysis does not go beyond the confines of the text, it cannot address 
consequences of a specific discourse on a larger scale (Burman and Parker, 1993). 
Ultimately, that would defeat the purpose of Critical Discourse Analysis. 
Parker (2005) sees the main objective of Discourse Analysis to analyse powerful 
images of the individual and the social that circulate in society, but as also, crucially, 
to explore ways of questioning and resisting these images. He suggests an exploration 
of the shared, possibly stereotypical, cultural images a text uses and, as a 
consequence, to ask how a text challenges or conforms to patterns of power. I regard 
this recommendation as hugely relevant when it comes to dealing with political 
implications of a text in practical terms. How power structures inform discourse is a 
highly complex and rather abstract question that Discourse Analysis needs to frame 
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in concrete and comprehensible terms. Parker (2005) is of the opinion that Discourse 
Analysis is an activity that is constantly being carried out by lay people in the real 
word. ‘Discourse-analytic interviewing’ (Parker, 2005:94) can therefore be a 
collaborative method to explore and to contrast a number of different readings. Of 
particular interest are contradictions with (the perceived) mainstream or intended 
reading as well as contradictions with the researcher's own reading. Both can point 
to ways of resisting the dominant discourse. This technique can however also help to 
identify the existence of stereotypical portrayals and also the way ‘people police 
language, and how they become active participants in ideology’ (Parker, 2005:101). 
It certainly is the intention of this research to explore how the programme under 
scrutiny was perceived in the non-academic world and to research to what extent the 
suggested reading of the programme materialises. Regarding the interviewee as co-
researchers means in my opinion to be open about one's own interpretations as well 
as the wider political implications of the research without foreclosing an open 
debate. 
 
4.4.2 Interviewing 
 
I now want to turn to another method I intend to use: interviewing. First of all, I want 
to explore the idea of regarding interviewer and interviewee as two co-researchers 
in more depth. In my opinion, the main advantages of this approach are twofold. On 
the one hand, a greater degree of openness can enrich research as relinquishing 
control over the specific topic of the interview can open up the debate to other, 
unexpected areas. For this piece of research, this can mean that, for instance, 
alternative readings of People Like Us (2013l), or about media power in general, might 
enter the frame. And secondly, as Burman (1994) points out, treating an interview as 
a collaborative endeavour has the potential for empowerment. I regard this aspect 
as of particular importance in the context of this specific research project. Since I deal 
with inequality in terms of opportunities to make one’s voice heard, and potentially 
exploitative media portrayals, it is my intention not to repeat unequal and 
undemocratic forms of communication. Parker (2005:55) suggests that the 
researcher should facilitate the reciprocity of the interview process by enabling the 
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‘switching of positions’. However, it is important not to be overly naïve about the 
democratic potential of this approach as well as the difficulties of putting it into 
practice.33 
Taking participants seriously does, in my opinion, include giving them the choice to 
opt for or against anonymity. As I will interview adults who are able to consent, I 
believe that it is not for me to decide whether the interviewees’ names will be 
published or not. As my research critically deals with questions of access to and 
control over representations, I do not want to take the default position of social 
research of anonymising statements regardless of the participant’s wish. In my 
opinion, blanket anonymisation is not necessarily the more ethical position as this 
stance has the potential to be patronising and furthermore makes the researcher less 
accountable, insofar as statements cannot be easily attributed by the involved 
interviewees. Parker (2005) makes the point that anonymisation without explicit 
consent potentially denies the participants a voice and therefore might stand in 
contrast with what a research project might have initially claimed or what the 
participants wish. Furthermore, an open discussion about anonymity can also help to 
address questions around the researcher’s power to control what parts of interviews 
they decide to publish as well as the privilege to add comments and their 
interpretations. 
To conclude this subchapter, I wish to discuss a number of potential beneficial 
aspects of the interviewing method as well as potential dangers and pitfalls from a 
Bourdieusian perspective and demonstrate how the former fit in with the above 
                                                          
33 One major obstacle could be that the co-researchers might have different agendas. In a 
way, that, to some extent, lies in the nature of their respective positions as well as possible 
external demands the academic researcher has to deal with. Furthermore, I would argue, 
there is still a power differential at work that cannot simply be undone merely by the 
academic’s good intentions. As Burman (1994) points out, research is always set up and 
conducted within pre-existing power relationships. Apart from the ‘researcher vs. 
researched’ dichotomy, other structural relations can enter the research. Gender and ‘race’, 
or, most relevant for this particular research, class relations intersect with the interviewing 
relationship. Burman (1994) however asks whether this issue is specific to interviewing or 
just more visible than in other research methods. Either way, the researcher has to show 
great reflexivity if they want to take their intention of sharing power seriously. Assumptions, 
implicit ones as well as explicit ones, always inform and structure research, the challenge for 
the interviewer is to be aware of and open about them. 
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discussed premises and demands. First of all, Bourdieu sees the objective of his 
research, and critical sociological research in general, to act as a counterweight to 
(media) narratives that misrepresent or outright ignore people on the margins of 
society. He argues that it is therefore justified to focus on those who rarely get the 
opportunity to make their voices heard (Bourdieu and Ferguson, 1999). 
As discussed above, Bourdieu’s explicit ambition is to go beyond the alleged 
dichotomy of the individual versus the social. He opposes a subjectivism that 
understands the social world from a subjectively situated point of view as much as an 
objectivism that aims to explain action as consequences of structural relations 
(Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991). His theory of practice tries to adequately frame the 
practical character of social life. Individual agency and action cannot be sufficiently 
explained by the field or by the habitus alone, but has to be understood as an 
encounter of the two. Hence, with regards to methodology, the habitus is not a 
concept suitable to research social realities. Since the psychoanalytically informed 
habitus is such a central concept in Bourdieu’s social theory, it might come as a 
surprise that Bourdieu advises to use rather conventional methods. Bourdieu 
suggests to focus on the individual narrative as for him the place of analysis has to be 
the concrete narrative rather than the somewhat elusive habitus (Couldry, 2005). He 
is very clear however, that this focus on individual narratives does not restrict social 
research to exploring individualistic points of view. Quite the opposite Bourdieu is of 
the opinion that individual narratives can express structural conditions:  
 
This explains the way that narratives about the most ‘personal’ difficulties, 
the apparently most subjective tensions and contradictions, frequently 
articulate the deepest structures of the social world and their contradictions 
(Bourdieu and Ferguson, 1999:511).  
 
This is particularly true for people in precarious positions who develop an 
understanding of the objective contradictions that ‘have them in their grasp’ 
(Bourdieu and Ferguson, 1999:511) .  
Bearing in mind the alleged ubiquity of doxic assumptions, this assessment might 
surprise, and Bourdieu, indeed, sees a number of problems concerning working with 
individual narratives. First of all, he warns against the over-interpretation of interview 
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material and insists that sociological research must distance itself from the 
ungrounded and de-contextualised treatment of individual accounts that is 
characteristic of popular media representations (Couldry, 2005). The interviewer has 
to attempt to situate themselves in the place of the interviewees. However, not least 
because of potentially huge differences in terms of habitus, this has to happen with 
a great degree of cautiousness and self-reflexivity. Furthermore, it has to be taken 
into consideration that distortions are also likely to happen on the side of the 
interviewee, partly due to self-censorship and in particular, when it comes to 
contentious issues. Finally, the aforementioned power differential that is likely to 
influence the interview situation can lead to a rather inhibited encounter. The 
challenge for the interviewer is to get as close to the interviewee’s position as 
possible and to grasp their position without however identifying emotionally and 
hence compromising one’s objectivity (Couldry, 2005).34  
Bourdieu suggests to conduct interviews as ‘methodical listening’ (Bourdieu and 
Ferguson, 1999:609); as a way of countering the aforementioned power differentials. 
Differences in habitus and social capital can only to some degree be reduced, 
Bourdieu refers to the use of appropriate language, but the second source of the 
interviewer’s power can be addressed. It is usually the interviewer who sets the rules 
as well as the objective of the interview in advance and without any negotiations. 
This, according to Bourdieu, can and needs to be addressed if the interviewee shall 
‘give a response worthy of the name’ and it can be achieved ’if they can appropriate 
the inquiry for themselves and become its subject’ (Bourdieu and Ferguson, 
1999:609). Methodical listening is therefore not (only) about reducing the 
directedness of the questioning, but about transparency and openness about the 
rules and the objective of the interview. Apart from that, Bourdieu encourages the 
researcher to offer his own interpretations of the discussed material. This ‘technique’ 
not only takes the interviewee seriously, but also stands in conscious opposition to 
the ‘misleading neutrality of structured questionnaires or surveys that reinforce 
                                                          
34 Bourdieu regards emotions as generally misplaced in an interview and also warns against 
the danger of ‘romantizising the local encounter’ (as cited in Couldry, 2005:365). As alluded 
to above with reference to the ethnographic method, Bourdieu warns against putting too 
much emphasis on the specific interaction and thus ignoring wider social structures that 
shape the social space in which the encounter takes place. 
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rather than soften the power differential between interviewer and respondent’ 
(Bourdieu as cited in Couldry, 2005:363). 
Putting these ambitions into practice certainly requires a great degree of attention 
and reflexivity. In addition, the possibility that the suggested forms of interviewing – 
discourse-analytical interviewing and methodical listening largely seem to mean the 
same thing – might possibly contradict the interviewee’s expectation, and therefore 
be met with puzzlement rather than appreciation, has to be taken into consideration. 
Nevertheless I would argue that there needs to be a fit between the theoretical 
framework, the researcher’s political positions and the used methods. Being critical 
of undemocratic and misleading media representations almost forces the researcher 
to be transparent and inclusive. I intend that the above discussed will inform my 
interview practice and I will analyse to what extent this ambition could be put into 
practice.  
 
4.4.3 Audience research 
 
In the following, I want to discuss the methodological and ethical issues of the type 
of audience research I intend to carry out and that will form the empirical basis for 
the analyses in chapter five. These general methodological considerations will be 
followed by a discussion of specific issues that surfaced when conducting the actual 
data collection and analysis.  
I intend to gain an understanding of how the TV programme under consideration was 
perceived by the audience by analysing comments that were made on newspaper 
websites reporting on People Like Us (2013l). I will look at what McKee (2003:89) calls 
an ‘intertext’ and what he regards as expressions of ‘public discussions about culture’. 
McKee (2003) argues that our understanding of a text can be enhanced if we gain an 
idea of the audience’s reading and this, together with a discussion of the potential 
(political) impact of a docusoap, is the intended purpose of this analysis. 
From a methodological point of view, it is somewhat problematic to use comments 
that were made anonymously, are rather brief, and cannot retrospectively be 
followed up to gain clarification. It certainly can be questioned whether anonymous 
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comments left on a newspaper website reflect the actual opinions of the discussants 
or whether, for instance, there is deliberate provocation (trolling). Secondly, the 
brevity of many comments make their interpretation to some degree speculative.  
However, this ‘unobtrusive’ and ‘non-reactive’ method also brings with it a number 
of advantages (Hine, 2011:1). Recent research indicates that, compared to face-to-
face interviews, these methods of data collection show a lesser tendencies to 
produce socially desirable answers and to discuss contentious issues in a more open 
manner (Seale et al., 2010). Also Lee (2010:17) points to the strengths of using ‘found 
data’. However, I need to be clear that the data used in chapter five was not just 
‘found’, it was rather ‘looked for’. Debates around People Like Us (2013l) have 
certainly taken place in many spaces. Choosing to analyse comments on The Guardian 
and The Daily Mail websites is meant to reflect a certain breadth of opinion. 
Furthermore, compared to utterances made on social media like Facebook and 
Twitter, the use of these comments seems relatively unproblematic from an ethical 
point of view. I will come back to this shortly, but it needs to be mentioned that my 
‘sample’ is not just self-selected (people who visit the respective websites, who have 
the ability and wish to partake in online debates), but also selective in the sense that 
I chose to analyse these two specific arenas of public discourse.  
Furthermore, as Hine (2011) points out, simply because data is publicly available, it 
does not mean that it is ethical to use it for research purposes. This is particularly true 
if it is not practical or possible to request the consent of the involved discussants. 
However, I would argue that it needs to be distinguished between the different 
contexts in which online debates take place. Discussions in closed forums are, from 
an ethical point of view, clearly more problematic to research than comments posted 
publicly that are meant to be read by a wider audience. I will come back to this shortly 
to discuss my specific sample.  
 
4.4.4 Combining methods  
 
Whereas the above discussed analysis in chapter five was carried out before, and 
therefore relatively independent of, an in-depth analysis of the content and 
production process of People Like Us (2013l), the critique of the programme as 
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presented in chapter eight does combine my own discourse analysis and the 
conducted interviews. This blending of two separate methods and two separate 
analyses might be regarded as a methodological flaw and as potentially problematic. 
I would however argue that it is a legitimate attempt to put ‘discourse-analytic 
interviewing’ (Parker, 2005:94) into practice. Of course, it is necessary to distinguish 
clearly between my own views and the opinions of my interviewees and I intent to 
do so. However, my critique will crucially be informed by my research participants’ 
views on authenticity, representativeness and control in the context of the 
programme. I aim to illustrate how these matters are reflected in People Like Us 
(2013l) and also to make connections between the participants’ experiences and my 
own reading of the text. Therefore, I discuss both elements of my analysis in the same 
chapter. As mentioned, I will use a large number of direct quotes from the interviews 
to express the views of the interviewees comprehensively and also to provide some 
context within the respective interviews. As discussed above, a discourse analysis can 
be a collaborative process and in the context of my research, I would argue that it 
necessarily has to be just that. My own reading of People Like Us (2013l) will inform 
the interviews in the way the interviews are structured, what areas I will attempt to 
cover and also in the sense that I will offer my own interpretation of specific scenes 
and the programme as a whole. Trying to separate these two dimensions in the 
analysis of the programme appears neither sensible nor sincere. 
 
4.5 Reality check 
 
This subchapter was, in contrast to the above, written after I conducted the 
interviews, worked with them and analysed the programme and the reactions to it. 
In the following, I now want to retrospectively reflect on the theoretical, practical, 
methodological and ethical difficulties of putting the above discussed ambitions into 
practice and reflect on the significance of my own position (in class as well as in 
cultural terms) in the context of this research.  
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4.5.1 Practical and theoretical problems 
 
First of all, I want to discuss how the small-scale audience research that I present in 
the following chapter was conducted and how methodological and ethical issues 
were negotiated.  
As alluded to above, the impossibility of a ‘non-reactive’ (Lee, 2010:8) approach to 
clarify statements can pose a methodological problem insofar as deliberate 
provocation or simple misunderstandings cannot be ruled out. However, I would 
argue that in my particular empirical example there is very little overall that suggests 
that comments were made with the intention to cause controversy (and if so, they 
did with very limited success), and secondly, most of the comments under discussion 
appear rather unambiguous. Nevertheless, there remains a degree of uncertainty 
that this form of data collection and interpretation ultimately has to live with. The 
above discussed positives of the chosen approach are however, I would argue, 
obvious in the analysed debates. A number of politically contentious issues are being 
discussed in what appears to be a rather uninhibited manner. Internet debates, like 
the one under scrutiny, are often characterised by a great degree of immediacy and 
the analysed comments indeed appear to be unfiltered. It is doubtful whether they 
actually reflect the opinions of their writers in all their depth, however, it can in my 
opinion reasonably be assumed that, in contrast to more conventional methods of 
data collection, people feel less inhibited to express opinions that they perceive not 
to be desirable or politically correct. The frankness of the debates indicate just that. 
Finally, I want to point to potential ethical issues of this form of data collection. As 
mentioned above, I would argue that it needs to be distinguished whether comments 
made in the online world were meant for the eyes of a wider public or not. In my 
opinion, it is reasonable to assume that commenting on The Guardian and The Daily 
Mail website, as they are the most popular newspaper websites in the UK (Baird, 
2015), means that the discussants wanted their opinions to be openly available to 
the public. As it, turned out, people participating in the analysed debates opted to 
self-anonymise their statements. I would argue this and, more importantly, the 
context of the debate make their use for my research, from an ethical point of view, 
unproblematic. 
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I now want to turn to the conducted interview. To begin with, I need to point out that 
the recruitment of participants to this study panned out quite differently to what I 
had anticipated. I was fortunate to be able to interview seven people who took part 
in People Like Us (2013l) in front of the camera. This was quite unexpected as I could 
not assume that people who, according to what I had gathered, felt misrepresented 
in a TV programme and found themselves in the middle of a controversy that played 
out far beyond the boundaries of their own community (The Media Show, 2013a), 
would be prepared to speak to yet another outsider. As it turned out, most of the 
people I managed to make contact with35 were prepared to speak to me. I will discuss 
the ethical and methodological consequences of this ‘recruitment success’ shortly. It 
is however clear that the ‘composition of the sample’ had an impact on (the scope 
of) my findings. I was able to get insights into the production of a docusoap from the 
perspective of the participants and I believe that these insights allowed me to 
underpin many theoretical assumptions empirically.36 As discussed above, CDA (like 
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence) revolves around questions of power and 
control. Being able to speak to participants of People Like Us (2013l) put me in a 
position to explore their perspective in this symbolic struggle. However, my analysis 
of this power dynamic is largely restricted to an analysis of the powerlessness of the 
working-class participants of the programme. Unfortunately, the production 
company, Dragonfly, did not reply to any of my interview requests and accordingly 
their point of view is missing from my analysis. Therefore, this thesis has to rely on 
more general explorations of the class positions of media professionals, the working 
conditions in and the logic of the media field (see chapter six). How power 
distributions in the production of a docusoap is classed, could only be explored from 
the position of relative powerlessness. Of course, this perspective is very illuminating, 
and possibly more illuminating than the production company’s statements (see: The 
Media Show, 2013a). However, it became very evident when conducting this 
                                                          
35 Some people I was very keen to speak to could not be tracked down and made contact 
with. 
 
36 In particular, the lack of control on the side of the participants with regards to the editing 
as well as apparently wilful and stereotypically classed misrepresentations could be 
documented and proved very beneficial in exploring the central questions of this thesis. 
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research, that the ambition of CDA to explore the actual mechanisms of power in 
politically and socially relevant discourses is very difficult to put into practice.  
Another intention of research along the lines of CDA is to locate the document under 
discussion to wider (political) contexts. Again, this is something that was only partly 
achieved. I believe to have managed to locate the programme in the wider genre and 
to make links with a number of relevant political discourses such as the social security 
complex (see chapter five). However, an analysis of these linkages has to some 
degree to rely on plausibility. The assumption for instance that a negative and 
stereotypical portrayal of the working class, like in People For Us (2013l), is in the 
interest of powerful social groups and political players is certainly plausible and 
clearly forms the basis for Bourdieusian concepts relevant to this research. However, 
empirical evidence for this nexus is difficult to produce. I have worked with examples 
to the contrary (see chapters six and nine), but it seems that an analysis of the 
functioning of the media field and its links and interdependencies with those in power 
require access to the inside of media production that generally eludes the social 
sciences. Power works in complex ways and I would argue that CDA, underpinned 
and complemented with Bourdieusian concepts, offers a potent methodological tool 
to explore these. I have managed to discuss and present the views of participants of 
the programme and I would argue that explorations of power from the position of 
relative powerlessness are a very valuable contribution. The production process was 
explored from the perspective of the participants in front of the camera and this 
perspective clearly offers insights into the functioning of a docusoap production. As 
mentioned, I have attempted to locate People Like Us (2013l) in the wider genre, but 
only made few comparisons to similar programmes. Exploring commonalities, 
differences and general trends in the ‘Poverty Porn’ subgenre could be a very 
interesting and beneficial future line of inquiry. 
Finally, it is problematic to define tangible effects of classed representations. The 
logical and methodological reasons for this are summarised in the conclusion to this 
thesis. 
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4.5.2 Methodological and ethical problems 
 
As discussed above, I generally question the default position of research in the social 
sciences to anonymise interviews and have doubts whether this is automatically the 
‘more ethical’ position. The problem of anonymisation was compounded by the fact 
that a number of people who participated in People Like Us (2013l) agreed to be 
interviewed by me. Firstly, having been on national TV and, in the case of the 
Wakefield family in particular, being the centre of a controversy that took place in 
the local area as well as the national media, did make the participants of People Like 
Us (2013l) anything but anonymous. Hence, referring to the content of their 
interviews in all but the most general and superficial terms would have given away 
their identity. Even references to age or occupation for instance would have had the 
same effect in many cases.  
As it turned out, the participants themselves did not regard anonymisation of their 
interviews as necessary or even as sensible and useful. A few interviewees regarded 
their participation in my research as an opportunity to make a point and to comment 
on the programme. Having taken part and being referred to with their real names 
(with their real lives, in a sense) in a programme that was watched by hundreds of 
thousands of viewers, it seemed, as some interviewees expressed, not very logical to 
anonymise their retrospective views on the programme. From an ethical point of 
view it can be argued that it does not make a difference whether a participant in a 
research project is known to the wider public or has taken part in a docusoap. If 
anything, it brings issues around anonymity to the fore and it does certainly 
complicate the issue as simply using a pseudonym is clearly not a viable option.  
Either way, I had applied for ethical approval to refer to my interviewees with their 
real names, if they wished so, before I knew that I would interview participants of the 
programme. Initially, I was not granted ethical approval, but the fact that all of my 
interviewees wanted to appear in my thesis with their real names, and some felt quite 
strongly about this, made me reapply for ethical approval. In a drawn-out and, at 
times, somewhat frustrating process, I finally argued my case to the ethics 
committee. As I had already conducted my interviews, I was required to reapproach 
my interviewees and ask them to sign a new version of the consent form. It would be 
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somewhat disingenuous to pretend that my own position was entirely neutral in this 
process. As mentioned, I feel quite strongly about research participants being given 
a choice in terms of anonymization. However, as I only became fully aware when 
working with the interviews, anonymisation, if taken seriously, would have 
considerably complicated the presentation of my findings. Despite that, I believe to 
have offered the participants a genuine choice of whether they wanted their 
interviews anonymised or not without hinting at what my preferred outcome would 
be. In this sense, it can be seen as a positive that the process of gaining ethical 
approval was a rather lengthy one, as it meant that the interviewees had several 
months to reconsider their position. Of course, the interviewees would have always 
had the opportunity to withdraw from the study regardless, but in this case, they had 
to actively opt-in and re-consent. 
A somewhat related ethical concern transpired while interviewing. I have referred to 
the wish of some interviewees to make their opinions heard. However, in some of 
the first interviews that I conducted, I sensed that some interviewees might 
overestimate the impact and the reach of my research. I believe to have made no 
overstated claims in that direction, but, possibly, took the environment of academic 
discourses for granted, assumed knowledge of it and possibly did not sufficiently 
explain in what ways my research would be published and disseminated. In an 
attempt to rectify this to some extent, I invited all interviewees to a public debate at 
which I spoke about my research. A couple of them followed up this invitation and 
engaged in the debate. Furthermore, I was more mindful of the potential of the 
impact of my research being overestimated and was more forthcoming in that 
respect in the later interviews. 
Above, I discuss the benefits of semi-structured interviews and the possibilities of 
conceding control in interviews. In hindsight, it can be said that I managed to partly 
put this into practice. I started off all interviews with questions about the 
interviewee’s involvement in the programme and in particular the extent to which 
they felt that they could influence their own representation. Following on from that, 
I had a set of questions to fall back on, but essentially aimed for a more dialogical and 
free-flowing conversation. It would be an exaggeration to say that this materialised 
in every instance, but in all of the interviews, topics were brought up that I had not 
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anticipated. On more than one occasion however, the conversation only became 
more natural and uninhibited after I had stopped recording. To conclude, conceding 
control and opting for a semi-structured interview clearly proved beneficial in terms 
of depth and breadth of the interviews, but was also very much appropriate in the 
context of this particular research.  
Being critical of exploitation and misrepresentations, as I aim to be in this thesis, 
clearly implies ethical and methodological questions for the researcher. In many 
ways, conducting interview research has parallels with the production of a TV 
programme. By this, I mean the rather unequal allocation of power and, more 
specifically, how the produced material is worked with. In a sense, the researcher 
sets the parameters of the discourse (by choosing a certain methodology, by making 
choices with regards to recruitment, by formulating questions, by defining what is 
being recorded etc.) not too dissimilar from the way casting and the use of specific 
production techniques set the scene for a documentary. Condensing and interpreting 
the interviews mirrors the editing process of a TV production. Choices have to be 
made as to what is cited in the thesis, in what context quotes are presented, what is 
left out etc. 
As mentioned, I intended to ‘share power’ in the interviews with regards to being 
open about the directions the conversations would take (Burman, 1994). In hindsight, 
I would argue that this was partly realised, but that it would nevertheless be an 
exaggeration to claim that my research was a truly collaborative process. Many 
interviewees clearly had the expectation that I would be asking the questions and 
there was no fundamental discussion that would challenge this established role 
allocation. I would claim with some confidence that I partly achieved the objectives 
of ‘methodical listening’ as suggested by Bourdieu in the sense that I offered own 
interpretation of the programme and by trying to be open about the direction the 
interviews took. I would however be an exaggeration to claim that negotiations about 
the rules and objectives of the interviews took place. Furthermore, it cannot be 
denied that the interviewees had no actual power in my research beyond the 
interview itself. As much as I am keen not to repeat misrepresentations and commit 
symbolic violence in my research, it would not be appropriate to claim that power 
over the process and the content of my research was shared in a substantial and 
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meaningful way. Of course, the views of the interviewees had an impact on the 
direction my interpretation of People Like Us (2013l) took, however, the choice was 
still mine and there was no collaboration in that respect. Having realised that, I was 
still very keen to be as transparent as possible and to at least keep the interviewees 
informed throughout the different stages of the research.  
Firstly, I sent transcripts of the conducted interviews to all of the interviewees, usually 
within a fortnight to a month of the interview. In contrast to the production to the 
TV programme, the participants of my research got to see the ‘raw material’ and were 
given the opportunity to clarify things or to decide that they did not want certain 
answers used in the research. Despite the fact that none of the participants made use 
of this opportunity, I still regard this as necessary and appropriate. I also tried to be 
transparent about the ‘editing’ of the interviews and therefore sent out transcripts 
of the interviews in which those parts of the interviews that I quote directly or refer 
to otherwise in my research are highlighted. Again, participants had the opportunity 
to clarify or delete passages, to anonymise their statements or to withdraw from the 
study altogether. In my representation and interpretation of the interviews, I aimed 
to be very honest about their content, to provide context and not to only focus on 
statements that best served my theoretical claims or my own views on the 
programme. By this, I mean for instance that I intended to reflect the nuanced and 
differentiated views of the interviewees. The quantity and length of the used quotes 
is probably greater than in most PhD theses. This is a conscious decision in order to 
reflect the opinions of the interviewees in a less condensed and more comprehensive 
way. To summarise, I regard it as very difficult to produce research in a truly 
collaborative way when remaining within an academic framework and when relying 
on rather conventional methods. However, I only grasped the practical implications 
of this view whilst conducting my research. There remain uncertainties and open 
questions that clearly would pose a challenge in any potential future research that I 
might carry out. However, what I hope to have already achieved in this project is to 
be transparent about my own intentions and about the purpose and limitations of 
the research. As alluded to, in particular the latter two were not always easy to 
communicate. I also tried to be transparent in my work with the interviews and all 
interviewees had numerous opportunities to clarify their statements or to opt-out 
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(with regards to individual statements or altogether). Whether this amounts to a 
sharing of power is debateable, but, I would argue, it constitutes a significant 
improvement compared to the intransparent and manipulative practices that I 
criticize in my analysis of the programme. I am reasonably confident that my 
interviewees do not feel misrepresented in my research. Whether we necessarily 
arrive at the same conclusion regarding the content and (political and social) 
significance of the programme is a different matter, but I believe to have made efforts 
to convey the views of the interviewees and to distinguish them from my own 
interpretations. 
 
4.5.3 The insider / outsider problem 
 
Above, I have referred to a couple of ethical and methodical issues that reflect my 
position as an academic doing research in a community that is not his own: 
expectations regarding the reach of academic research as well as underlying 
assumptions about the role and power allocation in the research process. In the 
following, I want to expand on these issues, explore how my position as an outsider 
can be made sense of and how this position impacted on the research itself.  
A central ethical dilemma of social research is the question ‘who actually benefits 
from research?’ In most cases this is probably more the researcher themselves and 
their respective institutions than the subjects of the research. I have discussed the 
potential danger of research participants overestimating the reach and impact of a 
publication. Therefore, (among other reasons) the claim of ‘giving a voice to people’ 
must not be made lightly. I would still maintain that this is among the ambitions of 
this research, but the actual extent to which this can be put into practice is, 
realistically speaking, rather limited.37 I do not want to portray my own research as 
insignificant and would like to think that my analysis adds something to the debate 
                                                          
37 Even if I have succeeded in conveying the views of my research participants and managed 
to draw conclusions they agree with, ‘giving a voice’ not only has paternalistic overtones, 
but implies that this voice is being heard – something that cannot be guaranteed. Some of 
my interviewees had given interviews to journalists who work for mainstream media (see: 
Wheatstone, 2013) and in some cases used their fame to communicate with a considerable 
number of followers on Twitter. In that sense, they do not need this thesis to ‘give’ them a 
voice. 
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that journalism does not, but it is probably a fair assumption that for participants of 
the programme articles publishes in the Manchester Evening News, had a greater 
(immediate) significance and a greater potential to tell their side of the story than my 
academic research. As mentioned, attempts have been made to present my finding 
outside the confinements of academia, in the real and the virtual world (Wagner, 
2014). To feedback my findings in a more readable form, I will send a brief summary 
of my thesis to the participants of my research. 
I have not explicitly asked my research participants for their reasons to take part, but 
overall I very much got the impression that they were happy to help me out and to 
have a conversation. Like I said, ‘telling their side of the story’ was an element (and 
explicitly mentioned by some), but, unlike for instance the production company of 
the programme, the interviewees did not seem to be too concerned with the 
question of what benefit participating in my research had for them.  
I now want to turn to the questions of class membership (of the involved parties) and 
its implication for the research process. As Parker (2005) points out, and as it is at the 
heart of Bourdieu’s habitus concept, (classed) power relations are embodied and 
therefore impossible to escape. I have alluded to the way in which institutionalised 
power relations (expressed in expectations and role allocations) structured the 
conversation to some extent; however, class differences, on an interpersonal level, 
also played a role in the interviews. Throughout the interview process, I very much 
got the impression that I was perceived as an outsider in more than one sense, by 
being an academic, by not being working-class, by not being from the local area or 
even this country. I believe that this status as an obvious outsider to some extent 
obscured, but also relativized, my own class position. I would argue that the fact that 
I am foreign and speak with a foreign accent to some degree runs counter to implicit 
assumptions about classed judgements. Being an outsider in terms of nationality and 
language does not only shift the focus away from class differences, it also makes them 
less acute. Admittedly, this assumption is rather speculative and of course, a foreign 
accent does not undo class differences or the assumed authority of my institution. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that, somewhat counterintuitively, being foreign (and 
therefore being somewhat outside the classed hierarchy of British society) rather 
helped than hindered the conversations. At the same time, I am quite aware that not 
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having grown up in the UK and having lived here only for a relatively short period of 
time (five years) means that my understanding of the British class system is rather 
detached and academic and that this limits my understanding of how class works in 
this specific cultural context.38 I hope to have developed a good theoretical 
understanding of how class operates and that it is a phenomenon that cannot solely 
be reduced to economic variables. However, I would argue that the discussed ‘hidden 
injuries of class’ (Sennett and Cobb, 1972:4) have a strong culture-specific dimension. 
Acknowledging these theoretically does not equate to experiencing them (in their 
specific cultural context). Again, it is important not to overstretch this point, but I 
would argue that my outsider position was to some degree helpful in the interview 
situation, but at the same time must be seen as a disadvantage in the interpretation 
of my findings and when trying to grasp the (emotionally charged) complexities of 
classed hierarchies.  
To sum up, how the respective class positions of researcher and researched impacted 
on the interview process is difficult to assess retrospectively39. Nevertheless, I would 
state that class differences and cultural differences worked in an unexpected way 
and, to some extent, in a way that reduced distance and can therefore be seen as 
beneficial to this research. Of course, some forms of capital are quite easily 
transferrable to a cultural environment that is not too dissimilar to the country where 
it was acquired. Arguably, being foreign can even in itself, probably depending on the 
foreigner’s country of origin, add to a person’s cultural capital (for instance by being 
perceived as cosmopolitan). However, there are aspects of cultural capital, together 
with the according of privilege / disadvantage, that get lost in translation or are rather 
peculiar to the specific cultural contexts of the respective countries. In the context of 
this research, I would argue that systems of classification (my lack of knowledge as 
well as practical mastery of and emotional investment in them) are significant. I 
                                                          
38 Despite the many similarities between Germany, my country of origin, and the UK, class 
does work in a significantly different way and appears to be a more present aspect of public 
debates in Britain than it is in Germany. Of course, Germany is not a more egalitarian 
society, but other modes of creating difference are much more central in political 
discourses. Furthermore, in particular the class differentiations ‘in the middle’ play, I would 
argue, a much less significant role in the German context. 
 
39 in particular as it was not part of the conversation and is therefore solely based on the 
inferences of myself as a researcher 
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would argue that as a foreigner I am less harshly judged and equally less perceived as 
someone who is in a position to make a judgement on alleged (classed) deficiencies. 
Again, it is important not to overstate this point and to imagine myself as a neutral, 
classless or in any shape or form 'objective' outsider. As discussed, some forms of 
capital travel quite well and the cultural capital that is associated with academia does 
not evaporate because of a (not even too) different cultural background, but it is still 
an aspect in a complex relationship that is worth discussing. 
It is evident that these are not very well explored thoughts (yet). Nevertheless, I 
believe that fixing these considerations in writing can be beneficial for this research 
and (possibly) beyond, in the sense that they point to future lines of inquiry as well 
as methodological challenges of research that possibly follows on from this thesis. 
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5. Perceptions of People Like Us 
 
Judging the (political) impact of cultural products is inherently problematic, not least 
because the audience’s reading of a text might be complex and contradictory in itself 
and also differ significantly from the researcher’s reading. This might be particularly 
true for a Reality TV programme that claims to depict contemporary social reality. A 
reading of such a programme is, in a hierarchically structured society, I would argue, 
necessarily bound up with the respective class positions and differing attitudes 
(about class) of the audience members. In an attempt to get an impression of the 
breadth and content of possible readings and interpretations of People Like Us 
(2013l), I will analyse comments that were made in response to newspaper reporting 
about the programme. I will look at the opposite ends of the UK mainstream 
newspaper landscape.  
Of course, as discussed in chapter four, this approach is somewhat methodologically 
problematic and also rather limited not least because of the relatively small sample 
size of 200 comments. Furthermore, the sources that I picked, The Guardian and the 
Daily Mail websites, are at the opposite ends of the mainstream spectrum in a 
political sense, but probably less so in terms of the class membership of their readers. 
However, given that audience perceptions are not the main focus of this thesis (and 
therefore more time-consuming methods like in-depth interviews or audience focus 
groups are ruled out) the chosen approach appears appropriate. It will not put me in 
a position to conclusively answer the question how People Like Us (2013l) was 
generally perceived, but it will, hopefully, illustrate the breadth of the discourse 
surrounding the programme and allow me to make tentative conclusions regarding 
the political significance of People Like Us (2013l). 
In this chapter, I will again employ some of Bourdieu’s main concepts to analyse and 
interpret the aforementioned online debates. In particular the concept of doxa will 
be used to problematize the relationship between popular media representations of 
social class and mainstream political discourses around social security.  
The placement of this chapter might appear peculiar as the perception of the 
programme is discussed before the programme itself. Indeed the following analysis 
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was carried out before the discourse analysis of the programme and before the 
interviews with people appearing in it. I therefore decided not to pretend otherwise 
by placing this chapter after the discourse analysis. Of course, I already was very 
familiar with the content and style of People Like Us (2013l) when conducting the 
ensuing analysis, however, it has taken place without knowing about the views of 
people involved in the production of People Like Us (2013l) in front of the camera. I 
do not necessarily regard this as a weakness and believe that these aspects of my 
analysis exist relatively independently of each other. Accordingly, I will first discuss 
how People Like Us (2013l) was perceived and discussed by the audience and then 
move on to an analysis of the programme itself and its genre. 
 
5.1 Audience research 
 
Before I present and discuss my own empirical findings, I want to briefly address 
existing research around perceptions of Reality TV and docusoaps. The intention is 
not to provide a comprehensive summary, but to raise aspects of particular 
importance to this research. Most centrally, I intend to discuss contributions that 
explore the relation between the class-based content and (potentially) classed 
readings of docusoaps and Reality TV.  
As Hill (2005) points out, docusoaps are popular among men and women and 
members of all social classes. In particular, the figures for ‘occasional viewing’ of 
docusoaps are almost identical for both sexes as well as the major social classes. As I 
will discuss shortly, there exists however, convincing empirical evidence that despite 
their universal popularity across social classes, docusoaps are being watched in a 
distinctly classed manner.  
Kilborn and Izod (1997) point out that the reading of any factual television is 
influenced by the viewers’ own experience and a range of factors including age, 
gender, class, political leanings, personal biography etc. The meaning of a programme 
is therefore not just read off, but the result of a negotiation, that reflects all of the 
above mentioned dimensions. Kilborn and Izod (1997:227) acknowledge that there 
are, from the perspective of the filmmaker, ‘preferred readings’ and an intended 
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impact, but that the relationship between the viewing of a programme and the 
(change in) attitude of the viewer is not straightforward. Of course, this ‘preferred 
meaning’ cannot just be attributed to the, more or less conscious and more or less 
deliberate, political motivations of the filmmaker, but is the result of a complex 
relationship that reflects the social order (Hall, 1980). I will try to untangle some of 
these complexities with Bourdieu’s (1992) concept of doxa later in this chapter.  
For the purpose of this research, studies exploring the classed nature of docusoap 
viewing are most relevant. Allen and Mendick (2012), working with young people of 
different class backgrounds, come to the conclusion that interpretations of Reality TV 
programmes are strongly influenced by class positions. Allen and Mendick (2012) 
show how, for instance, the devaluation of working-classness in game- or 
competition-based Reality TV programmes is resisted by their working-class research 
participants. However, at the same time, many middle- and working-class 
participants are very critical of ‘illegitimate fame’ and its repercussions (most notably 
‘pretentiousness’ that many working-class participants are critical of). The reading of 
Reality TV appears to be clearly classed, but in rather complex and unpredictable 
ways. Allen and Mendick (2012) explore the functions these interpretations fulfil. 
These mainly came to the fore in the group interviews that were part of their 
research. Establishing ‘ordinariness’, in the sense of normality, appears to be a 
central function with regards to the acceptance or resistance of the moral 
judgements that Reality TV invites. Also Mayer’s (2012) research in a school setting 
(US college) confirms that talking about Reality TV provides a platform to perform 
class and to (re-)establish class membership. 
These findings are to a large extent confirmed by the audience research of Skeggs 
and Wood (2012a) who regard the reading of Reality TV as a deeply classed process, 
that works in a similarly complex and at times contradictory way. Akin to the above 
mentioned studies, Skeggs and Wood (2012a) come to the conclusion that their 
participants use Reality TV to locate themselves in terms of class position. Skeggs and 
Wood (2012a) worked with focus groups that represent socio-economic groups and 
demonstrate that there is little overarching consent about whether what was shown 
on screen represented proper or improper conduct. Working-class participants often 
resisted the implicit devaluation of working-class Reality TV participants. Skeggs and 
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Wood (2012a) come to the conclusion that their working-class participants were put 
in a dual role of being the judge (a position that Reality TV tends to suggest) and being 
judged (for being working-class themselves) simultaneously. As mentioned, and I will 
come back to this later in this chapter, proximity and distance in terms of class 
position does not predict the reading of classed portrayals in a direct manner. Many 
working-class participants displayed very negative affective reactions towards people 
on screen who were closest to them in terms of class position. At the same time, 
there were also class-transcending affective reactions by the members of all groups.40 
The most salient dividing issue in this study was the success and fame Reality TV 
participants gained from their involvement in the respective programmes. Whereas 
the working-class participants generally sympathised with successful working-class 
contestants, the middle-class participants were visibly angered by and expressed 
disapproval of the ‘something for nothing rewards of reality television’ (Skeggs and 
Wood, 2012a:232). Similar to the study by Allen and Mendick (2012) this form of 
success was regarded as illegitimate and as devaluing their own aspirational efforts 
and investments.  
To sum up, the meaning of a docusoap is not just read off, it is created and, as class 
tends to be a central issue in docusoaps, meaning is very much created in relation to 
the class position of the viewer. Talking about cultural products, as Bourdieu (1984a) 
shows, has a wider, politically relevant social function; it creates distance and helps 
to (re-)affirm the legitimacy of normative boundaries. Therefore, there is a hierarchy 
of readings and not all interpretations are equally valid and valued. Nevertheless, 
dominant readings can be contested and challenged.  
In the following, I will analyse online discourses around People Like Us (2013l). In 
contrast to the aforementioned studies, the class background of the respective 
discussants is not known, nevertheless, as I intend to show, the above discussed 
processes very much appear to be at play. 
 
                                                          
40 The former point will be explored later, but it is worth pointing out that Skeggs and Wood 
(2012a) regard the display of affective reactions as classed in itself, with the middle-class 
participants tending to create neutralising distance and using their cultural capital to assess 
the content of the programmes under consideration. 
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5.2 Newspaper articles 
 
Under the headline: 
 
It’s Jeremy Kyle-style, laugh at the chavs TV: Stars of BBC’s People Like Us 
claim it is faked to make them appear drunk, fat and lazy (Hills, 2013)  
 
the Mail Online published a relatively short article about the outrage People Like Us 
(2013l) supposedly caused in Harpurhey, the area where the programme was filmed. 
The tone of the article is rather matter-of-fact and mainly lists a number of opinions 
expressed at a public meeting in Harpurhey as well as brief comments by unnamed 
spokespeople of the BBC and the responsible TV production company (Dragonfly). 
The article is illustrated with three screenshots of the programme, a screenshot of 
The Jeremy Kyle Show (2005) and a picture of Media City in Salford. I do not want to 
analyse the article in depth, but point to a few peculiarities that might inform the 
following debate to some extent. First of all, the article deliberately conflates the 
opinion of people appearing on People Like Us (2013l), or ‘the stars’ of the 
documentary as the Mail Online puts it, with opinions expressed by residents of 
Harpurhey who attended a public meeting where the programme was discussed. 
None of the used statements were made by the participants of the programme. 
Therefore, the claim of the article that participants of People Like Us (2013l) felt 
misrepresented is somewhat dubious. Of course, this might very well be the case, but 
the opening sentence of the article:  
  
The stars of a new BBC documentary People Like Us have accused the 
programme makers of making them look fat, drunk and destitute (Hills, 2013) 
 
is not substantiated in any way. This is neither the case for the Daily Star (Lawton, 
2013) article that the Mail Online article is clearly based on. 
Secondly, the selection of pictures can be seen as to falsify the claims of 
misrepresentation. The first screenshot is an image of the mother and daughter of 
one of the families that feature in People Like Us (2013l) in the somewhat bleak and 
run-down backroom of their workplace. It is however not pointed out that this is a 
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workplace and a reader not familiar with the programme or the particular episode 
will in all likelihood assume the room to be a living room in a rather desolate state. 
The daughter appears to watch TV and not, as is actually the case, images of a CCTV 
camera monitoring the shop. The caption reads:  
 
Angry: Residents of Harpurhey, Manchester, have accused TV producers of 
making them look like ‘chavs’ who live in a ‘slum’ in a new documentary by 
BBC Three.  
 
This screenshot appears to show very poor, almost slum-like living conditions. In the 
second screenshot, a group of young girls apparently drinking shots of alcohol is 
pictured. The reference to the article headline is obvious.  
To sum up, the main claim of the article is not substantiated in any way as none of 
‘the stars’ of the programme were actually spoken to. Furthermore, it appears that 
the manipulative choice of screenshots mocks the (alleged) claims of the participants 
of People Like Us (2013l). The main theme of the article is the disputed authenticity 
of the programme. 
The comment by Fern Brady (2013) on The Guardian website critically discusses the 
problematic effect of ‘poverty porn’. As opposed to the Mail Online article, the factual 
authenticity is not the concern of the author who instead points to the repetition of 
working-class stereotypes. People Like Us (2013l) is accused of being voyeuristic and 
exploitative. There is reference to the current political climate of benefits cuts and 
the main point of critique is the cartoonish representation of deprivation that, 
according to Brady (2013), aggravates and deepens the class divide in today’s Britain.  
 
5.3 Comments 
 
In order to structure the analysis, the readers’ comments to the aforementioned 
articles will be clustered and categorised in four categories. The first category is 
authenticity and entails comments that discuss whether the TV programme is 
genuine or fabricated. The second category includes positive and negative value 
judgments referring to the portrayed individuals and communities. The third and 
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fourth category refer to the meta debate around the programme and the genre, 
namely discourses of the media field and its logic and functioning as well as wider 
political implications of the programme. Some comments cannot be categorised 
whereas others fit into more than one category. Furthermore, there is naturally a 
certain overlap and in particular questions of authenticity and the debates around 
the functioning of the media fields overlap to some extent. 
To make the analysis more manageable and to be able to discuss the debates in 
sufficient depth, only the first 100 comments under the respective articles will be 
analysed. 
 
Mail Online 
 
Not categorised 15 
Authenticity 38 
Judgment 39 
Media 32 
Politics 9 
 
The main theme of the article (authenticity) was picked up in 38 comments. Only one 
of those 38 comments questions the truthfulness of the TV programme: 
 
‘overexaggerated a hell of a lot’ nickunknown, manchester 
 
Four comments are rather ambiguous and 33 express the believe that People Like Us 
(2013l) is largely authentic and truthful. Interestingly, a large number of users that 
believe in the authenticity of the programme refer to the above discussed 
screenshots as proof for their arguments. 
39 out of the 100 comments contain some sort of value judgment. One comment is 
rather neutral, nine are sympathetic and 29 unsympathetic. Of the positive 
comments, one is a defence of the area out of personal experience of working in 
Harpurhey. Three refer to Harpurhey as an ordinary area in a positive sense:  
 
‘Just a Normal Neighbourhood to me’ BurnageMafia, Manchester  
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‘It’s just a slice of life’ Minny25, London 
‘Even the young lad who admitted being the ‘neighbour-from-hell’ was not so 
different from any 20/21 year old living away from home’ Lucy67, London 
 
In four comments, there is reference to the likeability of the characters. Interestingly, 
three of those appear to defend the portrayed people on the grounds that they are 
employed and not, as other comments suggest, claiming benefits:  
 
 ‘… and she has a job’ Leah, London 
‘Lots of people in the show work, and are very likable too.’ Jo123 
 ‘The dad had a terrible childhood and has done so much to be a decent adult 
and father. He works very hard’ Lucy67 
 
It is not possible to assess without doubt whether these comments were mainly made 
in the interest of factual correctness or to what extent employment is used as the 
basis for normative judgements. The context of the comments suggests the latter 
might be the case as in two of those comments, work appears to be linked to decency 
and likability. 
Categorising the unsympathetic comments is rather problematic as there is a lot of 
overlap. However, a number of themes can be identified. Firstly, a large proportion 
of negative comments refers to matters of style and taste and more specifically to 
clothing and the state of the decoration of the protagonists’ house:  
 
‘they dress chavvishly and their house looks kinda like a slum… did the BBC 
come over feed you pies, strip your wallpaper and make you wear primark?’ 
cheoffshore, variable  
‘Love, look at your walls.’ Ikwyaut, Aagdne  
‘Or is that some kind of ‘New’ and ‘Modern’ wallpaper they have over there?’ 
MrComment, Dogmersfield  
‘Get a bra on that kid in the blue cardy for Gods sake!!!’ CMC79, Leicester  
 
Closely related to these judgements based on taste are expressions of shock, shame, 
disgust and embarrassment. Again, a high proportion of comments more or less 
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explicitly state to be feeling those emotions or suggest that the participants of People 
Like Us (2013l) should be ashamed of themselves:  
 
‘Look at the STATE of them!’ Steve, Swindon  
‘All it does is make my skin crawl as to what this country is full of’ silas1980, 
Washington  
‘Maybe they are kicking up a fuss because they are shocked when they watch 
it back and realise they are embarrassed at what they see and hear?’ The Nit 
Picker, Blighty  
‘On the bright side, at least they’re embarrassed! They should be.’ Annette, 
NYC  
 
The word chav is used a number of times and some of the comments are downright 
dehumanising:  
 
‘I thought the Kyle creatures were created in a lab’ DMrSoles, Netherworld, 
Saint Helena 
 ‘Amazing how this type of Chav can afford a colour telly but can’t be bothered 
to paint the walls’ SocialistShirker, EUSSR, United Kingdom 
 ‘You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear, as they say.’ Bert The Builder, 
Kettering, Botswana 
‘Council Tenan t=A simple organism with the ability to convert new property 
into a slum.’ Kiernan, Manchester, United Kingdom 
 
As mentioned, there are a number of comments that relatively directly refer to 
current political debates. Interestingly, all of those address social security. This is 
insofar remarkable as, which will be demonstrated in the chapter seven, People Like 
Us (2013l) does not explicitly deal with social security and neither is there a reference 
in the related article. All but one comment appear to suggest that the participants of 
People Like Us (2013l) claim benefits and there is the underlying suggestion of benefit 
fraud or undeservedness: 
 
 ‘We’re paying for most of them.’ Steve, Swindon 
 ‘… they don’t even work so they aren’t ‘working class’! They are the ‘benefit’ 
class!!!’ mestar, Manchester 
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A couple of comments, referring to the family running the local laundrette, imply that 
despite in the programme being shown to work long hours, they still must be claiming 
some sorts of benefit payments: 
 
‘Did they manage to say this with a straight face, whilst sitting there with 
graffiti all over the walls of their own house…or should that be their council 
houses’ Stevie, Liverpool 
‘I noticed that they said she couldn’t ‘work in the laundrette because of a bad 
back (couch, cough, disability benefits) but spent all day in there barking 
orders’ Laura, Cambridge  
 
One overtly political comment breaks the mould and whilst also referring to social 
security, does so with a distinctly different spin: 
 
‘and this kind of trash-tv plays into the hands of people like Iain Dunce Duncan 
Smith….’ ProfessorHaushofer, Atlatis 
 
Unfortunately, this is not explored further and none of the following comments made 
reference to this statement or to the implied political impact of People Like Us 
(2013l). 
32 out of the 100 comments refer to the media field and its functioning and tend to 
do so in rather abstract terms and sometimes without direct reference to the 
discussed TV programme. Again, I will cluster these comments thematically. The 
largest of these groupings are comments questioning the production methods of 
People Like Us (2013l). There is clearly a great degree of doubt concerning its sincerity 
and truthfulness. This is surprising as, as discussed above, the vast majority of 
discussants apparently belief in the authenticity of the programme. On a more 
general level there appears to be a degree of doubt regarding the way programmes 
like People Like Us (2013l) are produced:  
 
‘The UK media twist and edit to get better ratings’ John, Veliko Turnovo, 
United Kingdom 
‘Everything you hear or read in this country is enhanced for your 
entertainment and someones profit’ alfonso55, Cornwall, United Kingdom  
 ‘When will people realise that ‘reality TV’ is anything but?’ Dom and 
Wolfhound, Cotswold Hills, United Kingdom 
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‘… it indicates manipulation to fit a story angle’ Mike, York 
 
It appears that there is critical distance and a degree of scepticism regarding the 
production methods and the according authenticity of what is shown on screen. This 
assessment however is made on a more general level and there are few direct 
references to the actual TV programme. 
Interestingly, a large number of comments express doubts regarding the truthfulness 
and fairness of People Like Us (2013l), but at the same time place responsibility on 
the side of the participants. There is also the, often explicitly expressed, accusation 
of seeking attention and fame and displaying nativity by agreeing to take part in the 
programme:  
 
‘OMG! The producers of this show definitely went to the right place to get 
cannon fodder for this show. They believe they were going to be portrayed 
well –and treated fairly– much like the idiots who believe that Jeremy Kyle is 
going to do the same with them.’ troll, under a bridge, United Kingdom 
 ‘This is what ‘reality’ TV producers do. Never go on them, because your ego 
and their greed will make you look bad.’ triplesec, London, United Kingdom 
‘Put a camera in front of an idiot with the promise of 5 minutes of fame and 
they’ll say anything- just like they have done on this show’ Red Mist, 
Manchester, United Kingdom  
 ‘I’m afraid you sell your soul to the devil when you get involved with the 
media ... Given that there have been many very loud and public complaints 
about not dissimilar programmes in the recent past, I’m surprised the people 
of Harpurhey got suckered in.’ Countrylass, Manchester 
 
It appears that there is an acceptance, almost an expectation, that Reality TV distorts 
reality. However, this implicit critique does not translate into general consideration 
regarding questions of access to and control over media productions. To the contrary, 
most discussants point towards the participants and to their alleged naivety. 
Only a very small number of comments, two to be precise, make any reference to the 
question of access and control. These however appear to be located on the opposing 
ends of the debate:  
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‘Not ‘stars’ or ‘celebs’ ……….. just chavvy embarrassing people who have no 
right to be on the television’ Damian, Elsewhere, Afghanistan  
‘When are people going to realise that tv shows are always going to make 
poorer people look like scum! Its so the middle class tv producers can feel 
good about themselfs’ Heathcliff, Haworth 
 
A similarly small number of discussants complain about the waste of license fee 
money. And finally, one comment points to the fact that People Like Us (2013l) was 
filmed in Manchester: 
 
‘Because of coronation street we are used to looking down on Mancunians. 5 
times a week, 52 weeks a year we enjoy the unhappiness and dysfunction of 
Mancunians in coronation street. No wonder the producers decided to set it 
in Manchester. Same reason shameless was set there. If it were set in 
Liverpool or Newcastle, people would be less comfortable with it.’ James01, 
Manchester, United Kingdom 
 
The Guardian 
The comments on The Guardian website clearly focus on different aspects of the 
debate: 
 
Not categorised 38 
Authenticity 0 
Judgment 7 
Media 10 
Politics 48 
 
First of all, I want to point to the relatively large number of comments that could not 
be meaningfully sorted into one of the four categories. The vast majority of those 
comments were only remotely related to the themes of the article and dealt with the 
culture of debate on The Guardian website. Another strand of debate compared the 
factual and perceived dangerousness of a number of cities which I regard as of little 
relevance for this research. 
Interestingly, the authenticity of People Like Us (2013l) was not debated at all and 
neither was the production process or the editing process of the programme under 
110 
 
scrutiny. In stark contrast to the above presented comments, the question of 
responsibility for possible misrepresentations was not discussed at all. 
The number of comments that included value judgements or judgments based on 
taste was comparatively small and rather diverse: 
 
‘I don’t live on handouts, I simply got a summer job picking fruit- minimum 
wage to keep the wolf from the door. If normal people can do it so can those 
on benefits.’ SamsonB 
‘Many commentators ATL confuse chavs with the working class, they’re an 
underclass all of their own whose sole point of existence is to ruin working 
class communities they infect’ Jackston  
‘I have given up on poverty porn since Ross Kemp said ‘I have dodged bullets 
in Pakistan, seen a witch hunt in Africa … but Glasgow is the toughest place’ 
kristinekochanski  
‘..in the 70s fly on the wall documentaries ordinary families were shown as 
ordinary .. Now its some grotesque freak show where only selective examples 
of dysfunctionality are allowed’ MasterNonPO  
‘There was this well-known clothing brand which offered to pay one of the 
Jersey Shore actors quite large sums of money *not* to wear their clothes, as 
they had been in previous episodes, because they were worried about this 
kind of reputation damage’ SolidSquid  
 
as reply to the above: 
 
‘Cool’ Let’s do it again! I suggest giving PR lurgey to such esteemed areas as 
Hoxton, Islington and Brick Lane. Sort of in the interest of social justice, of 
course, but mainly for the lulz.’ TruculentSheep  
 
In contrast to comments on the Daily Mail website, these comments are much less 
personal in nature and not referring to individual people. Nevertheless, in particular 
the first four comments clearly show a similar mode of distinguishing and distancing 
the acceptable mainstream of society from what is described as an underclass. The 
fourth and fifth comments acknowledge the relevance of cultural goods to achieve 
distinction, but do so in a rather playful manner and with no direct reference to the 
TV programme.  
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The comments that refer to the media field and its functioning again do so on a rather 
abstract level and mainly focus on two central points: 
 
‘Its not just the right wing though. The liberal left are quite happy to portray 
the working class as caricatures.’ Missing yet again. 
 
as reply to the above: 
 
‘Depends on what you mean by the ‘liberal left’. If you mean New Labour I 
agree. It also depends on what you mean by caricatures – some are more 
harmful than others, particularly in the context of attacks on the welfare 
state.’ robbo100  
‘The fact that it’s on Channel 3 disqualifies it by default. Though, wouldn’t it 
be nice to see reality TV set in the dysfunctional and freakish realms of upper 
middle class suburbia? Or would that, if you’ll forgive the cliché, be too close 
to home for many TV producers and media types?’ TruculentSheep  
 
as reply to the above: 
 
‘Didn’t the “Bank of Mum and Dad” series do that? Pathetically weak, 
ineffectual parenting resulting in spoilt, unmotivated, arrogant, idiot children. 
Even though the cliches on display at the poverty porn end of the spectrum 
are a bit worm, their subjects tend to be generally more likeable than at the 
overprivileged end. Tbh though, the upper-middle class do seem to have fairly 
a predictable life which doesn’t make for particularly interesting TV’ chapelle  
 
Most comments referring to the media field thematise the unrepresentativeness of 
Reality TV. Firstly, by reducing working-class subjects to caricatures and secondly by 
almost exclusively focussing on poorer members of society.  
As the above quoted comments already indicate, it is rather problematic to 
categorise statements as political or unpolitical as basically all of the mentioned 
comments have a political dimension. In this case, I made the distinction again based 
on a very narrow definition of the word. In the context of this research, it appears 
appropriate to include comments that revolve around state benefits, bias of the BBC, 
as well as political implications of classed representations. 
 
‘With the line between working and the middle class becoming blurred, a new 
bottom tier is needed to re-affirm the status-quo’ BlackRoads 
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‘No, it’s the age old trick of social division, create the idea of an other who 
you can look down on to keep you in line with what the rulers want.’ 
MiddleEnglandLefty  
‘More right wing propaganda courtesy of the Bullingdon Broadcasting 
Corporation’ robbo100 
‘Thats the issue with the beeb – its ultra establishment. It’s not that it’s Tory 
supporting or Labour supporting – it’s government supporting in general …’ 
princesschipchopz  
‘So all those people on benefits are living off other peoples money then? 
Would you care to explain to me what national insurance is! I worked for 30 
years before being too ill to work.’ Bifess  
 
as a reply to the above: 
 
‘Well, people on benefits are spending other people’s money. It is money 
provided through the government by the taxpayer.’ Mkubwa  
 
Overall, seven comments discuss whether or in what way the BBC is politically biased 
and 28 comments debate issues around social security.  
 
5.4. Theoretical framing  
 
In the following, I want to frame the portrayed online debate theoretically by using 
the Bourdieusian concept of doxa as well as Bourdieu’s (1984a) considerations 
regarding taste. I have discussed the limitations and methodological issues of this 
form of analysis in chapter four and at the beginning of this chapter. However, as 
discussed, the aim of this chapter is not to comprehensively explore the general 
public opinion on matters of class or social security, but to analyse one specific 
discourse to discuss a way of theoretically making sense of classed media discourses 
and, more specifically, to get a sense of how People Like Us (2013l) was perceived 
and discussed by its audience. Ultimately, I intend to suggest a way of applying 
Bourdieusian theory to empirical data and to discuss the linkage between media 
discourse and publicly expressed opinions along Bourdieusian lines. 
First of all, I want to address the doxic character of this particular debate. Bourdieu 
(1977) argues that the structure and the structuring principles of a society become 
internalised and therefore are assumed as natural and undisputable: ‘Every 
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established order tends to produce … the naturalization of its own arbitrariness’. For 
the context of this chapter this means that doxic beliefs and accordingly doxic 
representations take social inequalities for granted and, by doing so, uncritically 
reinforce them. Naturalising the, historically produced but ultimately arbitrary, social 
order renders fundamental critique impossible or as Maton puts it (2008) 
‘assumptions that “go without saying” determine the limits of the doable and the 
thinkable’.  
These (collective) blind spots result in stereotypical images of the social world. As 
alluded to above, what makes doxic beliefs so stable and immune to critique is their 
location in the (collective) unconscious and the resulting taboos are reflected in 
stereotypical perceptions of the social world. I will address the question to what 
extent stereotypical ideas around British working-class life have informed the 
conception and production of People Like Us (2013l), it appears, however, that the 
perception of the programme was structured by established class stereotypes, 
around poverty and the benefit system.  
First of all, it seems that these three terms and concepts are very much entangled 
and conflated, which arguably in itself reflects a somewhat biased and distorted view 
of the social world. Secondly, as pointed out, some comments make the assumption 
that participants of the TV programme fraudulently claim benefits. Neither the 
programme nor the related newspaper articles give any indication for this 
presumption. So it appears that far-reaching assumptions were made by a large 
number of discussants based on a very scarce information. A number of clichés 
relating to poverty are referred to, ranging from excess (eating and drinking) to bad 
taste or a lack of culture and workshyness. It appears that the commentators 
interpreted the available pieces of information in a very stereotypical fashion by 
picking up common images and by uncritically associating working-class life with 
poverty and benefit fraud. 
Bourdieu (1984a) famously explores how matters of taste are politically charged. 
Questions of taste show a strongly classed character and are can be doxic in nature 
insofar as they tend to obscure structural inequalities and reduce them to supposedly 
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benign and individual preferences.41 Socially produced differences become 
essentialised, charged with value and ascribed to individuals or social groups without 
acknowledging their social and their arbitrary character. Bourdieu (1984a) points out 
that tastes are often asserted negatively by distancing oneself from the supposedly 
disgust-provoking bad taste of others. Taste is not only essentialised, but naturalised 
in the sense that it is seen as an inherent characteristic of an individual, independent 
of formal and aesthetic education. What is perceived to be a working class-taste has, 
according to Bourdieu (1984a), the sole function of constituting a negative reference 
point. 
As discussed above, a large number of comments use derogatory language and speak 
about the presented subjects as if they were culturally fundamentally different. 
Expressions like ‘chav,’ ‘Jeremy Kyle creatures’ or ‘simple organism’ indicate that 
there is no perceived common ground between the discussants’ own position and 
the described other. Accordingly, the (alleged) style and taste is not referred to as 
inferior, but as of no cultural value whatsoever. Skeggs (2004:153) makes the point 
that working-class culture is seen as the negative referent without any intrinsic 
worth, as the ‘point zero’ of culture. On The Guardian website, compare to the Mail 
Online, the comments that portray working-class people as fundamentally different 
are fewer in numbers, but similar with regards to how they draw boundaries. A clear 
distinction is made between normality and life at the bottom of the social hierarchy. 
Finally, traces of dehumanising language (that remain unchallenged) can be found on 
The Guardian website as well as one user speaks of the ‘underclass’ as ‘infecting’ 
working class communities. 
In a Bourdieusian sense, this ‘othering’ has the function of reaffirmation and 
revalidation of mainstream middle-class culture. Bourdieu (1984a:468) speaks of a 
‘network of oppositions’ that consist of ‘pairs of antagonistic adjectives’ that classifies 
objects or persons in a dichotic way. This doxic thinking, he argues, is readily accepted 
as ‘behind them lies the whole social order’ (Bourdieu, 1984a:468). Doxic thinking 
not only confirms the social order, it is also shaped by it, in a sense that classifications 
express social hierarchies and translate them into a hierarchy of taste. The function 
                                                          
41 Ridiculing poverty or a lack of education, for instance, is far less socially acceptable than 
ridiculing supposedly bad taste. 
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of these (often rather one-sided) classificatory struggles lies in the substantiation and 
the ascertainment of boundaries as ‘taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984a:6). So it is not only the object that is judged as tasteful or not, it is 
also the individual that makes the judgement that is, wittingly or not, rated according 
to the legitimacy of their taste. In the context of the online debates under discussion, 
this means that the discussants ascertain their status by distancing themselves from 
what they regard as bad taste and, more importantly, from an inferior class position. 
These processes gain their power through the opacity of their political foundation 
and function. The taken-for-grantedness of taste hierarchies make them somewhat 
immune to critique such as elitism or snobbery42. Savage (2003) points to recent 
socio-historical developments that resulted in the middle class becoming the 
‘particular-universal’ class; a particular class whose practices came to be accepted as 
universally valid. Sayer (2005), analysing processes of moral boundary drawing, 
makes the distinction between conditional and unconditional recognition and 
demonstrates how these different types of recognition are related to the distribution 
of economic capital. Furthermore, he demonstrates that claims regarding moral 
values and virtues are routinely generalised and that their cross-class character is 
likely to inflict shame as value judgements tend to be normatively and morally 
loaded. These judgements tend to relate to the hierarchical class structure of a 
society, but are made on an individual level (Sayer, 2005). As I have shown above, 
shame and disgust are two very central categories in the online debate around People 
Like Us (2013l). 
Before I address the judgments that are made in the online debates around People 
Like Us (2013l), I want to briefly explore the readiness with which judgments are 
generally made in the Reality TV context. The specific, emotive and possibly 
manipulative, narrative structure and visual language of the programme will be 
discussed later, but, I would argue, the Reality TV genre itself invites judgement based 
on class membership. This is most apparent in several Reality TV subgenres that 
revolve around (moral) judgements. Crime-based Reality TV (e.g. Judge Judy (1996a)) 
and chat shows (e.g. Jeremy Kyle Show (2005)), but also game-based programmes 
(e.g. Big Brother (2000)) and make-over formats (e.g. What Not to Wear (2001c)) are 
                                                          
42 At least as far as the alleged tastelessness of the working class is concerned. 
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largely based on judgement by experts and also clearly invite judgement by the 
viewer. Couldry (2012) demonstrates how these judgments have a classed character 
and how the role of judge and judged are assigned along class lines. Skeggs and Wood 
(2011:96) make the point that Reality TV can be seen as a ‘morality play’ with a 
‘neoliberal imperative to how one should live (emphasis in original)’. 
People Like Us (2013l), it needs to be pointed out, does not fall under the above 
mentioned sub-genres and I will later discuss to what degree a specific moral 
judgement is implied. However, I think it is very plausible to assume that viewers are 
very much used to the default role allocation of most Reality TV formats. The 
readiness with which the aforementioned judgements are made, bearing in mind that 
the readers of the discussed newspaper articles actually know very little about the 
portrayed people, indicates that this is very much the case. 
The strong language used in the comments quoted above, indicates that the othering 
of the working class has a strong emotional dimension and that a lack of taste or of 
cultural and economic capital has an element of shame attached to it. It is not 
inequalities and difference as such that provoke disgust and shame, but supposedly 
individually embodied characteristics. The strong emotional component of the 
portrayed discourse might indicate that Bourdieu’s (1984a) psychoanalytically 
informed theory that regards processes of othering as founded in the need to 
ascertain one’s own class position by distancing oneself still has validity and 
relevance. For the purpose of this chapter, I will leave these considerations to one 
side and instead look at the origins for the prevalence of disgust and shame. 
Interestingly, those comments that imply that participants of the TV programme 
should be ashamed of themselves do not base their judgment on any despicable 
deeds. As illustrated above, shame is associated with the, in the eyes of the 
discussants, displayed lack of style, bodily appearances and inadequate living 
conditions. The same can be stated for the reactions of disgust that are equally based 
on appearance and not action. Disgust is a very powerful, yet underresearched 
emotion (Lawler, 2008) that, as alluded to above, is difficult to make sense of on a 
purely rational level. It is not evident why differences in style and taste, whose 
foundations and hierarchical order are completely arbitrary, should lead to such 
strong emotional reactions. Lawler (2008) argues that disgust refers to the norm 
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violation itself and not to the specific content of the respective norms. Again, it is the 
wish or the need to distance oneself from lower class positions that must be seen as 
charging these opinions with normativity. Of course, these reactions of disgust 
cannot be interpreted as individual, solely psychologically founded expressions. The 
zeal and vehemence of those statements point to the strength of the associated 
norms as well as the associated stigma of falling short of what defines good (enough) 
taste. Classed shame and disgust are developed and expressed in collective 
processes, but, reflecting the doxic character of this process, are generally put into 
practice on an individual level. The arbitrariness of what defines good taste is not 
under scrutiny. Quite the contrary; those individuals and groups that are suspected 
of violating these arbitrary and somewhat opaque norms are judged in the strongest 
possible terms; not because their actual taste or behaviour would warrant any such 
reactions, but because of the collective imperative, on the side of the classifier, not 
to be associated with what is defined as shameful and disgusting. Below a certain 
threshold, taste is non-negotiable.  
Power-blind, status quo-affirming doxic beliefs also can be traced in the comments 
that refer to the functioning of the media field. There appears to be an acceptance 
that media products in general and Reality TV in particular are not entirely 
trustworthy and do not treat their subjects fairly. However, there is a remarkable 
absence of indignation about that. As shown above, the vast majority of comments 
in this context indicate that it is the participants and not the producers of docusoaps 
who are to blame for misrepresentations. From a Bourdieusian perspective, this can 
be interpreted as the underlying power structure (in the media field) being beyond 
the reach of criticism. Attempts to deceive and manipulate are accepted as part of 
the game and ultimately those on the receiving end of an exploitative relation are 
ascribed responsibility. There is even the suggestion that the longing for the 
proverbial fifteen minutes of fame combined with a degree of naivety tempted the 
people of Harpurhey to expose themselves. This argumentation indicates another 
element of class contempt: the generalised expectation of self-betterment is coupled 
with a disdain for reaching beyond classed limits. Attempts by people with working-
class backgrounds to reach beyond what is ascribed to them are mocked as 
pretentious (Lawler, 2005). As shown above, a considerable number of discussants 
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are of the opinion that the portrayed individuals had no right to be on TV or brought 
the negative repercussions of their involvement in People Like Us (2013l) on 
themselves. There appears to be a tacit acceptance of the established power 
distribution concerning the production and editorial process that is not further 
problematized. This is insofar remarkable as their appears to be a degree of 
scepticism about how ‘real’ Reality TV is. However, this general scepticism does not 
translate into the questioning of wider political implications of inequality in the media 
field. 
As shown above, nine out of 100 comments on the Daily Mail website and 48 
comments on The Guardian website make more general statements that can be 
classed as political in the narrow sense of the word. Interestingly all of those (Daily 
Mail), respectively 28 of 48 (The Guardian), comments refer to state welfare. Again, 
this is remarkable as People Like Us (2013l) does not thematise benefits and mainly 
shows people who are in employment. In particular the family that features most 
prominently in the programme and is most referred to in the comments are shown 
as hard working and there is no indication that they actually receive welfare 
payments. A number of discussants assume that the participants of People Like Us 
(2013l) must be benefit recipients and this assumption is hardly challenged by other 
discussants. It can only be speculated what sets these associations in motion (area? 
cultural capital? suggestive representations?), but the tone and the choice of words 
of most comments indicate that debates around social security are very emotionally 
charged. It is most likely a fair assumption that, since social security and in particular 
alleged benefit fraud is a pet subject of the Daily Mail, that their readership might 
have a particularly negative and biased view. Other political dimensions of the TV 
programme like poverty, power, structural injustice or inequality are not part of the 
debate at all. Politics only appear to matter with regards to potentially unjustified 
welfare payments. Interestingly, comments referring to social security are even more 
prevalent on The Guardian website. Although the debate there is more balanced in 
the sense that a number of discussants appear to be generally in favour of social 
security, none of the analysed comments questions what appears to be a reflex to 
debate matters of state welfare when working-class life is portrayed and talked 
about. As the debate shows, this link is made with a wide range of political 
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implications and a number of discussants defend state welfare, I would however 
insist that the uncritical conflation of working-classness and state welfare shows the 
doxic character of mainstream political debate. People at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy are automatically classed as beneficiaries of welfare payments and as 
potentially fraudulently claiming benefits they are not entitled to. Questions of low 
pay, exploitation etc. appear not to enter the frame in this empirical example. 
It needs to be added that the characterised debate took place pre-Benefits Street 
(2014d). The way in which working-class positions and state welfare are lumped 
together in the debate does therefore not mirror the narrative structure of Benefits 
Street (2014d) or other programmes, like Skint (2013i), that followed to some extent 
the blueprint of People Like Us (2013l) with the major exception that they put an 
explicit emphasis on state benefits.  
As indicated, a number of comments call into question what can be described as the 
doxic logic of the class divide. Bourdieu (1977:168) argues that the taken-for-granted 
is challenged by ‘the political and economic crises correlative with class division’. The 
undiscussed is brought into discussion due to changes in the objective economic 
conditions that disrupt the congruence of the experience of the social world and the 
ideological superstructure.43  
This means that what is thinkable is not fixed and can, in particular in times of crisis, 
be challenged. In this empirical example, this happens in numerous ways. As pointed 
out, a small number of comments are generally sympathetic towards the participants 
of People Like Us (2013l) and their authors refuse to distance themselves from them. 
Despite being relatively small in number, these comments are very significant for this 
analysis as they illustrate the spectrum of possible readings of the programme. As I 
explained above, the comments that defend the area where the programme was 
filmed and the people appearing in it, do so either on the grounds of personal 
knowledge of the area or because they can relate to the displayed circumstances. 
This implies that the reading of a programme like People Like Us (2013l) is to some 
degree bound up with class positions. The audience research by Skeggs and Wood 
                                                          
43 However, Bourdieu (1977:169) points out that there is no inevitability in these ultimately 
political processes and speaks of ‘material and symbolic means of rejecting the definition of 
the real’ that the dominated need to possess in order to break with doxa. 
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(2011) confirms this assumption. However, it must also be pointed out that this 
relationship is not a straight-forward one as ‘relationships of proximity work in a 
much more complex manner’ (Skeggs and Wood, 2011:100) than one would assume. 
People are not necessarily more sympathetic towards the ‘characters’ who are in 
class-terms most like them. This is very much in line with the above discussed need 
to distance oneself. In a Bourdieusian sense, the imperative to ‘other’ supposedly 
immoral Reality TV participants and to create distance is a greater concern for those 
who might fear to be associated with them. From the safety of an assured (upper) 
middle-class perspective, these value judgements need not to be made in the same 
way. Stating a clear class bias would probably over-stretch what can be deducted 
from rather brief anonymous comments, it can however be registered that a variety 
of readings as well as (political) interpretations are possible. And, as the pieces of 
research discussed at the beginning of this chapter show, these interpretations are 
to some degree influenced by class positions.  
Furthermore, numerous comments indicate a degree of scepticism regarding the 
truthfulness of the programme. As I will discuss later, the question of authenticity is 
absolutely key in how Reality TV programmes are perceived. From a Bourdieusian 
point of view however, this immanent critique ultimately leaves the general political 
framework intact as for instance neither the social hierarchy nor its structuring 
principles are called into question. As discussed above, the doubts regarding the 
truthfulness of Reality TV in general do not lead to a general dismissal of People Like 
Us (2013l) as fabricated. By and large, the programme is taken seriously and 
discussed as a rather authentic representation of Harpurhey and its residents.44 
                                                          
44 Quantitative research indicates that the trustworthiness of TV genres and sub-genres 
varies significantly. Whereas 89% of respondents to a ITC/BSC poll said they would ‘always’ 
or ‘most of the time’ perceive the information provided by news programmes and nature 
and wildlife programmes as accurate, the figure is only 59% for documentaries (ITC/BSC, 
2002). The subgenre of docusoap was regarded as ‘honest in its portrayal of individuals and 
the situations they are in’ ‘always’ or ‘most of the time’ by 42% of the respondents (ITC/BSC, 
2002:62). So there seems to be a lesser degree of trust compared to traditional 
documentaries. However, compared with daytime talk shows (9%) and game-based Reality 
TV programmes (20%), docusoaps do not fare too badly, in particular as a further 31% of 
respondents are of the opinion that they ‘sometimes’ portray its participants and their 
surroundings honestly. Of course, not too much can be read into these figures (in particular 
as they are already over ten years old and audience perceptions will certainly have 
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There are however, predominantly on The Guardian website, a number of comments 
that challenge the functioning of the political and the media field on a more 
fundamental level. First of all, there is reference to the ways in which cultural capital 
works as a means of distinction and secondly, some discussants point to the political 
functions of social divisions. And finally, the bias and unrepresentativeness of 
mainstream media discourse is referred to. Without overstating the scope of the 
mentioned comments, I would argue that it is acknowledged by a number of 
comments that media representations can be political in their effect. Furthermore, 
some discussants see media output as structured by the distributions of power in a 
wider sense and as reflection of the social hierarchy of a society.  
To sum up, from a Bourdieusian point of view, a large number of comments referring 
to People Like Us (2013l) can be regarded as doxic insofar as they stereotypically pick 
up common underlying beliefs and translate them into biased assumptions about the 
programme. It is not only the way in which the TV programme is made sense of, but, 
possibly even more importantly, what is not talked about that reveals the doxic 
nature of the debate: structural inequalities, power differences and hugely differing 
possibilities to make one’s voice heard are taken for granted and not worth talking 
about. By and large, established social structures and their repercussions are not 
questioned, and affirmative, individualistic interpretations of (perceived) social 
problems are put forward. 
Mirroring the programme under discussion and, as I will discuss later, the genre as a 
whole, social inequalities are largely discussed on an individual level and 
comprehended more as individual characteristics than as structural effects, which in 
itself can be seen as the prevailing, doxic way of seeing the world. Interestingly, the 
popular distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor seems absent 
from the debate on the Daily Mail website. Instead, poverty and benefit payments 
are assumed and the underlying suspicion of fraud is apparent in a number of 
comments. On The Guardian website, class is discuss in a much less personalised or 
individualised way and debates around inequality take place on a rather abstract 
                                                          
developed), but these figures appear to confirm the impression that a majority of viewers 
regards docusoaps not as entirely fabricated and at least to some degree believable. 
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level. Nevertheless, the debate is dominated by questions around state welfare which 
in itself can be seen as an unwarranted assumption with regards to People Like Us 
(2013l). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The analysis of comments referring to two newspaper articles about People Like Us 
(2013l) unsurprisingly shows a wide range of opinions, but at the same time a small 
number of common themes that are called upon in order to make sense of the 
programme. In particular, debates around social security appear to be of central 
importance in this context. Furthermore, hierarchies appear to inform these debates, 
but often do so in a rather implicit way. One of the most obvious findings clearly is 
the noticeable emotional dimension of social hierarchies and their public negotiation. 
Matters of taste, as expressions as well as fields of contention of stratification, are 
clearly morally, normatively and emotionally charged and classificatory battles are 
waged often without, as it appears, conscious awareness of their contestants. Shame 
and disgust clearly play a role in classed expressions of worth and, again, inform the 
debate below conscious rationality. 
Doxa is therefore a concept that is well suited to explore representations of social 
class as well as the reactions to it. It allows us to take subconscious elements in the 
reproduction of the social order into account without depoliticising or psychologising 
social class. In this specific empirical example I have shown how a, potentially biased, 
representation of social class sparked debates around social security. Despite the fact 
that People Like Us (2013l) almost shies away from poverty and state welfare, the 
political discourse of social security dominates the debate. Morally and normatively 
charged judgments create distance between the mainstream of society and the 
‘other’. By doing so they cement the established social order and stereotypically 
portray working-class positions as inferior and in need of (potentially undeserved) 
welfare payments. 
Bourdieu is interested in how social structures shape individual and collective 
processes that reaffirm the political order, but also points to possible frictions 
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between objective conditions and ideology that can put established ways of thinking 
into question. Using doxa as a conceptual tool inevitably puts the unsaid into the 
frame and therefore I tried to address areas that the analysed debates did not cover. 
Of course, this is insofar problematic as the researcher himself is not outside social 
structures and has no, in any sense, outside or objective view on the taken-for-
granted. However, as indicated above, Bourdieu is very clear that no form of 
domination is complete and that there necessarily are frictions, inconsistencies and 
actual resistance to doxic beliefs. The role of the researcher, I would argue, is 
therefore to aim to reflexively explore these. Doxa as a method can help to question 
aspects of political representations that tend to be overlooked as well as pointing to 
an explanation why they are overlooked. 
Reality TV and, arguably, docusoaps in particular, portray social matters in an 
extremely individualised way. It is therefore not too surprising that the debate 
around the programme to a large degree mirrors this way of seeing the world. In 
similar vein, the morally and emotionally charged judgements can clearly be seen as 
mirroring the narrative structure of a TV genre that is predicated upon (classed) 
judgement.  
Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that the actual impact of a programme like 
People Like Us (2013l) can nowhere near conclusively be assessed by this type of 
analysis. As discussed above, even this analysis of very limited data shows that there 
are many different readings and interpretations of the programme. Those are 
inevitably linked to political as well as class positions and wider public discourses. 
Realty TV is not produced in a vacuum and it certainly is not consumed and discussed 
in a vacuum either.  
Even this brief analysis has shown how the perception of Reality TV is bound up with 
current political discourses. In a sense, the fixation on state benefits is indicative of 
that, but is, I would argue, largely a surface phenomenon of how a social and 
economic inequalities are justified, internalised and rarely questioned. 
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6. The docusoap genre 
 
In this chapter, I want to locate the docusoap genre historically to explore its 
similarities and differences with other, more traditional and conventional, forms of 
documentary filmmaking. I will discuss formal aspects as well as typical themes of 
docusoaps. However, following the ambition of Critical Discourse Analysis and 
Bourdieusian media critique, I intend to discuss how wider developments in the 
television market impacted on the development of the genre. The working conditions 
of those involved in the production of a docusoap will also be addressed. Equally, the 
relevance of outside influences and pressures on the media field will be touched on. 
Finally, I will discuss some points of critique that docusoaps generally face; namely, 
questions of quality and impact. Docusoaps are routinely accused of being of poor 
quality and of having a detrimental political impact. I do not intend to defend the 
genre against these accusations, but aim to critically engage with this critique and to 
assess whether it is based on criteria that should inform my own empirical analysis.  
 
6.1 The history of the docusoap 
 
The history of the docusoap genre is not easy to pin down, partly due to the fuzziness 
of its definition. It will be discussed later what constitutes a docusoap, but it is very 
clear that what is called docusoap today developed from more conventional forms of 
observational documentary filmmaking. It therefore can be stated that the docusoap 
is a relatively young television genre with a long history. For the purpose of this 
research, I want to point to similarities and differences between newer forms of 
documentary filmmaking (like docusoaps), and earlier, more traditional forms. My 
aim is to arrive at a characterisation of the genre that takes its historicity into account. 
Therefore, I will not recapitulate the history of the documentary genre in 
chronological order, but structure my analysis around a number characteristics 
relevant to this research. 
Observational cinema in the UK emerged as a documentary genre in the late 1950s; 
building on and further developing pre-war attempts of the filmmakers of the British 
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Documentary Film Movement around John Grierson (Bruzzi, 2001a). Observational 
cinema can be seen as a precursor of the docusoap insofar as there are clear parallels 
in terms of topics and filming techniques. Both tend to focus on ‘ordinary people’ and 
use supposedly unintrusive and passive filming techniques. The Australian TV 
programme Sylvania Waters (1992) is often regarded as the first TV programme to 
be labelled a docusoap (Kilborn, 2000). The commonalities with and differences to a 
programme like The Family (1974), that clearly stands in the tradition of 
observational direct cinema, illustrate the changing context of documentary 
filmmaking and points to wider developments in the television market as both were 
directed by the same director, Paul Watson, and reflect the changing contexts they 
were produced in. 
Arguably, the most consequential development in the documentary sector in the last 
two decades is the invention and popularisation of Reality TV. Hill (2005) states that 
docusoaps can be regarded as the second of three waves of Reality TV innovations. 
Crime-based reality programmes were followed by a boom in dramatized, soap-
opera-like observational documentaries and later by game-based reality TV shows 
(like Big Brother (2000) or Survivor (2001a)). It can be added that the docusoap genre 
itself went through a number or reincarnations. Whereas the earlier forms of 
docusoaps in the UK focused on the portrayal of workplaces (e.g. airports), the genre 
diversified, portraying the lives of celebrities as well as ordinary families in their 
homes and local communities. Other popular categories are the make-over format 
(e.g. Snog Marry Avoid? (2008b)) and, more recently, scripted-reality programmes 
(e.g. The Only Way is Essex (2010a)). The latter two are arguably furthest removed 
from the observational documentary tradition of the genre.  
My chosen empirical example, BBC Three’s People Like Us (2013l), can be seen as the 
first of a new wave of docusoaps that were set in deprived areas and explicitly 
advertised as such. It was followed by programmes like Skint (2013i) and the hugely 
successful Benefits Street (2014d).45  
                                                          
45 Again, there are obvious parallels with earlier observational documentaries like for 
instance The Scheme (2010b) that are generally put in the documentary category. 
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According to Kilborn (2000), it was not before the late 1990s that docusoaps had an 
impact on the schedules of British broadcasters. However, by 1999, alone the BBC 
had twelve docusoaps in production. Docusoaps proved a hugely successful 
innovation, even rivalling established prime-time formats in terms of viewing figures 
(Kilborn, 2000).  
Ever since, reality-based programmes fill large parts of the day- and also prime-time 
TV schedules. Even after 15 years, the draw of docusoaps appears unabated with the 
first episode of Benefits Street (2014d) being watched by 4.3 million viewers, more 
than any Channel 4 programme in the whole of 2013 (Collier, 2014).  
The proliferation of docusoaps was fuelled by two main factors: popularity with the 
viewers and comparatively low production costs. These factors will be discussed 
later, at this point, it is important to point out that wider developments in the 
television market contributed to the rise of the genre. Increasing deregulation and 
marketization generally made production costs and audience ratings a much greater 
concern for the broadcasters.46 Interestingly however, the dramatic increase in the 
number of TV channels did not necessarily result in a greater degree of variety and 
specialisation. As Kilborn et al. (2001) argue, consumer-oriented broadcasting largely 
resulted in uniformity. The docusoap genre is a good case in point, as there are 
numerous examples of very blatant replication of successful formulas – from BBC’s 
Airport (1996b) and ITV’s Airlines (1998a) to the aforementioned mini-wave of 
‘Poverty Porn’. Increased pressures on the broadcasters appear to have intensified 
the tendency to copy successful formats in an attempt to secure a channels’ market 
share. This argument will be further developed in the next sub-chapter.  
The production costs of a docusoap are only approximately one third of the 
equivalent amount of a sit-com (Bruzzi, 2006), which is in turn considerably cheaper 
to produce than television drama. As mentioned, docusoaps manage to attract vast 
numbers of viewers and, due to their parallels with popular drama, also attract a 
similar audience than fictional drama (Bruzzi, 2001b). The marketization of television, 
                                                          
46 With the launch of Sky television (1989), Channel 4 (1982), Channel 5 (1997) and ITV 2 
(1998) and the increasing availability and popularity of cable and satellite transmission, the 
number of available channels rocketed in the 1990s (Ofcom, 2014) and clearly increased 
the level of competition in the TV market. 
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does, as I will discuss shortly, not simply favour ‘cheap’ formats, it also has a 
significant impact on the conditions of production and through that on the content 
of those programmes (Graef, 1999).  
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that technological progress played a significant 
role in the development of the genre. The arrival of digital recording and editing 
equipment made it feasible to produce large amounts of film material for 
comparatively little output. Shooting on film would have been prohibitively expensive 
as the production of a docusoap tends to require a large amount of raw material 
(Bruzzi, 2001b). Digital filming and editing allows the production and handling of the 
large amounts of material that docusoaps require. 
 
6.2 Characteristics  
 
In the following, I want to explore the central characteristics of docusoaps in terms 
of content, but also with regards to production conditions and the most tangible and 
relevant differences to more traditional documentary filmmaking.  
 
6.2.1 Production conditions of the docusoap 
 
As mentioned above, due to technological advances, as well as social and political 
developments, the TV landscape has changed significantly over the last three decades 
(Ofcom, 2014) and it can certainly be expected that the full impact of the increased 
availability and popularity of new, digital media is yet to be felt for conventional 
broadcasters. In the following, I want to discuss how those changes that have already 
materialised impacted on the production conditions and through them shape the 
output of contemporary documentary filmmaking. 
Bourdieu regards considerations along these lines as highly relevant as he, as has 
been discussed in the methodology chapter, regards media output as to a 
considerable extent structured by the internal logic of the field. However, Bourdieu 
(1998) also acknowledges that the autonomy of the media field is severely limited by 
external factors like market demands. This is particularly true for the mass media. 
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Whereas the more elitist field of art, or the ‘field of restricted production’ (Susen, 
2011:176) enjoys a greater degree of autonomy, popular media or ‘fields of large-
scale production’ (Webb et al., 2002:182) are more dominated by economic 
interest.47  
This market logic drives the homogenisation of media output. The increased 
commodification of cultural products and the competition in which media products 
stand to each other, leads to greater uniformity. Bourdieu (1998) acknowledges that 
this sounds counter-intuitive and contradicts the promise of the free market 
economy that competition is a driver of diversity. However, the market pressures on 
television providers are, according to Bourdieu (1998), even stronger than in other 
areas of cultural production and leaves them with very little autonomy. Bourdieu 
(1998:23) therefore speaks of ‘a whole series of mechanisms, the most important of 
which is competition’ that lead to conformity. The competition for market share is 
the central pressure that limits the variety of television output. Many TV channels try 
to appeal to the biggest possible audience and catering for niche markets in the 
context of television is rarely a viable option. As alluded to above, another effect of 
competition is that tried and tested formats that proved successful for a competitor 
are often copied.  
Furthermore, Bourdieu (1998) identifies two more dimensions of competition that 
lead to a homogenisation of television output. Firstly, time is a rare commodity and 
people working in the television industry are under pressure to produce their output 
quickly. As a result, they tend to resort to clichés and to the repetition of what the 
viewer is used to. Bourdieu (1998:29) speaks of ‘received ideas’ that are easy to (re-) 
produce and even easier to receive and understand. Secondly, in a commodified and 
competitive environment, there is also a scarcity of jobs. This leads to a (partly 
unconscious) tendency to political conformity among people competing for or trying 
                                                          
47 According to Susen (2011), there is a dialectic of cultural distinction at play: whereas the 
somewhat autonomous field of art can create (or help to recreate) cultural distinction, the 
imperative for mass-appeal largely denies the mass media this capacity. There naturally is a 
negative correlation between popular appeal and the potential for cultural distinction. 
Processes of commodification work in significantly different ways for the respective fields 
of production. Whereas exclusivity and inaccessibility can be seen as vital components of 
high culture and a necessity in the creation of (economic and symbolic) value, the opposite 
is generally true for popular media products. 
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to secure their employment. Bourdieu (1998:17) is clear that this tendency to 
conform should not be regarded as an individual shortcoming, but that  
 
... individual corruption only masks the structural corruption ... that operates 
on the game as a whole through mechanisms such as competition for market 
share.  
 
Self-censorship and economic censorship go hand-in-hand.48 Whereas Bourdieu 
(2005) analyses processes of homogenisation and commodification on a more 
general level and in structural terms, a number of authors see his critique confirmed 
in the actual developments in the UK television market. Biressi and Nunn (2005) for 
instance, argue that the development of factual television in the UK cannot be 
understood without taking processes of commodification and capitalisation into 
account. Crucially, these processes also had a significant influence on public 
broadcasting that, if one accepts Bourdieu’s assumptions, would traditionally show a 
greater degree of independence (from market forces at least). The move from 
broadcasting as a public service to a largely consumer-oriented service provider had 
a very noticeable effect on programming in general and on the documentary genre 
in particular (Kilborn et al., 2001). 
The pressure television workers are under, the scarcity of time and competition for 
resources that Bourdieu (1998) describes, are confirmed for the documentary genre 
by the renowned filmmaker Roger Graef (1999), who states that the working 
conditions and the structural pressures in the documentary filmmaking genre have a 
negative impact on the quality of its output. Graef (1999:16) sums up his concerns as 
follows:  
 
If casualization, short contracts and quick turnarounds are the rule, how are 
skills developed and passed on? If ethics are not engrained, and results and 
ratings more important for survival, researchers must deliver or else. 
 
With regards to the scarcity of time Graef (1999:16) states: 
                                                          
48 These forms of censorship are, according to Bourdieu (1998), even more effective and 
problematic than censorship by political players or the state because their principle remains 
invisible. Television for Bourdieu (1998:27) provides little opportunity to go ‘against market 
imperatives’. 
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Time is undervalued in tight schedules. Time to reject and dig in research and 
development time to shoot over time ... 
 
Hewlett, in conversation with Fiddick (1999:23), seconds this assessments by stating 
that limited time and limited funding leads documentary-makers to ‘seek 
confirmation of what had been commissioned’ rather than to critically engage with 
the given subject matter and potentially produce unexpected and unconventional 
results.  
The notion of authenticity and truthfulness of documentary filmmaking will be 
explored later, but at this point I want to argue that the working conditions of 
filmmakers might be as big a factor (if not a bigger one) as possible political agendas 
or conscious attempts to manipulate public opinion on the side of the producers of 
television. Bourdieu goes as far as stating that accuracy is irrelevant in a television 
context where sensationalised headlines are everything (Webb et al., 2002). I imagine 
that many media analysts and practitioners would disagree with such a broad-brush 
judgement, and there are instances where misrepresentations and distortion of 
reality have backfired and severely damaged the offending programmes and 
therefore been proven not to be irrelevant at all.49 Nevertheless, even Winston 
(1999:22) who speaks of a ‘witch-hunt about truth and lies on tv’ concludes that 
commercial pressures on documentary-makers are difficult to reconcile with 
truthfulness, as in a ‘commercialised and casualised tv industry ... sensationalism has 
become all and honesty an unaffordable luxury’. According to Graef (1999:21), 
commercial pressures and time constraints lead to mistakes (partly caused by 
inexperience), but are also a ‘recipe for fakery’ and further:  
 
The cheapness and flexibility of the new technology plus the increasing 
competition and focus on ratings and profits makes hoaxing, or at least 
massaging a modest story into a sensation, both easy and more tempting 
                                                          
49 The most prominent example of recent times is probably Carlton Television’s The 
Connection (1996c) where the undeclared recreation (maybe fabrication is the more 
appropriate term) of supposed drug smuggling was exposed as such and caused a lot of 
financial and reputational damage to the involved channel and production company (Hill, 
2005). 
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Bourdieu’s assessment that accuracy is no concern for television might be an 
oversimplification, but it appears that there is a clear tension between journalistic 
standards and claims of truthfulness on the one side, and market demands that 
create working conditions that are hardly conductive to integrity on the other side. 
Maybe it is a more realistic assessment that accuracy is (only) insofar a concern for 
documentary filmmaking, as a gross violation of established norms can, if detected, 
become a problem for broadcasters. I will later discuss what these established norms 
consist of and to what degree they meet a lay understanding of authenticity. 
Finally, I want to point to another dimension of exploitation, as it appears that it is 
not only people behind the cameras that are potentially being exploited as a result of 
the commodification of culture and the according market pressures. As I will discuss 
later, the docusoap genre heavily relies on the depiction of the emotions of its 
‘characters’ and, it could be argued, this focus on displayed emotions provides a 
substitute for a plausibly developed narration or a more in-depth engagement with 
the lives of the participants. In order to be able to capture the display of emotions on 
camera, producers of docusoaps need, generally speaking, to gain the trust of the 
subjects who agree to be filmed. They are encouraged to share their inner-world with 
the camera and ultimately with the audience. Docusoaps are much more character-
centred than issue-centred (Kilborn, 2000) and are therefore generally very keen on 
capturing emotionally charged, and therefore ‘authentic’, situations or (self-
confessional) statements of their protagonists. This foregrounding of affect and 
emotions will be discussed later with regards to the empirical example, but it should 
be pointed out that pressures to produce successful entertainment at relatively low 
cost intensifies the temptation (or the need) to prompt and exploit the display of 
emotions. Again, Graef (1999) backs up this assumption through his experience as a 
practitioner and argues that there is a huge degree of trust among members of the 
public as well as institutions that can easily be exploited by the filmmaker. As 
previously discussed, Graef (1999) is of the opinion that appeals to ethical behaviour 
and journalistic standards are unlikely to prevail in an increasingly commercialised 
and competitive environment. Fiddick (1999:23), citing Gardman, refers to the 
ambiguity of getting close to people and then having to ‘distance yourself in the 
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cutting-room’. It is not a new phenomenon that people are being exploited on 
television, both behind and in front of the camera, and, as I will argue later, the issue 
is not a straightforward one when consenting adults are involved. However, there 
can be little doubt that focussing on the displayed emotions in a potentially 
exploitative way is very compatible with the need for cheap, easy and fast to produce 
television entertainment. Bourdieu (1984b:8) argues that the commodification of 
culture reinforces 
 
... the primacy of form over function, of the mode of representation over the 
object of representation .... Affirming the primacy of the saying over the thing 
said.  
 
Therefore, appearance is key. Emotions need to be visibly displayed; for Reality TV 
the authenticity or context is secondary to them being clearly displayed and easily 
readable.  
 
6.2.2 Content  
 
As I mentioned above, the docusoap as a genre is not easy to pin down and even in 
its relatively short history it has been through a number of reincarnations. 
Nevertheless, there are a small number of typical and identifiable docusoap themes. 
Most notably, docusoaps tend to revolve around the portrayal of ‘real lives’ and ‘real 
people’ and ‘ordinary’ subjects (Holmes and Jermyn, 2004) . The focus of the 
docusoap tends to be on the banal and minutiae (Skeggs and Wood, 2012a) and the 
quotidian (Bruzzi, 2006). However, it is fairly obvious that ordinariness in a docusoap 
context has a somewhat different meaning to the common usage of the word. Even 
when celebrity-based varieties of the programme are not taken into account, 
docusoaps tend to depict situations, workplaces and people that are to a varying 
degree extra-ordinary. Ordinary in a television context therefore, first and foremost, 
means that the themes and subjects depicted in the programmes are supposed to be 
non-fictional and at least somewhat relatable to the viewers’ perceptions of reality. 
As mentioned, the issue of authenticity will be discussed separately, but at this point, 
I want to question the notion of ‘ordinariness’ a little further. It is certainly part of the 
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appeal of docusoaps to revolve around issues, situations and people the viewer can 
relate to and that are not too distant from their own social world or, if not that, not 
too dissimilar to accepted conceptions of contemporary social realities. As I will show 
with regards to my chosen empirical example, authenticity and ordinariness are 
claimed by docusoaps and used as a major selling point. However, there is a strong 
case for docusoaps, due to their main intention to entertain, being structurally 
incapable of effectively portraying ordinariness. Corner (2002), for instance, points 
to contradictions that arises when docusoaps, and Reality TV in general, pretend to 
portray ordinariness by creating very temporal, constructed and artificial situations. 
What appears, or is intended to appear, natural, spontaneous and uncontrolled is, as 
Bruzzi (2006) argues, a highly controlled setting in which the structure of the 
programme is predetermined and the locations and cast are carefully selected. The 
casting of docusoaps clearly, and maybe unsurprisingly, shows a tendency to choose 
characters that are able and willing to display what Dovey (2000:172) describes as 
‘new subjectivities’ that foreground the particular and the specific. The success of a 
docusoap appears very much to depend on the main ‘characters’ and therefore 
Lawson (2013) states that for the docusoap genre that ‘this type of film is as obsessed 
as any Hollywood blockbuster with casting’. 
Docusoaps are, due to constraints of the production process and the medium in 
general, unable to present all aspects of reality, as Kilborn et al. (2001) demonstrate 
with reference to the work-based docusoap Vets in Practice (1997a). To what extent 
documentary filmmaking can successfully portray reality shall be discussed later, it 
seems, however, that the docusoap genre restricts itself to the portrayal of a small 
number of aspects of reality that cannot be explained by the inherent limitations of 
documentary filmmaking alone.  
As previously discussed, docusoaps clearly favour the personal over the social. It 
certainly can be argued that the former is easier to capture on camera than the latter, 
but it is questionable how Reality TV can, in a meaningful way, claim to portray 
‘ordinariness’ without making reference to (ordinary) circumstances. If social 
background features in docusoaps it tends to do so solely as a, often negative, 
reference point and as something ‘from which the individual has risen, indeed which 
he or she has overcome, on the quest to selfhood’ (Palmer, 2004:186).  
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Docusoaps, as well as their more sober predecessors, appear to be drawn to working-
class communities and the depiction of them and their members. Arguably, 
depictions of working-class people and communities imply authenticity in a way that 
portrayals of more privileged circumstances do not. Skeggs and Wood (2012a) show 
that the Grierson-influenced British social-realist documentaries of the 1940s 
specifically and explicitly intended to expose everyday life and in their context, 
working-class experience was almost equated with ‘the real’, despite, as Kilborn and 
Izod (1997) point out, the documentarists themselves generally having been middle-
class professionals.50  
Docusoaps do generally not only marginalise issues (Bruzzi, 2006) in favour of the 
microsocial (Corner, 2002) they take their focus on the individual to the extreme by 
constructing narratives along the lines of therapeutic discourses. This is most evident 
in the make-over formats (Palmer, 2004), but a construction of life as an ongoing 
individual quest for true selfhood appears to inform most varieties of the genre. 
Docusoaps clearly focus on the self, but often on selves that face challenges that 
(seemingly) take place on the level of the individual. Biressi and Nunn (2005:96) speak 
of ‘public disclosure’ and ‘narrativisation of personal identity’ as crucial elements of 
contemporary factual television. I will later discuss to what extent this general 
assessment is applicable to my empirical example, but it is evident that docusoaps 
offer a (relatively) new platform for the public performance of a mediated self 
(Skeggs and Wood, 2012a).  
It is debateable whether a hyper-individualised, almost therapeutic narrative of the 
self can in itself be seen as an ‘ordinary’ way of making sense of the world. What 
seems less debateable is the intention of docusoaps to foreground psychological 
struggles and to neglect social, let alone political, aspects of ordinary circumstances. 
As I will argue in the following section, this almost exclusive focus on the individual, 
                                                          
50 It appears that fictional and non-fictional social realist filmmaking influenced each other 
and that in the British context the approach of the pre-war documentarists was picked up 
by the filmmakers of the British New Wave around Tony Richardson, Jack Clayton, Lindsay 
Anderson etc. As Hill (1999) demonstrates, there are clear parallels between the genres in 
terms of ambition and content. Like social realist documentaries, these fictional 
representations tried to portray working-class people as ‘“real”, “fully-rounded” characters 
in ”real” settings (the regions, cities, factories etc.) with “real” problems’ (Hill, 1999:130). 
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personal and private is something that sets the docusoaps genre apart from more 
traditional and conventional forms of documentary filmmaking. 
 
6.2.3 Documentary vs. docusoap 
 
As shown above, docusoaps clearly stand in the tradition of documentary filmmaking 
and observational documentaries in particular. It seems however that an adjustment 
of the ‘focal length’ (Corner, 2002:256) has taken place. In docusoaps, localised 
personal narratives and the display of emotions are much more in the foreground 
than in traditional documentary filmmaking. As described above, the ‘inner story’ 
generally gets ‘pulled rather sharply away from its broader social conditions and 
contingencies’ (Corner, 2002:256) and the (social) background of a person appears in 
the docusoap as just that: a background that might or might not be part of a personal 
narrative.  
This foregrounding of the personal is possibly the most obvious, but actually just one 
of a number of characteristics of a ‘postdocumentary culture of television’ (Corner, 
2002:257). Docusoaps look different from conventional observational 
documentaries. This is not too surprising - the hint is in the name - as docusoaps 
resemble soap operas with regards to the way stories are developed and storylines 
interwoven, in the way music is used to amplify the affective dimension of the plot, 
and also with regards to their dramatised narrative structure. Docusoaps generally 
incorporate many playful elements that conventional documentaries do usually not 
employ (Corner, 2002). The narration or ‘voice-over’ of docusoaps tends to be much 
more light-hearted and humorous. Docusoaps can, in contrast to conventional 
documentaries, certainly not be characterised as a ‘discourse of sobriety’ (Corner, 
2002:264). This is reflected in the topics, but probably even more so in the style and 
tone of the programmes. Skeggs and Wood (2012a:26) point out that in docusoaps 
‘objectivity and rationality give way to subjectivity and sensation.’ This development 
is also reflected in the fact that docusoaps put a much greater emphasis on the 
‘performance’ of their protagonists. This is particularly true for those variants of the 
genre in which the participants are put in constructed and unusual situations. It can 
however be argued that alone the presence of a camera (crew) creates a somewhat 
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unusual and constructed situation and that therefore a performative element is 
unavoidable. Bruzzi (2001b) makes the very relevant point that despite the 
performances of its protagonists being a vital component for the success of a 
docusoap production, the genre displays a great reluctance in acknowledging that 
fact and to a large extent holds on to claims of authenticity. 
This reluctance to concede that performance plays a role in the production of a 
docusoap, is, as I intend to demonstrate in relation to my empirical example, to some 
degree caused by a concern that this would undermine the programmes’ claims of 
authenticity and truthfulness. There is a tension between the notions of ‘performed 
self’ and the ‘true self’ that Reality TV exploits, but fails to lay open. Pretentiousness 
or ‘fakeness’ of participants can be used in the narrative and the portrayal of a 
character, but the artificiality of the setting, plus the manipulative potential of the 
editing process, necessarily remains in the dark.  
Truthfulness is another area where differences between traditional forms of 
observational documentary filmmaking and docusoaps can be made visible. In a 
nutshell, it can be argued that the focus has switched from the ambition to present 
the real to the aim to ‘stage the real’ (Skeggs and Wood, 2012a:23). Holmes and 
Jermyn (2004) come to the conclusion that in contemporary documentary filmmaking 
attempts to capture real life are secondary to the demands of the format and to an 
emphasis on performance and display. Whereas a concern with ‘the truth’ was 
traditionally at the core of documentaries, docusoaps appear less concerned with the 
distinction between fact and fiction (Skeggs and Wood, 2012a).51 Whereas, for 
instance, Paul Watson’s The Family (1974) was meant to be read as a true 
representation of ordinary British family life in the 1970s (Biressi and Nunn, 2005), its 
descendants do not let go of the claim of truthfulness completely, but appear to be 
much more geared towards entertaining their viewers and less concerned with the 
notion of authenticity.  
The intended impact and, if one exists, the political agenda of docusoaps remain 
somewhat unclear. This fuzziness can be seen as another characteristic that 
                                                          
51 Corner (2002) even argues that the playful, performative and entertaining style of 
contemporary reality-based programmes impacted to some extent on the general 
conception of categories like ‘the public’, ‘the social’ and ‘the real’. 
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separates the genre from the tradition of documentary filmmaking. Corner (2002) 
acknowledged that entertainment and diversion has always been among the 
intentions of documentary filmmakers, but beyond that sees the genre as rooted in 
journalistic inquiry and a sometimes radical interrogation of perceived social and 
political ills. Documentaries, or at least a significant proportion of them, traditionally 
aspired to offer an alternative perspective and to add to the public discourse. In 
particular, early social-realist documentary filmmaking, influenced by Grierson’s 
work, showed a strong commitment to exposing the living conditions of the poor and 
capturing working-class experience more generally (Skeggs and Wood, 2012a). The 
aforementioned The Family (1974) can be seen in that tradition and its maker, Paul 
Watson, as quoted by Biressi and Nunn (2005:66), distances himself from newer, 
docusoap-like developments of his approach:  
 
They sneered and didn’t enrich our lives or understanding, even when dealing 
with serious hurt in Neighbours From Hell. Most of the time it was middle-
class media people taking the piss out of people performing for the 15 
minutes of fame.  
 
So Watson’s aim was to ‘enrich lives’ and ‘enrich understanding’ whereas he regards 
programmes like the one mentioned as not helpful and potentially damaging. Kilborn 
(2000:112) follows a similar line of argument and concludes that the 
programmemakers of docusoaps are more concerned with producing ‘mildly 
diverting entertainment than one that is likely to raise a viewer’s level of social 
awareness’. Ken Loach’s Cathy Come Home (1966), although strictly speaking not a 
documentary, is often referred to as a programme that, by choosing to depict the 
lives and the suffering of (fictional) working-class people, had a palpable impact in a 
political sense (Biressi and Nunn, 2005).  
I would, however, argue that it is problematic to label conventional documentary as 
inherently critical and docusoaps as solely geared towards entertainment and 
(therefore) apolitical or even depoliticising. I will discuss this common criticism 
shortly, but I would argue that it is problematic to jump to conclusions regarding the 
supposedly depoliticising impact of docusoaps and to contrast them with the alleged 
journalistic qualities and agency of conventional documentaries. Furthermore, this 
sort of juxtapositioning runs the risk of producing unhelpful generalisations. I very 
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much agree with Holmes and Jermyn (2004) who argue that in the contemporary 
television landscape, boundaries between genres have become blurred and 
therefore thinking in binaries is not helpful. Programmes and their function and 
impact cannot be judged based on, increasingly complex, genre classifications. As 
much as even very sober social-realist documentaries have a somewhat entertaining 
(arguably voyeuristic) element, as can a seemingly shallow and unpolitical 
programme like Wife Swap (2003) (that I will come back to later) be interpreted as 
an illuminating social experiment that tells us more about class divisions than 
conventional, pedagogically-minded documentary filmmaking.  
Equally unhelpful are binaries with regards to considerations about the respective 
genres’ relationship with ‘the truth’. I would argue that the differences between 
conventional documentary and docusoap are of a gradual rather than fundamental 
nature. Even early social-realist documentary filmmaking relied, for instance, on the 
re-enactment of scenes (Graef, 1999) and John Grierson (as cited in Holmes and 
Jermyn, 2004:11) himself described his own documentary filmmaking as ‘the creative 
interpretation of reality’. The sobriety and self-restraint of the social-realists can, 
even with the best of intentions, not escape the contradictions that accompany any 
attempts of capturing reality or ‘the truth’ on film. Corner (2002:263), referring to 
these early social-realist attempts, concludes that their attempted naturalism was 
ultimately ‘highly implausible’. As I have touched on above and intend to develop 
further with regards to my empirical analysis, the ‘truth’ and ‘authenticity’ of filmic 
representations are extremely complex issues that warrant a thorough analysis of 
their general conditions and specific realisations. Broad-brush categorisations along 
genre lines are not helpful. 
My intention is not to gloss over significant genre differences and to portray 
docusoaps as a, more or less, benign and, more or less, realistic representation of 
social realities. Quite the opposite. However, it seems to me that the docusoap genre 
has to be seen as developed from conventional observational documentaries and not 
as standing in sharp contrast to it. The specifics of it can best be explored if 
generalisations and demonizing value judgments are avoided. In the following, I 
intend to discuss the most central and relevant of these judgments that tend to 
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revolve around questions of quality and also further the argument around the 
allegedly malign political impact of the genre.  
 
6.3 Critique 
 
In the following, I want to add to the characterisation of the docusoap genre by 
discussing points of critique that are generally levelled at it. Firstly, I will deal with the 
critique that docusoaps lack quality and generally represent rather poor television. 
Secondly, I will refer to the concern that docusoaps have a problematic political 
impact.  
 
6.3.1 Quality 
 
Docusoaps are often described as an inferior form of documentary filmmaking. 
Kilborn (2000:111) for instance sees the danger that they ‘potentially devalue the 
whole currency of documentary’ filmmaking by trivialising serious subjects. It appears 
that there is a correlation between the comparatively low production costs and the 
cultural value that is ascribed to the genre (Skeggs and Wood, 2012a; Holmes and 
Jermyn, 2004). A rather common line of critique therefore revolves around the 
assumption that due to their relative cheapness in terms of production costs, 
docusoaps can be seen as cheap and less worthy television. In the hierarchical order 
of television output, docusoaps appear close to the bottom and clearly below 
conventional documentaries. Brunsdon (1990:67) makes the observation that 
docusoaps are routinely criticised for lacking quality, but that it appears that ‘only the 
most conservative ideas about quality are circulating’. One of the more prominent 
critics of docusoaps, or in this case of Reality TV in general, is John Humphrys (2004): 
 
Reality implies authenticity and honesty. And whatever some of this stuff may 
be, it is not authentic and it is not honest. This is not just bad television in the 
sense that it's mediocre, pointless, puerile even. It's bad because it is 
damaging. 
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Humphrys (2004) is of the opinion that Reality TV damages or ‘desensitises’ the 
audience, and has a negative impact on television output in general, claiming that 
‘they have infected the mainstream of the medium’. 
This critique embodies what Holmes and Jermyn (2004) see as a paternalistic impulse 
to protect a supposedly vulnerable and malleable audience from attempts of 
manipulation. Also, Brunsdon (1990) is very critical of a value judgement like 
Humphrys’ and rightly asks the questions: ‘Quality for whom? Judgment by whom? 
On whose behalf?’ and goes on to state that what audiences gain from docusoaps 
does not necessarily correlate with ultimately subjective value judgments. However, 
and Brunsdon (1990) refers to this, value judgments are not subjective at all and 
always bound up with the social structure of a society as well as with questions of 
power.  
Lawson (2013) makes the point that the relationship between docusoaps and other 
television genres is a more complex and reciprocal one than Humphrys implies. He 
points to mock-documentaries like The Office (2001b) to demonstrate its creative 
impact on fictional filmmaking.  
Again, it is helpful to return to Bourdieu’s critique of taste. Bourdieu (1984a) 
demonstrates how taste is bound up with class positions and is also used to 
legitimise, ascertain and reproduce difference. Cultural classification systems reflect 
the socio-economic divisions of the class system (Susen, 2011). Therefore, 
supposedly subjective judgments very much tend to reflect socio-economic positions. 
Brunsdon (1990) adds to this that some judgments are perceived as more subjective 
than others. In a Bourdieusian sense, value judgements are seen as more objective 
the closer they are to legitimate taste. Coming back to the docusoap genre, its 
classification as ‘trash TV’ is based on moral and aesthetic criteria which are 
themselves part of an ideological discourse (Holmes and Jermyn, 2004). Debates 
around cultural value are shaped by class struggles and, as Bourdieu (1984a) 
demonstrates, power is always at stake when the worth of cultural products is 
discussed. Docusoaps, like their preferred subjects, rank low on the hierarchy of 
tastes and this fact cannot be explained by supposedly objective aesthetic criteria; 
quite the opposite, it brings their classed character to light.  
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This is not to say that cultural products like docusoaps cannot, and should not, be 
criticised, but acts as a reminder not to ‘retreat into a position of class and taste-
based superiority’ (Palmer, 2004:175). I would argue that there are plenty of reasons 
to be very critical of docusoaps and some of those will be explored in the empirical 
analysis, however labelling them as ‘trash’ is problematic and clearly a reflection of 
classed cultural hierarchies. Both their relatively low production costs and their focus 
on ‘ordinary people’ make docusoaps susceptible to class snobbery. The ‘cheapness’ 
of Reality TV makes it an easy target. Assessing the quality or cultural worth of 
television output can easily and uncritically fall back on unhelpful criteria. I would, 
therefore, suggest a critical engagement with this critique and an exploration of the 
implications of classed value judgments. This does not let docusoaps off the hook or 
make them uncriticisable. Quite the opposite; as I intend to demonstrate in my 
empirical analysis, docusoaps can be scrutinised if not for their (lack of) ‘quality’ or 
their ‘tastelessness’, but critiqued for their misleading claims of truthfulness, for their 
potential to exploit their subjects, for their intentional and unintentional political 
impact etc. My aim is however not to reproduce classed and morally loaded value 
judgments, but to assess docusoaps against their own claims. Finally, and possibly 
most importantly, the view of participants of one particular programme will be 
presented and will help to substantiate an assessment of the programme. Before that 
however, I will briefly explore lines of argument that criticise docusoaps on a political 
level and with particular regard to their political function and impact. 
 
6.3.2 Banal vs. political & impact 
 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, Bourdieu’s media analysis can be described 
as somewhat patchy and largely focused on the internal mechanisms of the media 
field as well as on external forces that shape its output. Bourdieu regards the media 
field as semi-autonomous and therefore of limited capacity to set an agenda 
independent of influential political and economic players. To what extent media 
outlets are capable of independently defining and pursuing political aims is 
debatable, and, as discussed, Bourdieu has been criticised for understating this 
capacity. He is however quite clear that the impact of mass media is not to be 
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underestimated. Whether their agenda is their own or largely influenced by powerful 
players in the political and the economic field, media organisations have a huge 
influence on their audience. For Bourdieu (1998:18) television is a particularly 
powerful medium as it 
 
... enjoys a de facto monopoly on what goes into the heads of a significant 
part of the population and what they think.  
 
The media field, and television in particular, is therefore a crucial battleground where 
meaning and the legitimacy of power are at stake. As discussed in relation to the 
Bourdieusian concept of doxa, meaning is always the result of political struggles and 
power constantly needs to be legitimised discursively. Of course, this process cannot 
be regarded as transparent and democratic due to the subconscious dimension of 
doxa and, more importantly, the unequal degree of influence that individuals and 
groups of people can exert. Cultural struggles, fought out in the media field ‘are 
always struggles over the parameters of social legitimacy’ (Susen, 2011:180). 
Therefore, people or groups of people who are in powerful positions to shape media 
output have a greater capacity to exert social and political control. Cultural 
domination, in a (neo-)Marxist as well as in a Bourdieusian sense, goes hand and hand 
with political domination.52 Nevertheless, it is important not to over-simplify this 
relation and to acknowledge degrees of freedom and the potential of media-, even 
television-, output to go against dominant ways of producing meaning. Bourdieu 
himself helped to illustrate this fact by having two of his lectures (on television) 
broadcast on French national television, relatively free of limitations (Webb et al., 
2002).  
A common line of critique is that docusoaps are apolitical or even depoliticising due 
to their foregrounding of emotional aspects and their focus on the individual and the 
micro-social. Bourdieu (1998:51) is very critical of the tendency to dramatise and 
sensationalise events and states that  
 
                                                          
52 This is not to say that material conditions ceased to matter; economic domination is not 
replaced with, but to a great extent mediated by cultural domination (Susen, 2011). 
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... human interest stories create a political vacuum. They depoliticize and 
reduce what goes on in the world to the level of anecdote and scandal.  
 
Skeggs and Wood (2012a) refer to this critique along similar lines, regarding 
sensationalism and rationality as mutually exclusive and emotional engagement as 
not helpful in the political debate. In this view, the sensation produced by Reality TV 
has no political connection nor public purpose. Skeggs and Wood (2012a:26) quote 
Nichols who sums up this critique by stating:  
 
The very intensity of feelings, emotions, sensation, involvement that reality 
TV produces is also discharged harmlessly within its dramatic envelope of 
banality.  
 
Corner (2002) sees a similar dichotomy as for him the focus on the micro-social has 
to a large extent replaced a critical engagement with social and political structures. 
This shift is also reflected in the intended purpose of documentary filmmaking, that 
according to Corner (2002:260) has shifted from journalistic inquiry or interrogation 
to diversion which he characterises as: ‘snoopy sociability’ and goes on to state that: 
‘Propagandistic, expositional, or analytic goals are exchanged for modes of intensive 
or relaxed diversion’. In this view, the focus on individual stories that are presented 
in a sensationalised and dramatized way diverts the viewers’ attention away from 
general, structural and political consideration to individual fates. The main point of 
critique is that any sort of social or political context is omitted from the narrative.  
However, it can equally be argued that the foregrounding of emotions and even their 
presentation in sensationalised form is not in itself apolitical or depoliticising. Quite 
the opposite, the portrayal of emotions can be very politicising and open up political 
debates. Corner (2002) points to the fact that even very early, comparatively sober 
and consciously political documentary filmmaking in the 1920s and 1930s did not just 
seek cognitive, but also affective impact. Skeggs and Wood (2012a) add that a 
number of feminist writers regard the portrayal of supposedly private spheres of life, 
including their emotional dimensions, as potentially political. A focus on the domestic 
or even on the (supposedly) banal has the potential to politicise allegedly private 
domains and to illustrate how social and political developments (like for instance 
policy changes) impact on everyday life of the people concerned. Corner (2006) 
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explores how the docusoap Wife Swap (2003)53 illustrates class differences in modern 
Britain in a way that more conventional documentary filmmaking would struggle to 
do. The ‘deliberate mismatch’ (Corner, 2006:72) of families is certain to produce 
tensions and drama, but also often provides insights into the classed differences of 
domestic life. This view is seconded by Biressi and Nunn (2005:64) who state that:  
 
The best docusoaps, which may be regarded as a sub-genre of observational 
documentary, with their detailed attention to family and personal life, are 
especially adept at exposing the fractures in the social structure that maintain 
social cohesion.  
 
So it appears that the focus on the supposedly banal and private and the 
foregrounding of emotions does not preclude political arguments, let alone 
politicised readings. The portrayal of the specific can clearly, directly or indirectly, 
refer to the general. Whether intentionally or not, a docusoap like Wife Swap (2003) 
reveals aspects of inequality and class cultures. Even the most personal, seemingly 
individual, accounts have the potential to challenge social conventions and political 
convictions. 
Furthermore, docusoaps can be seen as politically relevant by widening access to 
television and giving a voice to people who in the past rarely appeared on screen. 
Couldry (2011) states that Reality TV can make populations appear and for Biressi and 
Nunn (2005) the representation of ordinary people is political in itself. Reality TV can 
make views heard that tend to be absent from mainstream television and provide  
 
... implicit social commentary ... through a commitment to revealing social 
structures and challenging the preconceptions of viewers through the 
revelation of the patent ‘humanity’ of its film subjects’ (Biressi and Nunn, 
2005:63). 
 
 Bourdieu (1998:21) argues that the power of television to make populations appear 
is very significant:  
 
                                                          
53 in which two women of often widely differing class background swap their homes and 
families for two weeks. 
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This power to show is also a power to mobilize. It can give life to ideas or 
images, but also to groups.  
 
However, it is obvious that simply portraying disadvantaged and marginalised groups 
cannot be seen as giving them a voice and empowering them. Crucially, questions of 
power and control need to be asked as docusoaps, and documentaries in general, 
have the potential to exploit their participants and to paint a rather unfavourable 
picture or, perhaps equally problematic, to adopt a paternalistic stance that 
maintains power inequalities in a different fashion, but to a similar extent. Docusoaps 
certainly improved access to television for groups (and classes) that were, and still 
are, underrepresented on television screens. I would, however, argue that there 
needs to be a critical assessment of whose terms this widening of access is on, who 
controls it and who benefits from it.  
Finally, there is a line of argument that is less concerned with the focus on individual 
stories and their emotional dimension, but with the way these (supposedly) 
individual stories are developed narratively. This view is summed up by Palmer 
(2004:187) as the ‘triumph of the therapeutic’ in Reality TV. Bourdieu (1998:52) 
argues that television, with its tendency to individualise and sensationalise, activates 
‘purely sentimental and therapeutic forms of mobilizing feelings’. It is not so much 
the foregrounding of the individual that is seen as problematic, but the way in which 
these narratives are structured. Life is presented as an endless individual challenge 
and a quest for individual fulfilment that revolves around a never-ending series of 
choices.54 Docusoaps not only focus on the individual, they also suggest that the 
individual needs to be invested in ‘a commercialized and commodified project of the 
self’ (Skeggs and Wood, 2012a:28). Self-responsibility is at the centre of many reality 
formats and probably most prominent in the make-over varieties, but also docusoaps 
appear very much informed by therapeutic discourses which 
 
... provide a language for acknowledging the intensities of subjective 
experience in a world where power structures and decision-making processes 
appear to alienate and exclude the everyday individual and the quotidian life 
(Biressi and Nunn, 2005:104). 
                                                          
54 Reality TV has the tendency to present these choices as morally loaded and, as Skeggs 
and Wood (2012a) point out, the ethical judgments of these choices are generally based on 
conservative ideas of ‘the family’ and ‘responsibility’. 
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Subjectivity appears to have become the only way of making sense of the world.55  
As touched upon previously, the individual is easier to capture on camera than the 
social and equally an individual choice is easier to narrate and to dramatise than the 
complex and messy interplay of structure and agency. Nevertheless, is it a fair 
criticism that docusoaps, intentionally or not, tend to reproduce the ideology of self-
responsibility and, as Skeggs and Wood (2012a:28) put it, of ‘compulsory 
individuality’. Reality TV acts as a template for self-reliance and self-work and can 
therefore be seen as a pedagogic cultural technology that promotes self-governance 
(Skeggs and Wood, 2012a). Docusoaps suggest a way of making sense of the world 
that neglects social conditions in favour of individual subjectivity. Their narration 
tends to point to the self as a closed psychological entity as opposed to a self in social 
contexts.  
Here I have shown that it is problematic to make general, broad-brush statements 
about the political function of docusoaps. There are a number of very valid points of 
critique regarding their political function, mainly around their extreme focus on 
individual narratives and their almost complete omissions of the social and political 
dimensions of the portrayed stories. However, this critique says very little about the 
actual impact of these programmes. The audience’s reading of a docusoap might vary 
considerably from the alleged depoliticising effect. Equally, the foregrounding of 
drama and emotions is not depoliticising in itself and, therefore, simplifying 
conclusions should be avoided. Docusoaps make people who are not usually present 
at all appear on screen, and offer a chance to make their views heard and offer 
insights into the lives of people and communities outside the mainstream of society. 
In particular, in a classed society with extreme inequalities, this can be seen as a very 
valuable and important contribution. The critique that docusoaps add to the 
establishment of a very individualised, almost therapeutic world-view, needs to be 
taken seriously. The way storylines in docusoaps tend to be developed, appears very 
                                                          
55 Dovey (2000:21) argues: ’... individual experience has always been a feature of 
documentary practices as evidential support to an argument. Here the relationship is turned 
around; the individual experience occupies the foreground and any “argument” is often 
impossible to discern.’ 
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compatible with the contemporary and ideological emphasis on self-governance. This 
world-view gains it persuasiveness from its omnipresence and is therefore a social 
doxa that is difficult to oppose. As discussed in the methodology chapter, media 
products like docusoaps can hardly be interpreted in a meaningful way if not related 
to wider political and social developments. Therefore, I would argue, docusoaps, to a 
great degree, mirror the power structures of the environment they are produced in. 
In a sense they offer a chance to challenge common perceptions about the working 
class, however their potential to empower their subjects should not be overstated 
and the production conditions and power structures of contemporary documentary 
filmmaking need to be critically assessed. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Docusoaps, it has been argued, should be seen as a television genre in their own right. 
However, I hope to have made the point, that a generalising critique is unhelpful in 
many regards. There is a temptation to see docusoaps as the corrupted offspring of 
proper, traditional documentary filmmaking in terms of journalistic, inquisitive ethos, 
filmic quality and intended impact. I would however argue that docusoaps clearly 
stand in the tradition of (observational) documentary filmmaking and that 
differences are more of a gradual than of a fundamental nature with regards to all of 
the aforementioned aspects. 
Equally, the potential to exploit their subjects is not unique to docusoaps. The main 
intention of this research project is to gain an insights into how questions of access 
and power come into effect in the production of one particular docusoap and to get 
the participants’ view on whether they felt represented fairly. Due to their (recent) 
focus on underprivileged communities, docusoaps principally offer a relatively rare 
opportunity to make communities and opinions appear on screen that are generally 
vastly underrepresented. They have the potential to challenge common, 
stereotypical perceptions, but they equally have the potential to simply exploit 
stereotypes as a structuring device and therefore to exacerbate them. 
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Questions of authenticity and truthfulness are often at the core of debates around 
docusoaps but are clearly not straightforward to answer. There are examples of 
detected hoaxing and wilful manipulation. However, even with the best of intentions, 
documentary filmmaking is faced with the impossible task of depicting realness and 
ordinariness in artificial and extra-ordinary circumstances. Moreover, as discussed 
above, requirements of the genre and commercial pressures in the television industry 
appear to shape the production process in a way that is not conductive to truthful 
portrayals. I intend to engage with the complexity of the issue of authenticity in 
filmmaking in my empirical analysis. 
Bourdieu’s approach to take the actual working conditions and the logic of the media 
field into account when analysing its output, appears very relevant and there seems 
to be (limited) evidence that supports the assumption that developments in factual 
television are to a considerable degree caused by changes in the working conditions 
of the people who produce these programmes. Incorporating the views of the 
producers of People Like Us (2013l) would surely offer valuable insights, but attempts 
to recruit people involved in the production of the programme were unsuccessful. 
Generally, the production side of docusoaps appears relatively under-researched, 
which is insofar regrettable as research along these lines promises to offer an 
opportunity to comprehend the commodification of culture and its implications in 
more practical terms.  
As I have discussed in the methodology chapter, the key aim of this research project 
is to link the discourse analysis of a TV programme to considerations of wider 
developments in the TV market and wider social and political structures. One of the 
central aims of Critical Discourse Analysis is to comprehend media products in 
political and social contexts. I hope to have illustrated in the above that this approach 
is relevant, meaningful and also potentially fruitful. However, it appears that the 
internal logic of and, even more so, outside influences on the media field are rather 
elusive and difficult to research from an outsider’s perspective. The degree, the full 
implications, and the actual exercise of economic and political influence on mass 
media are very much in the dark. And, as Bourdieu aimed to capture with his concept 
of doxa, (media) bias cannot solely be comprehended as the result of conscious 
intervention by those in power. Common perceptions that are picked up and 
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repeated by the mass media are, from a Bourdieusian perspective, as much 
influenced by unquestioned, stereotypical assumptions as much as they should be 
seen as conscious attempts at manipulating public opinion. Bourdieu is quite clear 
that the mass media are a battleground for the legitimacy of power. Therefore, I 
would argue, it must be asked in whose interest the repetition of stereotypical images 
is and, secondly, which mechanisms and structures are in place to shape media 
output in a biased, interest-driven way. In other words: who benefits from which 
media representations and who is in a position to control them?56  
The perception of the audience, as well as the views of participants of one particular 
docusoap, will be explored with the help of empirical data. I have discussed the 
limitations of the respective methods, but, I would argue, that it is nevertheless 
important to attempt an empirical underpinning. As indicated above, there appears 
to be a tendency to assume a certain political impact of docusoaps and a certain 
position of their participants. Audiences tend to be regarded as malleable and 
participants of docusoaps as exploitable. This might well be the case, but I intend to 
empirically explore the complexities of the perception and production of a docusoap.  
  
                                                          
56 As pointed out, considerations along these lines must be careful not to simplify and 
overstate potential relationships, but at the same time have to rely on plausible 
assumptions. Doxa is a powerful concept with which to inform research questions, the 
content of doxic thinking is however naturally difficult to pin down. Therefore, again, this 
research has to work with assumptions that I intend to substantiate, but are, ultimately, 
difficult to prove empirically. 
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7. People Like Us 
 
In this chapter, I will critically analyse the TV programme People Like Us (2013l) as an 
example of a contemporary media representation of social class. The specific content 
and its visual and narrative realisation will be at the core of this analysis. However, 
this analysis will not be restricted to the descriptive level. Instances of 
misrepresentation in terms of authenticity as well as representativeness will be 
critically analysed and finally those findings will be theoretically framed and made 
sense of with regards to the analytic framework set out in the previous chapters.  
The six, hour-long episodes of People Like Us (2013l) were broadcast on BBC Three at 
9 pm on consecutive Wednesdays between 06/02/2013 and 13/03/2013. The viewing 
figures for the live broadcast are as follows (BARB, 2015)57: 
Date Viewers in Mio. 
BBC Three 
Ranking / week 
06/02/2013 0.91 2 
13/02/2013 0.708 8 
20/02/2013 0.752 5 
27/02/2013 0.828 1 
06/03/2013 <0.649 >10 
13/03/2013 <0.624 >10 
 
The programme was produced by the independent, London-based production 
company Dragonfly. Dragonfly specialises in factual entertainment and also produces 
programmes like One Born Every Minute (2010c), The Hotel (2011), The Family 
(2008a) etc. and described People Like Us (2013l) on its website as (Dragonfly, 2014): 
 
A warm, unflinching and laugh-out-loud funny peek into the challenging lives 
of people living in or around the little-known Manchester estate of Harpurhey 
... Described as ‘shockingly real and funny’ by The Daily Telegraph, People Like 
                                                          
57 For the last two episodes, no accurate viewing figures are (publicly) available, as these 
episodes were not among the ten most watched BBC Three shows of the respective weeks. 
It is however clear, that there was a significant drop-off after episode four. Unfortunately, 
there is no data on online viewing (BBC iPlayer) available. Given the young target audience 
of BBC Three, it can be assumed that these would add significantly to the live viewing figure.  
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Us is BBC Three highest-rating debut factual series of 2012 by an independent 
production company. 
 
7.1 Production techniques & narrative structure 
 
People Like Us (2013l) uses the fly-on-the-wall perspective that is typical for the 
docusoap genre. Throughout the programme there is no visible intervention by the 
film crews. The use of hand-held cameras is apparent. On several occasions, even 
more direct and immediate filming techniques are used. For instance in episode one 
(2013b), one of the protagonists, Amber, is on holiday and, as it was confirmed in an 
interview, was given a camera to film her time in Magaluf. Some of the material 
produced by her was used in episode one (2013b:36min 48 & 38min 00).  
In episode four (2013c), a number of cameras shots of a police drug raid are used. 
Interestingly, these were shot by the police officers who carried out the raid as they 
wore small shoulder cameras (clearly visible for instance in episode four 
(2013c:26min 18)). In this incident, no Dragonfly film crew entered the premises and 
the whole sequence consists of material filmed by the shoulder cameras.58  
In episode six, footage produced by the ‘paranormal investigators’ Bob and Pete 
(2013c:13min 47), as well as mobile phone pictures shot by Karen (2013c:15 min 13) 
are used. Furthermore, in episode four, several sequences of a home video of Louise 
giving birth are used in the programme (2013d:49min 34). 
Overall, I would argue, these filming techniques appear to be used to underline the 
claims for authenticity. This assumption will be further explored shortly, but it is clear 
that in People Like Us (2013l) material that participants of the programme produced 
themselves was seamlessly interwoven with the footage the film crews produced. 
Using the supposedly non-intrusive and neutral fly-on-the-wall perspective is a 
                                                          
58 As it was confirmed in an interview with two of the involved police officers, these 
cameras were not the body cameras policemen and policewomen are officially equipped 
with, but were provided by the production company. Therefore, the police officers that 
carried out the raid double as cameramen / camerawomen for the production company. A 
number of shots that were produced by these shoulder cameras are used in the 
programme and imitate the point of view of the police officers. The raid culminates less 
than a minute later (2013c:27min 09) when a police officer, wearing disposable gloves, 
eventually finds a small bag of cannabis. 
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common feature of Reality TV programmes; with the inclusion of participant-
generated content People Like Us (2013l) appears even closer to reality and 
accordingly less influenced or manipulated by external perspectives. 
Occasionally, participants of the show address the camera directly or are interviewed 
in a studio. Corner (2002:256) points out that the interview is a vital tool for the 
producers of docusoaps ‘to get the personal and the microsocial fully realized on the 
screen’ and indeed, as I will demonstrate shortly, several of the interviews discuss 
rather personal and often on very emotionally charged matters. All of these 
interviews are, however, masked interviews (Bonner, 2013) as only the answers and 
not the questions are shown.59  
The fact that almost all interviews are edited in a way that only the participants' 
answers are shown is, I would argue, designed to suggest the absence of any outside 
interference and to enhance the credibility and authenticity of the programme. Bruzzi 
(2006) points out that in docusoaps, the camera and the filmmaker remain 
anonymous. I would add, that by remaining anonymous, their very existence is being 
concealed and the impression is created that what can be seen on screen would have 
happened regardless of the presence of a camera. The masked interviews appear 
more like a video diary than an actual interview. Just like the fly-on-the-wall 
perspective is intended to play down or even negate the effect of the camera, so does 
the masked interview eliminate the interviewer and make the answers appear as 
unmediated, authentic expression of the interviewees' thoughts. The absence of an 
interviewer makes those interviews appear very personal, almost like an act of self-
revelation that, according to Biressi and Nunn (2005:102), is, in a Reality TV context, 
‘the marker and touchstone of authenticity’.  
Throughout the programme, brief shots, usually underlaid with music, are used to 
mark the switch from one storyline to the next. These shots generally appear to be 
intended to convey the atmosphere of the area and largely consist of aerial shots and 
street scenes apparently shot from a distance. They show people that are by and 
                                                          
59 There are very few exceptions when the isolated answer would not make sense. For 
instance in the opening sequence (2013b:0min 37 of each episode) the following dialogue 
takes place: OFF: Are you the neighbour from hell? Pidge: Probably yeah.  
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large not participants of the programme. As I will argue later, these shots are 
significant in setting the scene and painting an implicit, emotive picture of the 
portrayed area.  
Generally speaking, there is little voice-over and, by and large, the provided 
commentary is rather sympathetic, if not slightly patronising at times. Occasionally 
the voice-over has a slight sarcastic touch, for instance in episode six (2013d:1min 
32): 
 
OFF: This week we meet likely lads Aaron and Mikee who are trying not let 
partying get in the way of them building a new business. 
[over a quick succession of shots showing them working, but then drinking 
spirit from a bottle, dancing, a female dancer / stripper, Mikee having his face 
shoved into a chocolate cake] 
Aaron (clearly intoxicated outside a night club): It will work, there is no 
alternative. It’s this or not. 
  
The editing in combination with the sarcastic voice-over mocks the efforts of the two 
young men and this portrayal is re-inforced at later in the same episode 
(2013d:11min 24) when the two men are shown to buy two pints of lager.  
 
OFF: Aaron and Mikee's flyering campaign has not been successful and the 
wanna-be painter-decorators are still no closer to getting a job.  
[pints are put on the bar] 
Bar man: 5.90 altogether. 
OFF: With barely enough cash for essential purchases, it's time for the lads to 
rethink their tactic’.  
 
Again the efforts of the young men are contrasted with alcohol consumption and at 
the same time are alleged as a potential explanation for their lack of success. There 
are many other examples of commentary that can be either be perceived as 
sympathetic or snide. For instance in episode six (2013d:54min 26): 
  
OFF: ...and at the Wishy Washy laundrette it's business as usual.  
[spinning washing machine] 
[cut to Karen sitting in a chair] 
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Karen: Now do you think George Bush had anything to do with the Twin 
Towers? 
[cut to female customer] 
Female Customer [rather sceptical]: I don't know. I remember... 
[cut back to Karen] 
Karen: 100 billion million percent. I've studied it, I have researched it, I read 
everything. He had something to do with the Twin Towers. That is my opinion. 
[cut back to customers sitting on a bench]  
Male Customer [clearly sceptical]: I think maybe that's a stretch too far... 
[cut back to Karen] 
Karen: Oh no, definitely. [cut] Do you think the Royals had anything to do with 
Diana's death?  
[end of scene] 
 
Referring to this short scene as ‘business as usual’ can be read in the sense that there 
is the usual friendliness and chattiness at the Wishy Washy laundrette, or, in 
particular if the viewer is critical of conspiracy theories (that are not explored in any 
depth), ‘business as usual’ can be read as a displayed lack of productiveness and 
irrationality.  
The narrative structure of People Like Us (2013l) combines, as is typical for the genre, 
the formal characteristics of a documentary with soap-opera-like narratives. Coles 
(2000:28) therefore states that the docusoap combines two of the most popular 
television genres, Reality TV and soap opera, and successfully forms a hybrid. As I 
have shown above and will further discuss in the following, the makers of People Like 
Us (2013l) went to great lengths to stress the authenticity of the programme with 
regards to the locations, the portrayed people and the supposedly unmediated 
representational style. In that respect, the programme borrows the techniques of 
traditional documentary film-making. In terms of narrative structure however, People 
Like Us (2013l) has parallels with conventional soap operas. In each episode, new 
characters are introduced and four storylines are developed. The storylines are 
generally narrated independently of each other and only intersect rarely60. The 
                                                          
60 For instance in episode four (2013c) when the Karen, Paul and Amber attend Dale's club 
night and boxing fight or in episode two (2013e) when Ryan hangs out with Pidge. 
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editing is rather quick and, as is typical for the genre (Kilborn, 2000), there are very 
frequent switches between the locations and the characters of simultaneously 
developed storylines. Bruzzi’s (2006) assessment that the purpose of this 
juxtapositioning and fast-paced editing is rather to move the stories on than to make 
a point, seems very true for People Like Us (2013l).61 The main purpose of this 
narrative structure is to ‘shape and control the amorphousness of actuality’ (Coles, 
2000:33) and to enhance the dramatic effect. In each of the episodes, four problems 
are presented that are then developed towards a resolution. Most of the participants 
appear in only one episode and in relation to one specific storyline. All of the 
storylines have a central issue they revolve around and show a clear problem / 
resolution narrative that can be summed up in a brief sentence: 
Episode Problem Resolution 
1 Amber goes to Magaluf for a ‘drink-fuelled 
holiday’ (2013b:1min 39) 
Returns safely 
1 Jamie ‘planning to Marry his girlfriend 
Lucy’ (2013b:1min 52) 
Split up 
1 Chris' ‘relationship with Cider threatens to 
break up his romance with girlfriend Nicki’ 
(2013b:2min 00) 
Alcohol somewhat under 
control, relationship 
survived 
1 David plans to put on a drag show in the 
local area 
Drag show a success 
2 Amber ‘determined to leave home to go to 
drama school’ (2013e:1min 35) 
Stays 
2 Dale trying to make it as a boxer and DJ Loses fight, reasonably 
successful club night 
2 Ryan ‘who's hoping rap could be a ticket to 
a better life away from his estate’ 
(2013e:2min 00) 
Loses battle, but stays 
out of trouble 
2 Nicola ‘considering leaving for a quieter life 
away from her family’ (2013e:2min 08) 
Moves away 
3 ‘Dad Paul walks out’ (2013j:1min 39) Moves back in 
3 ‘Landlord Nik and tenant Pidge face off in 
an eviction battle’ (2013j:1min 45) 
Pidge moves out 
                                                          
61 The material is organised along specific conflicts, but the individual storylines hardly 
intersect and there are no over-arching themes in the respective episodes. 
156 
 
3 ‘Mates Arroll and Patrick prepare for their 
first holiday abroad together’ (2013j:1min 
53) 
End friendship 
3 Jim, Sheryl, Avril and colleagues fighting 
crime 
Arrests made, fights 
broken up 
4 ‘Young mum Sherelle is trying to avoid 
getting into trouble, while Sherelle's Mom 
Mandy and neighbour Katie face the threat 
of eviction.’ (2013c:1min 33) 
No eviction 
4 Karen and Paul try to ‘curb Maddie's bad 
behaviour before she starts high school’ 
(2013c:1min 51) 
Maddie and Paul have 
father-daughter talk 
4 Louise pregnant Louise has baby 
4 Cathie struggling with anti-social behaviour 
of neighbours 
Cathie shares her rhubarb 
crop 
5 Jamie ‘dreaming of pop stardom, but his 
Mom Donna is unhappy about his unlikely 
mentor’ (2013g:1min 34) 
Jamie has first gig and 
Donna and Belinda meet 
up 
5 Break-in at Wishy Washy Damage repaired, 
burglars convicted 
5 Dance show of local dance school ‘proving 
hard work for new trainee teacher Kelly’ 
(2013g:1min 56) 
Does not get job 
5 Anthony tries to get his kids into modelling Kids signed up at agency 
6 Aaron and Mikee ‘trying not let partying 
get in the way of them building a new 
business’ (2013d:1min 34) 
Not quite successful, but 
built a ramp for Aaron's 
grandma 
6 Jazmine and Kelsea ‘are enjoying their last 
summer together before one of them 
moves out of the area’ (2013d:1min 46) 
Kelsea moving away 
6 Wakefields ‘feel the time has come to deal 
with their resident poltergeist Malcolm’ 
(2013d:2min 08) 
Paranormal investigators 
do their work 
6 ‘Exercise guru Javeno is planning a mass-
work-out day to get the locals fit’ 
(2013d:1min 58) 
Work-out day a success 
 
The focus on discrete and conflict-laden storylines mirrors the narrative structure of 
soap operas, as does the focus on individual characters and dramatic events in their 
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lives. Most storylines involve a certain amount of drama, but generally the plots do 
not appear extremely over-dramatized and several of the storylines revolve around 
rather mundane, every-day issues. It therefore seems appropriate to speak of a 
‘(mini)crisis structure’ (Bruzzi, 2006:127). I will discuss the absence of social and 
political framing and the peculiarities of the character casting later, but it is evident 
that People Like Us (2013l) portrays a number of individual, largely unrelated stories 
that have dramatic potential. Most of the portrayed stories have to do with the 
aspirations of the protagonists, be it building a business (Aaron and Mikee) seeking a 
career (Amber, Jamie, Ryan), fulfilling one's personal ambition (David, Javeno) or self-
betterment (Chris and Nikki, Sherelle, Nicola, Kelsea and her family, Anthony). Only 
the lives of the main protagonists, the Wakefield family, is, as they appear in every 
single episode, portrayed with any sense of continuity, but also broken down into 
discrete storylines about individual ambitions (Amber) and educational and familial 
struggles (Karen, Paul and Maddie). The storylines involving the police are 
exceptional insofar as they focus less on the personal and more on the professional 
lives of the portrayed police officers. These storylines are inherently dramatic (a large 
scale disorder / street fight, a dramatic, violent arrest, a bail breach, a drug raid), but 
also a couple of relatively minor, almost comical incidents are portrayed (presumed 
sexual intercourse in a parked car, alleged urinating in an alleyway).  
 
7.2 Claims of truthfulness, markers of authenticity 
 
People Like Us (2013l) claims to be truthful and authentic. This happens explicitly 
through the way the programme is advertised and defended against criticism by the 
production company. Furthermore, authenticity is suggested through the production 
techniques used, through the chosen visual imagery, through the casting as well as 
the choices of storylines and setting. I will explore the featured characters and 
storylines shortly, but, with regards to the claim of truthfulness, it can be stated that 
the production team clearly went for somewhat unusual characters and issues, but 
stayed clear of overly extraordinary and sensationalist occurrences. People Like Us 
(2013l), like most docusoaps, claims to portray real people in real locations. However, 
this intended ordinariness is emphasised by the programme’s focus on a working-
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class community. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, working-class people 
are routinely portrayed as being free from (and possibly incapable of) 
pretentiousness and therefore being (no-nonsense, salt-of-the-earth) authentic. 
Choosing a working-class area like Harpurhey as the location of the show is therefore 
intended to demonstrate a commitment to the truth. The participants of People Like 
Us (2013l) are filmed in their actual homes and places of work. Therefore, the 
impression is created that people on the programme go about their everyday 
business, unaffected by the presence of a television camera. What connects the 
individual participants and their storylines is first and foremost their shared location 
and therefore the programme goes to great lengths to (rather incorrectly, as I will 
show) stress the close relationship of the characters with the portrayed area.  
As discussed, People Like Us (2013l) uses filming techniques that are fairly typical for 
the genre. These techniques indirectly yet powerfully indicate immediacy and 
authenticity. The filming appears to be very unintrusive and spontaneous. As 
Leishman (2001) argues, with reference to a different docusoap, much of the filming 
happens at eye level in an occasionally unsteady fashion. This gives the viewer the 
perspective of an eyewitness. So the requirement of the genre to produce the raw 
material in a rather cheap fashion (small camera crews, few digital cameras) works in 
its favour with regards to underpinning its authenticity.  
Furthermore, the makers of People Like Us (2013l) regularly intercut the scenes 
filmed on site with studio-filmed interviews. In these above discussed ‘masked 
interviews’, the protagonists address the cameras, and therefore the audience, 
directly. The interviews appear less like interviews, but more as rather personal video 
diaries of the participants.  
Finally, as discussed above, footage produced by the participants of the programme 
is used. What is striking, yet fairly typical for the genre, is the invisibility of camera 
crews and production team. Their presence and therefore their potential influence 
on the portrayed events remains completely in the dark.62 When the participants of 
People Like Us address the camera, it is as if they address the viewers directly. Corner 
                                                          
62 Not all docusoaps are equally strict in that regard and, as Leishman (2001) shows with 
reference to The Cruise (1998b), where conversations between production crew and 
docusoap characters take place, akin to more conventional documentary formats. 
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(1995:80) speaks in that context of ‘the illusion of unseen onlooking’. That this is 
indeed an illusion and that the presence of cameras occasionally interfered in a very 
direct and palpable way with events on screen will be demonstrated later. The 
intended effect very much appears to be, once again, to signify authenticity: what is 
captured on camera appears to have happened independently of its presence.  
As mentioned above, the (relatively minimal) narration of the programme is done by 
an actress from the North of England who is known for playing likeable working-class 
characters in popular low-brow TV series63, so it almost appears as if the programme 
is narrated by someone who could be a in it. I would argue that it is no coincidence 
that the programme is narrated by a Northern actress with a ‘chummy voice’ (Brady, 
2013). Similar to the filming techniques used, the intended effect is to reduce 
distance and to underpin the light-hearted and well-meaning tone of the programme. 
An accent-free speaker with a more formal voice would, in all likelihood, be more 
perceived as an outsider by the viewer. A more formal narration could have damaged 
the intended intimate and authentic vibe of People Like Us (2013l). Furthermore, the 
regional accent of Natalie Casey, the narrator, reduces her distance not only to the 
participants of the show, it also signifies personal integrity (Montgomery, 1995) and, 
in a British context, Northernness is generally associated with down-to-earthness and 
unpretentiousness (Leishman, 2001). The fictional character the actress is associated 
with, can be seen as not too dissimilar to the characters in People Like Us (2013l), and 
therefore helps to underpin the notion of authenticity.64  
To illustrate these claims of truthfulness further, I will briefly turn to material used by 
the production company to advertise the programme and then discuss the opening 
                                                          
 
63 Natalie Casey is most famous for her roles in Hollyoaks (1995) (1995-2000) and Two Pints 
of Lager and a Packet of Crisps (2001d) (for the whole duration of the show 2001-2011) 
(wikipedia, 2014). The use of a prominent voice-over is common practice in the Reality TV 
genre (Bruzzi, 2006) and Kilborn (2000:113-114) adds that ’Producers have regularly honed 
in on the familiar and friendly tones of actors and actresses who have already made a name 
for themselves as performers of sitcoms and soap opera.’  
 
64 As Dickerson (2012) shows with reference to contemporary long-format documentaries, 
filmmakers like Michal Moore or Morgan Spurlock opt to use their own voices to add a 
degree of authority to the narration. In the case of People Like Us (2013l) it appears that 
authoritativeness was not the central concern and truthfulness was intended to be 
achieved through proximity, immediacy and intimateness. 
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sequence of People Like Us (2013l). In the one and a half minutes of this opening 
sequence the used documentary techniques are displayed in a very condensed and 
pointed way.  
On the BBC website, People Like Us (2013l) is described in the briefest possible way 
as ‘A documentary series about young people growing up on a housing estate in 
Manchester’ (BBC, 2014b). The programme is classed as ‘factual’ (by genre) and 
‘documentaries’ (by format) (BBC, 2014b). Also, the individual episodes are described 
very briefly in a single sentence. Under the heading ‘meet the residents’ the 
protagonists of the individual episodes are introduced in a few sentences. Again, the 
focus is on the main issues that are being portrayed in the programmes. Often these 
introductions end with a question that directly refers to the central issue of their 
involvement in the programme. This section of the website hints that the programme 
might not only be categorisable as ‘factual’ and as a ‘documentary’.  
The website of Dragonfly, the production company behind People Like Us (2013l) is, 
as quoted above, more direct in advertising the programme and in emphasising its 
authenticity (Dragonfly, 2014).  
 
‘A warm, unflinching and laugh-out-loud funny peek into the challenging lives 
of people living in or around the little-known Manchester estate of 
Harpurhey, in which they tell their stories in their own words. Giving a voice 
to young people to talk about the issues they face, People Like Us made stars 
of the Wakefield family – Paul, Karen, Amber and Maddie – bosses of the 
Wishee Washee launderette at the heart of the community. ....’ 
 
Speaking of a ‘peek’ into the lives of people living in Harpurhey suggests a neutral, 
unintrusive and authentic point of view. If ‘stories’ are told ‘in their own words’ and 
young people ‘are given a voice’ and are even ‘made stars’, it implies empowerment, 
distancing itself from any suggestions of manipulation and exploitation. 
Simon Dickson, then managing director of Dragonfly, appearing on The Media Show 
(2013a) on 27/02/2013, after three of the six episodes had been aired, defends the 
programme against criticism, on this occasion expressed by the local MP Graham 
Stringer (Labour). Dickson is adamant that nothing in the programme was fabricated:  
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Everything that we filmed was the result of spending 18 months working with 
young people in Harpurhey and faithfully recording what was going on in their 
lives. (2013a:5min 55).  
 
Any suggestions that the programme might to some degree be fabricated are 
resolutely dismissed. So again, the role of the film crews is described as a strictly 
passive one that ‘faithfully’ documents the lives of the participants.  
Truthfulness is equally explicitly claimed in the opening sequence of the programme 
that will be sketched here in its entirety (2013l:0m 00 of each episode): 
 
[shot of a tower block] 
[Jazmine and Kelsea riding on a bike together in front of a row of terraced 
houses] 
OFF: Just north of the city centre is a little-known Manchester suburb called 
Harpurhey. 
[Kids running in the street in what looks to be the same street] 
[Jamie fooling around / dancing on a gate] 
[multiple shot of loud motorised scooters in a park and a residential area] 
[youths pushing a bicycle into the road] 
[young children playing in the street. Prams, bicycles, adult sitting on the 
doorstep holding a can of beer] 
[direct to camera] 
Amber [direct to camera]: They say the area's just full of rough families. I don't 
think it's such a bad place. 
[youths on motorised scooter and bicycle in residential area] 
OFF: Ten years ago, a government report branded it the most deprived 
neighbourhood in England.  
[Nik strapping a sofa to the roof of his car and falling off] 
[Donna and Jamie sitting in the living room] 
Donna (raised voice): It's a simple question I asked! 
Jamie (raised voice): Yeah! And I'm trying to answer it.  
[young men doing reverse press-ups on a bench in the park, children in the 
background] 
[Maddie playing cheerfully in the laundrette] 
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[young children playing the street, older kids in the background]  
OFF: Things have got a bit better since then, but life round here is still no bed 
of roses.  
[shot of a sign ‘This is a HomeWatch area’, terraced houses in the background] 
[Man swinging a dog that has his teeth sunk into a rope] 
Nik [direct to camera]: There is one of them local expressions, ‘they'll steal 
the shit out of your arse’. Not cos they want it, just so that you haven't got it.  
[young women walking in track-suit tops and pyjama bottoms] 
[young man taken into a police van, shouting and slamming door] 
OFF: Half the people have no qualifications and anti-social behaviour is rife.  
[party scenes, including dancing, drinking and singing] 
Interviewer from the off: Are you the neighbour from hell? 
Pidge [direct to camera]: Probably, yeah.  
[Man in the street having a huge spider crawling on his chest] 
OFF: People round here might not be the poshest... 
[shot of a hen party participant on all fours imitating a peeing dog] 
OFF: ...but they are not lacking in spirit.  
[Jamie using spray deodorant] 
[Karen and Maddie sitting on the bed in their pyjamas] 
Karen That's why we call ourselves ‘the dysfunctionals’. 
[shot of a Louise with her new-born] 
[shot of a wedding] 
OFF: They just try to get on with life, be themselves...  
[David putting make-up on and then in full drag with wig, high-heels and hand 
bag and a bottle of cider] 
David: I ain't driving the van like this. 
[youth doing a wheelie on his bike on the pavement] 
OFF: and follow their dreams.  
Amber [direct to camera]: I can be like a different person when I'm acting.  
[Amber, in the laundrette] 
Amber: 'Tis true that a good play needs no epilogue.  
[girls running across a multilane road with horses] 
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OFF: For one long summer, the young people of Harpurhey let us into their 
secret world... 
[shot of a drug raid] 
[partying scene including drinking and laughing] 
[Karen filming Amber and her friends singing in her bedroom] 
Girls (singing): I have a penis, I shake it in the morning.  
[Aaron having his brows waxed] 
OFF: sharing the good times... 
Aaron: Megan Fox, eat your heart out. 
[Lucy with tears rolling down her cheeks] 
[cat with two legs in cast] 
OFF: ...and the bad. 
[Katie in the street] 
Katie (shouting): Hello! Go and find another street to go and terrorise! 
[Youths sitting behind barbed wire] 
OFF: This is how it really feels growing up the hard way.  
[Jamie being dry-humped by another young man in the market] 
[Maddie supposedly sleeping with a dog resting his head on the side of her 
head] 
[Belinda, Jamie and another man performing the YMCA dance] 
[Amber, direct to camera] 
Amber: Yous might think you know people like us, but you don't know nothing 
yet! (giggles) 
[Jazmine and Kelsea riding on a bike together] 
 
Again, there is relatively little narration. In the one and a half minutes of the opening 
sequence, there are just eight short narrated sentences. Right after the briefest of 
introductions, one of the protagonists of the programme, Amber, is shown speaking 
directly to the camera referring to the bad reputation of Harpurhey, but defending 
the area at the same time. Throughout the opening sequence, the narration is 
interwoven with statements by the residents. Again, the impression is created that 
the participants can express their views rather than being spoken for. A rapid 
succession of very brief shots is used to underline the truthfulness of the narrated 
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description of Harpurhey. While Amber is speaking about the bad reputation of 
Harpurhey, in the space of five seconds, seven different shots are used to visually 
express the unruliness of the area65. The quick succession and the emotive nature of 
these shots are clearly intended to confirm the claim that Harpurhey is a rough 
(menacing, chaotic, potentially dangerous) neighbourhood. References to 
criminality66, anti-social behaviour67 allegedly excessive drinking and partying seem 
to confirm the truthfulness of the claimed roughness of Harpurhey. 
However, it is equally evident that the opening sequence is intended to look 
balanced. First of all through the aforementioned statement of Amber, but also 
through a change in tone, signified by a change in background music (2013l:0min 40 
of each episode). Whereas the first 40 seconds of the opening sequence mainly depict 
disorder, the second half of the opening sequence shifts the focus to the area being 
full of life (marriage, wedding, humour), and of its residents having ambitions and 
‘dreams’ (drag queen Diane, aspiring actress Amber). The narration claims that the 
programme will be showing the ‘good times’ (singing, beauty treatment, dancing) 
and the ‘bad times’ (tears and anger). In this second part of the opening sequence 
the claims of truthfulness and authenticity are most explicit. It is claimed that the 
viewer is granted access into the ‘secret world’ of this ‘little known Manchester 
suburb’.68 And finally the narration ‘This is how it really feels growing up the hard 
way’ explicitly claims to explore the reality of reaching adulthood in a deprived area. 
Furthermore, there are a number of shots in the opening sequence that show people 
who are not further introduced in the programme and remain anonymous. These 
                                                          
65 Noisy motorised scooters driven by youths, a bicycle pushed into the street, shot of a 
number of people of all ages congregating in the street including bare-chested men, plastic 
furniture and a collection of bicycles and prams. 
 
66 Police arrest, ‘steal the shit out of your arse’, drug raid. 
 
67 ‘Neighbour from hell’, possible training of what looks like a combat dog, hooded youth 
doing a wheelie on the pavement, ‘go and find another street to go and terrorise’. 
 
68 It is not quite clear what is ‘secret’ about Harpurhey and why it is referred to as ‘little 
known’, but this alleged mystique is reinforced be Amber’s statement: ‘ Yous might think you 
know people like us, but you don't know nothing yet!’. As it was confirmed in an interview 
with Amber, this statement was scripted by the production company.  
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shots have a feeling of randomly filmed street scenes about them. In the context of 
the opening sequence, I would argue, they are supposed to convey a feeling for the 
area and the environment the portrayed families live in. The perceived randomness 
is in my view intended to further underline the claim of truthfulness. This collage of 
very brief and largely unrelated shots implies a wide focus. In most of these shots69 
the faces of the people appearing are not filmed at all or blurred. This adds to the 
perception of randomness in the sense that it is not specific people who train their 
dogs or wear pyjamas, but just any (typical) resident of Harpurhey. I will explore the 
content of these images later, but it is fair to assume that these images are anything 
but random and loaded with meaning by referring to working-class stereotypes. Yet, 
the truthfulness of the programme is implied exactly by focusing on the supposedly 
rough, dangerous and supposedly tasteless aspects of life in Harpurhey. 
Another marker of authenticity is the use of rather private, emotionally charged shots 
and scenes. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, docusoaps heavily rely on 
the drama of the private and the interpersonal. I would agree with Leishman (2001) 
that this focus on emotions and their visual display can be seen as a marker of 
authenticity in itself.  
Apart from the already mentioned rather personal video-diary like direct-to-camera 
pieces, People Like Us (2013l) uses a number of scenes in which the protagonist 
displays, sometimes dramatic, emotional reactions, for instance in episode five 
(2013g:15min 08).  
 
[Kelly walking down a street] 
Narrator: Kelly has lived in Harpurhey all her life. Growing up wasn’t always 
easy. 
[shots of traffic and house fronts] 
Kelly [direct-to-camera in a studio]: You have to learn how to fend for yourself 
and what not.  
[shot of back alleys] 
                                                          
69 Man swinging a dog on a rope, girls walking in track-suit tops and pyjama bottoms, 
youths sitting behind barbed wire, girls running across a multilane road with horses. 
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Kelly [direct-to-camera in a studio]: I’ve got a big chip on me shoulder, I had a 
really bad attitude. I was getting into trouble ALL the time. 
[photograph of a younger smiling Kelly surrounded by friends, bottle of alco-
pop visible] 
Kelly [direct-to-camera in a studio]: I just was with the wrong people. You 
were always… 
[Kelly crossing a street] 
[Another photograph of Kelly with a friend, holding a bottle of beer] 
Kelly:… stood around street corners. Underage drinking and smoking. And 
young guys would rob cars…  
Kelly [direct-to-camera in a studio]: …and we would joyride round the estate 
in cars and stuff like that. 
[Kelly walking in a street again] 
[Kelly in her home now, dancing to music] 
Narrator: Kelly still lives on the estate, just 10 minutes’ walk from the house 
she grew up in.  
Kelly: [pointing to a framed photograph on her wall]. This up here is me Mom, 
and this is me Dad when he was in the fire-service. That means a lot to me 
that. Me Mom died twelve years ago. You know like it’s been hard. It has been 
hard for me without her because my Dad had to be me Mom and me Dad, do 
you know? 
[photograph of Kelly, her Mom and Dad presumably on holiday, all smiling] 
[sad music sets in] 
Sam [Kelly’s Dad, direct-to-camera in a studio]: It was basically just me and 
Kelly since her Mom died. Because everything her Mom used to do, I had to 
take it on.  
[sad music continues] 
[picture of Kelly and Dad in a restaurant without her Mom] 
[Sam, direct-to-camera in a studio] 
Sam: So there is a special bond between me and Kelly.  
[another holiday picture of the whole family, all smiling] 
Kelly: She had cervical cancer and she fought it for years as well.  
[Kelly in her home, in front of the framed photographs again] 
Kelly: One year she’d find out she was in the clear, then a few month later, 
like it’d come back. Then she was clear for a few more months. Then a year 
later she’d found out it had come back and I think when I came to about the 
age of nine or ten it just gradually got worse and worse from there. 
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[sad music still in the background] 
[another photograph of Kelly and her Mom] 
[close up of Kelly’s face, visibly upset] 
Kelly: Me Mom would just get really tired of all these operations and 
medication and in and out of hospital. She just wanted to be left. So… 
[a photograph of Kelly at the grave of her Mom] 
Kelly: She died when I was about twelve. 
Kelly [direct-to-camera in a studio]: The only thing that upsets me now is that 
I don’t remember the sound of her voice. Like, AT ALL. I try to think of it and I 
can’t… I am getting emotional.  
[Kelly covering her face with her hands. Sobbing.] 
Kelly: I’m ok.  
[Another photograph of Kelly’s Mom] 
Jodie [direct-to-camera in a studio]: I know she had a tough time with her 
Mom passing away and she kind of got into bad crowds and things.  
[Kelly, in her home, dancing] 
Jodie: When she first started with me, she was one of those people, she would 
get up and it did not really matter what she did for the rest of the day. 
[Kelly, in her home, dancing] 
[shot of Kelly’s kitten] 
Jodie: I think her coming to us has kind of helped her kind of a purpose. 
[shot of the sun setting over the roofs] 
[sad music ends, dance music starts, shots of the local shopping centre and 
market] 
Narrator: As night falls on Harpurhey market… 
 
This short scene is one of the more intense examples of how People Like Us (2013l) 
utilises the display of emotions. The editing, as well as the use of music and personal 
photographs provide evidence of Kelly’s ultra-condensed life story and evoke an 
emotional reading by the viewer. The makers of the programme used at least four 
different interviews by three different participants to create an extremely condensed 
and very emotionally charged narrative. What is a very personal account of Kelly’s 
loss is highly edited with a large number of cuts. In a sense, the authenticity and 
supposed immediacy of the displayed emotions stand in contrast to very fast editing 
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and the extremely constructed nature of the sequence. Kelly’s account and the 
sincerity of her feelings are evidenced by a number of personal photographs as well 
as interviews with people close to her (her Dad as well as friend/employer Jodie). 
In the same episode (2013g), the tragic story of Anthony who has suffered from 
severe burns to his face and arms as a child is presented in an equally condensed, 
emotive and tearful fashion.  
Tears, I would argue, are a very strong signifier for strong and sincere emotions. 
Furthermore, I would argue, tears are a very powerful marker of authenticity, not 
least because they are notoriously hard to enact. Given the rather light-hearted tone 
of the programme and the generally more mundane than dramatic storylines, it is 
somewhat surprising that in every episode bar one, tears are shed:  
 
Episode 1 (2013b): 
Lucy crying after talking to Jamie (2013b:40min 28) 
Nikki crying after falling out with Chris (2013b:43min 50) 
 
Episode 3 (2013j):  
Maddie crying because the family’s puppies are given away (2013j:47min 10) 
 
Episode 4 (2013c): 
Kathy upset because she is afraid of being evicted and feels treated unfairly 
(2013c:21min 30) 
Kathy again, upset by youths in her street (2013c:47min 47) 
 
Episode 5 (2013g): 
Kelly when speaking about how she misses her dead Mom (2013g:17min 07) 
Anthony’s Mom telling how Anthony got severely burnt as a child (2013g:32min 50) 
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Episode 6 (2013d) 
Aaron’s disabled grand-mother: over-joyed and touched by his and Mikee’s efforts to 
build her a ramp (2013d:30min 55) 
 
Many of those stories are developed following a similar pattern. On a number of 
occasions, dramatic events in the lives of the participants are presented in a very 
condensed form that foregrounds the emotional impact and consequences of those. 
Often the participants address the camera directly and tell their stories in a very 
open, analytical, almost self-confessional way. 
Overall, it can be concluded that in People Like Us (2013l) emotions are displayed in 
a very visible and convincing way and therefore help to substantiate the impression 
that the characters of the programmes act authentically. Leishman (2001) speaks in 
this context very pointedly of the ‘performance of sincerity’. Biressi and Nunn (2005) 
argue that the visible display of emotions signifies immediacy and through that 
credibility. Therefore, these self-revelations and emotionally charged interchanges 
become a powerful marker of realness, truthfulness and authenticity.70  
Finally, truthfulness and accuracy are implied through the narration by being very 
precise about the relative location of the filmed scenes. Very often a new storyline is 
introduced with a reference to the relative location of the scene. Examples from the 
first two episodes: 
 
North of Harpurhey Market is Moston Lane, home to the Wishy Washy 
Laundrette. (2013b:5min 10)  
A mile down the road is a local newsagent. It's run by... (2013b:6min 38) 
                                                          
70 It should be added that I do not doubt the sincerity of the displayed emotions, however, 
it can be concluded that the editing of these scenes is intended to maximise the emotional 
impact on the viewer and, for instance through the use of music and personal photographs, 
to emphasise their sincerity. 
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To the west of the market is the Embassy Club... (2013b:22min 42) 
They live together in Nicki's house near Harpurhey... (2013b:23min 18) 
On the high street out of Harpurhey is the Wishy Washy laundrette. 
(2013e:2min 22) 
A couple of miles south of the laundrette, 19 year old Nicola... (2013e:4min 
12) 
Nicola and Crystal live in a one-bedroom council flat on an estate just north 
of Harpurhey. (2013e:10min 53) 
Two miles down the road from Dale's house is Strangeways Prison. It looms 
large over Harpurhey. (2013e:23min 14) 
Ryan lives with his parents to the south of Harpurhey... (2013e:24min 25) 
A mile up the road is the boxing gym. (2013e:24min 33) 
Nicola has moved in with her auntie Lisa 10 miles away on the other side of 
Manchester. (2013e:47min 08) 
At a club two miles west of Harpurhey, the lads from the local boxing gym... 
(2013e:51min 57) 
 
It appears that these rather precise details about the locations of the individual sites 
act as proof that People Like Us (2013l) was indeed filmed in or near Harpurhey. On 
several occasions, new characters are introduced in public places like the Embassy 
Pub (Dale and Friends, Nicki and Chris) or on the market (Jamie and Donna) to imply 
that they live in Harpurhey. As it turns out, many of the participants do not live in 
Harpurhey and a large number of used public locations are not in the area either. This 
was confirmed in a number of interviews with participants of the programme. 
Strictly speaking, People Like Us (2013l) does not make any false claims about where 
it was filmed. However, the narration tries to link as many different locations and 
individuals to Harpurhey as possible as the seemingly shared place of residence is 
what links the individual narratives. It certainly would have been more truthful to 
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speak of the actual areas (Collyhurst, Cheetham Hill, Moston etc.) or to use a wider 
label like North Manchester. This might appear as a minor technicality, but in my 
opinion, these precise but ultimately misleading details act to enhance the credibility 
of the programme’s claim to portray a specific local area. By doing so, it exploits the 
label of Harpurhey as the formerly most deprived neighbourhood in England (MEN, 
2007).  
I will further discuss the notions of truthfulness and authenticity later in this chapter. 
In particular, I am interested in genre limitations as well as the viewers’ perception 
of truthfulness and authenticity in relation to contemporary entertaining 
documentaries. I have demonstrated how truthfulness is claimed by People Like Us 
(2013l) in myriad ways, both implicitly and explicitly and how some of these claims 
are contradictory or downright misleading. 
 
7.3 Themes and characters 
 
To conclude this descriptive analysis of the programme, I now want to identify the 
main themes of the programme and discuss how these are narrated. I will then point 
to the peculiarities of the casting of People Like Us (2013l).  
 
7.3.1 Themes 
 
I would argue that overall there are five main themes that the vast majority of the 
storylines can be categorised under: 
 
Anti-social behaviour / criminality 
Alcohol & drug consumption 
Parenting (with an emphasis on single-parenthood) 
Work / career / individual fulfilment  
Racism / nationalism 
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All of those issues are central to several storylines. The exception is the nationalism / 
racism complex that only explicitly features in one single storyline and is otherwise 
largely implied. Of the other four central themes, none can be identified as dominant 
as they involve a similar number of participants and are equally central to a similar 
number of storylines. Of course, an analysis of the programme could focus on 
different issues altogether. Disability is for instance an underlying theme that is 
visually implied by a large number of shots of mobility scooters but, as I will come 
back to in the following chapter, not explored narratively despite being a part of the 
lives’ of two protagonists. The portrayal of gender norms, sexuality, inter-
generational conflicts, ‘Northernness’ etc. are all themes that could be discussed in 
relation to People Like Us (2013l) and that are also relevant from a class perspective. 
I would maintain that the above listed themes are very present in a quantitative 
sense.71 Nevertheless, these themes do not just ‘emerge’. They are relevant for my 
particular analysis, and therefore my own viewing of the programme will have to 
some degree been primed. The viewing of a researcher interested in disability, age, 
gender, sexuality or regional particularities might ‘code’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006), the 
programme in a significantly different way. This is not to say that People Like Us 
(2013l) can be anything that the researcher wants it to be, but to point to the degree 
of bias in my own identification of central themes. I decided against a quantitative 
thematic analysis as I agree with McKee (2003) that the coding process is in itself to 
a degree subjective and that the interpretation of a complex text is therefore not 
necessarily enhanced by the use of quantitative methods. On the contrary: there is 
the danger that quantitative analysis ‘produces information that is far removed from 
likely practices of sense-making’ (McKee, 2003:129). As I have discussed in chapter 
five, the reading of People Like Us (2013l) and debates around the programme are 
not determined by the prevalence of the respective themes in the programme, but, 
as it appears, in connection with popular public discourses. As I am interested in the 
potential impact of a programme like People Like Us (2013l), I will focus on themes 
                                                          
71 I have summarised the central storylines (see the problem-resolution box) and the 
majority of them revolve around one of the identified issues. 
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that feature prominently in the programme, but that also appear to resonate with 
the popular perception of the programme. 
 
7.3.1.1 Poverty 
 
Interestingly, given that People Like Us (2013l) is set in the formerly most deprived 
neighbourhood in England (MEN, 2007), poverty is not an issue that features 
prominently in the programme. A few characters allude to being short of cash (most 
extensively Aaron and Mikee in episode six (2013d)), but poverty in the sense of 
hardship does not enter the discourse. Although the high degree of deprivation is 
mentioned in the opening sequence and is presumably among the reasons why the 
programme is set in (and around) Harpurhey, the economic consequences of 
deprivation are not explored further. The same can be said about social security. 
There are very few direct mentions of state benefits.72 Generally, work and 
employment enter the discourse not so much as an economic necessity, but more in 
the sense of self-fulfilment. The emphasis appears to be more on how the 
protagonists ‘follow their dream’ (2013l: each episode at 0min 51) than the need to 
sustain oneself. The economic and emotional strain of not having an income is only 
(superficially) explored in one storyline (self-employed tradesmen Mikee & Aaron in 
episode six (2013d)). A few of the characters appear not to be in employment, but 
this is not further problematized. A number of participants show an interest in 
creative professions, the arts or in the show business73 and it is not entirely clear 
whether these are attempts to earn a living or just the participants’ hobbies.  
Two other central themes, alcohol consumption and drug use as well as nationalism 
and racism are treated in a similarly ‘light’ way.  
 
                                                          
72 In episode three landlord Nik argues that there is a ‘benefit culture’ (2013j:19min 15) in 
the UK, and on another occasion in episode two it is stated, in a rather matter-of-fact way, 
that ‘Nicola and Crystal live in a one-bedroom council flat on an estate just north of 
Harpurhey. They survive on benefits’ (2013e:10min 52). 
 
73 Amber – acting, Jamie – singing, Kelly – dancing, Anthony for his children – modelling, 
Dale – DJing / Radio / club promotion, Ryan – music 
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7.3.1.2 Drugs & alcohol 
 
Alcohol consumption is portrayed in every single episode and two participants state 
that they are alcohol dependent Chris - episode one (2013b), Nicola’s Dad Barry - 
episode two (2013e). Alcohol consumption plays a major role in a number of the 
portrayed storylines. Furthermore, several of the storylines involving the police 
appear to be caused by the supposed ubiquity and excessiveness of alcohol and drug 
consumption. A couple of the protagonists have been jailed for offences committed 
while intoxicated (Ryan, episode two (2013e), Anthony, episode four (2013c)). In 
several scenes, alcohol consumption is portrayed as excessive and PC Jim Evans states 
in an interview that the (young) residents of Harpurhey generally consume cheap 
alcohol: 
 
I think for the lasses it’s Lambrini. For the lads: cheap, cheerful Special Brew 
is always a popular one. And your nice White Lightning cider, nice strong cider. 
(2013j:26min 56) 
 
It is not clear what prompted this remark as, as is common practice in the 
programme, the interview question is omitted. The interview snippet is shown 
between scenes of unrest that resulted in the arrest of ‘a drunken youth’ 
(2013j:26min 52). So it appears that the excessive consumption of cheap alcohol is 
problematic. 
Whereas the drinking of some characters (Amber as well as Patrick and Arroll) is 
largely shown in recreational contexts and as excessive but largely unproblematic, 
the consumption of other characters (Dale as well as Mikee and Aaron) is portrayed 
as a hindrance in fulfilling their goals.  
Drug use, and in particular the consumption of cannabis is portrayed as a very wide-
spread phenomenon and a number or characters openly talk about their cannabis 
consumption and / or the popularity of the drug in the local area (Pidge, Sherelle, 
Mandy, Katie). The drug raid in episode four (2013c) is portrayed as a rather regular 
occurrence. This is signified by a (strangely staged looking) scene in episode four 
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(2013c) when an arriving police van is greeted by two waving young girls. This scene 
and the following drug raid is framed by Sherelle’s comment: 
 
Brentford Street gets raided, because the street probably DOES SMELL like 
cannabis because a lot of people sit there smoking it because they got nothing 
better to do. (2013c:26min 37) 
 
Which is supplemented by her mother Mandy’s view: 
 
Obviously yes, I smoke weed, everyone does, in this world. (2013c:27min 27) 
 
Again, it is not clear what the questions to these answers were, but the message is 
fairly obvious: residents of this particular street consume cannabis on a regular basis 
and law enforcement is not a serious concern to them. 
Overall I would argue that alcohol and drug consumption are portrayed in the 
programme as extremely common (with regards to ubiquity as well as choice of 
intoxicant) and excessive, as potential source of problems (unrest, drug raids), but as 
ultimately benign and not overly problematic.  
 
7.3.1.3 Parenting 
 
With regards to parenting, there is a strong emphasis on single parenthood and 
patchwork families. In fact, none of the families that feature on the programme solely 
consists of biological parents and their children. Only one of the four portrayed young 
parents lives with the partner of their children.  
Parenting is talked about explicitly on several occasions and a couple of storylines 
involving the Wakefield family revolve around parental / educational issues74.  
A common theme concerning the young parents featuring on the programme is the 
dual challenge of ‘staying out of trouble’ as well as protecting their own children from 
bad outside influences. All of the four young parents on the programme report of 
having got into conflict with the law and three of them have spent time in prison. 
                                                          
74 Episode two (2013e) – Amber and Karen undecided whether she should go to college, 
episode four (2013c:1min 51) – Karen and Paul trying to ‘curb Maddie’s bad behaviour’. 
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Wanting a better future for their own children is expressed by all of the young 
parents. This is mostly done with negative reference to the local area. One of the 
protagonists, Nicola, is seen to move away from Harpurhey to what looks like a rural 
location, stating that:  
 
I want a new life, I really do want a new life and up here I will be able to get a 
new life (2013e:47min 36).  
 
Protecting the own children from negative outside influences and wanting a better 
life for them appears central to all the portrayed young parents and is concisely 
expressed by Sherelle: 
 
I would not want my child to follow the road that I went down. No, I don’t 
want him to be a nothing like me (2013c:8min 58). 
 
I worry about him sometimes because of the community, like, the 
environment, sometimes ain’t a good environment for the kids. He copies 
most of the boys now, so I couldn’t imagine what it’s gonna be like when he 
is older, but I will stop it before it gets to that (2013c:10min 07). 
 
Ryan: 
 
I don’t want my daughter to see what I have seen and been through. And if 
anything it’s just more inspiration to get out of the place you are in. I don’t 
want to raise my daughter round here so it’s down to me to do something 
about that (2013e:31min 22).  
 
And Anthony: 
 
I hope that something comes out of it [referring to modelling] so I will be able 
to give my kids a better life (2013g:25min 19). 
 
Positive aspects of raising a child in Harpurhey are expressed by Sherelle in episode 
four, (2013c) as well as Jazmine’s mother Jaki in episode six (2013d). However, Jaki is 
also portrayed as contemplating a move away from the area: 
 
It’s my duty as their parent to take them somewhere safe (2013d:10min 22). 
Jaki: We can live a better way. When people like here have a problem what 
do they do? 
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Jazmine: They just wanna beat each other up. 
Jaki: The norm THERE (pointing to the screen that shows a picture of their new 
place) is to actually sit down and have a discussion (2013d:21min 08). 
 
So with regards to parenting, environmental influences do indeed enter the 
discourse. However, they mainly do so with reference to problematic influences and 
solutions are clearly individual ones. On two occasions the alleged chaos and danger 
of a childhood in Harpurhey is contrasted with the supposed safety and order of a 
gated alternative living project in Hulme, Manchester and a non-descript rural area 
10 miles south of Harpurhey.  
 
7.3.1.4 Anti-social behaviour & criminality 
 
Anti-social behaviour and criminality is clearly one of the central themes of the 
programme. Not so much in the sense that a huge number of storylines explicitly 
revolve around the issue, but more as an undercurrent. Crime and anti-social 
behaviour are at the centre of three discrete storylines.75  
A large number of characters portrayed in the programme report on camera of past 
or ongoing involvement in some form of criminal behaviour. The portrayed offences 
range from relatively minor offences to the aforementioned drug-taking and 
shoplifting ((2013e) and (2013j)) and serious offences including grievous bodily harm 
(2013g) and large-scale disorder (2013j). 
With regards to anti-social behaviour and criminality, what Skeggs (2009:10) 
describes as ‘judgement shots’ are very relevant. These are camera shots and 
sequences that as Tyler (2012:218) puts it: ‘incite [the audience BW] to respond with 
judgement’. A huge number of those ‘judgement shots’ are employed to display anti-
social behaviour and (low level) criminality. As described above, alone in 90 seconds 
of the opening sequence there are large number of short scenes that arguably depict 
                                                          
75 Pidge facing eviction (2013j), Kathie having to deal with anti-social behaviour (2013c), 
break-in at Wishy Wahsy (2013g)) as well as, naturally, all the stories around the portrayed 
police officers ((2013j) and (2013g). 
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some form of what is commonly understood as anti-social behaviour (see chapter 
7.2). 
Of course, not all of the behaviour depicted in these shots constitutes anti-social 
behaviour as such, but, I would argue, they clearly paint a picture of the area as 
unruly, chaotic and somewhat menacing. These, and other, judgement shots are not 
only used in the opening sequence, but throughout the programme. As mentioned 
previously, many of those shots are not put into any sort of context or explained in 
any way. So most of the people featuring in these shots remain anonymous. I would 
argue that this adds to the implied menacing and chaotic aura of Harpurhey and also 
makes the (sometimes faceless / pixilated) people ideal projection surfaces for (class) 
stereotypes. The choice of activities and outfits on display is very emotive and clearly 
refers to a number of easily recognisable working-class stereotypes. Overall, these 
shots contribute to a portrayal of Harpurhey as an area where crime and anti-social 
behaviour are extremely common occurrences. This is made explicit in the opening 
sequence when the narrator states that ‘anti-social behaviour is rife’ (2013l:0min 35 
of each episode). 
The ubiquity of criminality is, not very subtly, implied when the narration talks about 
Strangeways prison: 
 
Two miles down the road from Dale’s house is Strangeways Prison. It looms 
large over Harpurhey and to a few in the area it’s a second home. 
(2013e:23min 10) 
 
That crime is extremely common in Harpurhey is also implied through the editing. 
The most striking example is in my opinion the editing of episode three (2013j). The 
dramatic scenes of police officers breaking up a fight involving a large number of 
youths are interwoven with interviews. Right after the arrest scene is brought to a 
close and commented on, the programme continues with the depiction of an, 
allegedly out-of-control, birthday party.  
 
(2013j:25min 39) 
[Several shots of a small group of young man carrying large quantities of 
alcohol.] 
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OFF: It’s Friday night and Jim’s colleagues Sheryl and Avril are on the late shift. 
[Avril and Sheryl on their way to the location of the unrest. Serene blaring, 
police radio describing the nature of the unrest: ‘There are youth running 
towards the market, they have now got their tops off. They are all chanting 
“pigs” at the police’] 
Sheryl: [smiling] Shocker! 
Avril (to the camera): It’s a grade one. We are going to several youths fighting 
and throwing bottles at each other and passing vehicles. So a couple of other 
patrols are making their way there as well. 
Arroll (studio interview): I will say to you, on a Friday night it gets a bit lively, 
people have drinks. The next thing you know the estate’s flooded, there’s 
people on it and everyone is running from the police here and there and 
everywhere. And that’s it and they have a laugh. 
[Avril running after and stopping a young man] 
Patrick (studio interview): When Jeremy is boring me, I just go to my bedroom 
window. 
[Arrest of a young man] 
Jim (studio interview): I think for the lasses it’s Lambrini. For the lads: cheap, 
cheerful Special Brew is always a popular one. And your nice White Lightning 
cider, nice strong cider. 
[More shots of the arrest] 
Sheryl (interview in the street, apparently shortly after the arrest): Obviously 
there has been some sort of ado on the estate and it’s trying to find a fine line 
really between trying to maintain the peace in the area and trying to look after 
your own safety which can be quite difficult sometimes.  
Sheryl (now in a studio with Avril): It has been known that I have gone out in 
town and had a glass of wine or two in the past and I have never got myself 
into a fight. So I do ask the question why these people constantly find 
themselves, because we do generally come across the same people time and 
time again, so I do ask the question why they are constantly is these 
situations. And I don’t know why that is. Can you offer an answer to that? 
Avril: No. 
OFF: It’s eleven o’clock and half a mile up the road at Pidge’s his 21st birthday 
party is just getting going.  
[A number of shots of people drinking, smoking and dancing] 
OFF: By 1 am the party is in full swing and shows no signs of ending soon.  
Question from the off to Pidge: Do you ever worry about what the neighbours 
think? 
Pidge: No. 
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Party guest: Fuck the neighbours. Fuck. The. Neighbours. 
Pidge: Fuck the neighbours. [both laugh] 
 
The way in which short interview snippets are interwoven with pictures of the unrest 
and following arrests, to some degree plays down the dramatic and violent nature of 
the events and at the same time makes them appear as a very regular occurrence 
that ultimately entertain the residents of Harpurhey. In the interviews, some of the 
involved police officers expressed surprise that very little of the footage produced in 
relation to the unrest was used in the programme and that in particular the more 
violent and dramatic shots were left out. This, in connection with the rather light-
hearted statements, fits well with the general style and tone of the programme but 
is insofar surprising as, according to the interviewed police officers, these scenes 
would have made very spectacular television. 
The way in which the following party scenes were cut to and introduced, implies that 
the portrayed party took place on the same night as the unrest. This adds to the 
created sentiment of Harpurhey as an unruly, chaotic place where a Friday night is 
characterised by fighting and partying and little consideration for the neighbours. I 
would argue that the repeated references to the time of night are intended to signal 
the anti-social nature of Pidge’s behaviour that is made explicit in the interview 
question.  
 
7.3.1.5 Racism & nationalism 
 
Racism and nationalism, two more issues that are routinely associated with the 
working-class (Haylett, 2001), feature in the programme, but not as prominently as 
the aforementioned issues. Nationalism is not explicitly talked about, but implied in 
a large number of different shots of seemingly omnipresent England flags76. Racism 
is explicitly talked about in episode six in connection with Jazmine who ‘became the 
target of racism’ (2013d:19min 02). Although it is stated that racist abuse had a 
negative impact on Jazmine and her family and is part of the reason why they 
                                                          
76 For instance in (2013e:6min 27 & 36min 09), (2013c:50min 15), (2013g:41min 48) and 
(2013d:45min 52) 
181 
 
consider moving away from the local area, the nature and extent of racism in the 
local area is not explored in any depth.  
 
7.3.1.6 Conclusion 
 
So overall, a number of alleged symptoms of deprivation are depicted, but not 
explored in any depth and generally with little seriousness. It appears that the 
programme even shies away from anything but a very superficial exploration of 
violence, poverty and racism. Working-class stereotypes clearly structure the 
narrative of the programme, but do so in a very individualised way. People Like Us 
(2013l) deals with a number of social problems that are typically ascribed to the 
working class, but does so with very little seriousness. It could certainly be seen as a 
positive that the programme does not sensationalise contentious issues like social 
security, drug consumption, racism etc., but I would argue that the omission of 
serious and negative repercussions of the above mentioned issues plays them down, 
trivialises and ultimately depoliticises social problems. Inequality does not enter the 
discourse as poverty is treated as a purely individual phenomenon. Whether this was 
the intention of the makers of People Like Us (2013l) can only be speculated on, and 
the possibility that too graphic depictions of poverty, violence etc., let alone any 
seriousness societal or political considerations, were omitted in order to uphold the 
rather humorous, light-hearted and entertaining tone of the programme seems a 
likely scenario. Ultimately, however, as I will explore later, questions of intentionality 
are not overly relevant for a Bourdieusian critique of the programme. 
 
7.3.2 Characters 
 
Over the six episodes of the series, the viewer is introduced to a large number of 
characters, just over 50 of whom are introduced by name and get to talk on camera. 
I would argue that 33 characters can be seen as protagonists insofar as they are 
central to at least one storyline. Only a small number of participants appear in more 
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than one episode and are involved in more than one discrete and closed storyline.77 
The vast majority of participants are, as discussed above, introduced with reference 
to one particular issue that is developed and usually brought to a close within the 
same episode. 
As mentioned above, the participants on the programme very much appear to be cast 
for dramatic effect, and, as Brady (2013) shows with regards to the attempted casting 
of a young looking pregnant women, it appears with a pre-set agenda.78 In this sense, 
the casting of People Like Us (2013l) confirms Bonner’s (2013) assessment that 
docusoaps, despite generally claiming to be interested in portraying ordinary people, 
look for characters who embody a small number of easily recognisable stereotypical 
qualities. Their dramatic and comical potential should ideally match the qualities of 
sitcom characters. This view is echoed by Coles (2000:36) who states that the 
protagonists in docusoaps are as important as the characters in fictional drama. He 
also points to the ‘dual role’ of docusoap participants who perform as experts and 
presenters of their families and communities etc., but at the same time are expected 
to act as if the cameras were not there. The former is particularly evident in the 
direct-to-camera-pieces in which several participants make general statements about 
the local area.79  
A ‘dual role’ could also be ascribed to the participants of docusoaps in the sense that 
they are allegedly seen leading their normal lives, but do so ‘temporarily for the 
benefit of the television camera’ (Bruzzi, 2006:141). In a way, it could be said, they 
play themselves. The complexity of the notion of authenticity will be discussed later, 
but with regards to the ‘characters’ of docusoaps it can be stated that it is of vital 
importance that, despite the artificial setting and circumstances created by the 
presence of cameras, their emotions must appear real.  
                                                          
77 The Wakefield family, Jamie and Donna as well as the police officers Avril, Jim and Sheryl. 
 
78 The young lady was approached but then not considered to take part in the programme 
when it became apparent that she looked younger than she was and could therefore not 
embody the apparently sought after pregnant teenager. 
 
79 Amber and Cody in episode (2013b) or Avril and Sheryl (2013j) for instance. 
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The importance of the portrayed ‘characters’ for the success of a programme can 
hardly be overstated. Docusoaps focus on the stories and emotions of actual people 
and therefore foreground visuals, characterisations and the individual narrative (Hill, 
2005). Skeggs and Wood (2012a:25) point out that this focus on the character in the 
‘improvised drama’ of the docusoap is no coincidence insofar as docusoaps ‘fill the 
slot vacated by traditional drama across our schedules’ (Skeggs and Wood, 2012a:26). 
The focus on character does in my opinion not only apply to the (convincing) display 
of ‘true’ emotions but also in the sense that the displayed characters play their part, 
their ‘role’, with regards to the wider narrative of the programme. 
Even a superficial analysis of the main storylines of People Like Us (2013l) indicates 
that participants were not only chosen for their comedic and dramatic potential, but 
that the character casting was also influenced by the aforementioned working-class 
stereotypes. Most participants of the programme can clearly be identified with a 
single trait they are set to represent. I would argue that this assumption is confirmed 
by the way the stories of the participants are introduced and then narrated.  
As discussed above, most participants of People Like Us (2013l) only appear in a single 
episode and their respective stories are therefore introduced and brought to a close 
within one episode. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the individual 
characters are introduced with reference to their specific, easily recognisable, role 
within the problem-resolution narration of the programme. Most storylines revolve 
around a specific struggle that appears to relate to THE central characteristic of the 
character.  
The alcoholic (Chris), the troubled single Mom (Sherelle, Nikola), the party-girl 
(Amber), the gigolo (Jamie), the drag queen (David), the neighbour from hell (Pidge), 
the partying entrepreneurs (Mikee and Aaron, Dale), the rapper with a criminal past 
(Ryan) are all examples of easily recognisable and simplified characters that, as I will 
explore later, resonate with stereotypical depictions of the working class. 
Again, it could be argued that these shortened portrayals are first and foremost a 
result of the constraints of the genre. However, and this will be discussed in more 
detail with regards to the representativeness of the programme, the casting of the 
programme appears to be structured by stereotypical images. Taking the 
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‘requirement’ of Reality TV to look beyond the ordinary and to recruit more colourful 
and intriguing characters into account, it still can be can be questioned why so many 
of the participants of People Like Us (2013l) are reduced to (often negative) 
characteristics that are generally associated with the supposed deficiencies of 
contemporary working-class life.  
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8. Critique 
 
After having explored the production techniques and content of People Like Us 
(2013l) on a more descriptive level in the previous chapter, I now want to critically 
interpret these findings and relate them to my research question. This critique will 
take place on three levels. Firstly, I intend to analyse whether the claimed 
authenticity of the programme stands up to scrutiny. Following that, I intend to 
explore, taking into account the complexities of the notion of authenticity, whether 
the programme can be regarded as an unbiased representation of the local area and, 
more generally, of contemporary working-class life in the UK. And thirdly, I want to 
explore whether this critique can be generalised to address wider questions around 
the political and social significance of contemporary documentary filmmaking. The 
Bourdieusian concept of symbolic violence will be used to analyse whether the 
empirical example under consideration is indicative of wider (power) structures and 
is a mode of reproducing them. The first and second part of this critique is based on 
interviews with participants of People Like Us (2013l). Their opinions on authenticity 
and representativeness will be presented and related to the discourse analysis of the 
programme. Unfortunately, the views of the makers of the programme are largely 
missing from this research as my interview requests remained unanswered.  
 
8.1 Authenticity 
 
In the previous chapter’s rather descriptive analysis of People Like Us (2013l), I 
frequently refer to the notion of authenticity. In this chapter, I want to further explore 
what authenticity means in the context of contemporary documentary filmmaking 
and point to potential frictions between a professional and a lay conception of 
authenticity. Furthermore, and most importantly in this context, I want to portray the 
viewpoints of participants of the programme and their opinions on its truthfulness. 
Finally, I want to discuss the relationship between authenticity and truthfulness. I will 
however begin by asking the question whether authenticity is of significance to the 
audience in the contemporary television environment.  
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8.1.1 Significance of authenticity 
 
As I have shown above, markers of authenticity are extensively used in People Like 
Us (2013l). From specific recording techniques and the use of material produced by 
the participants of the programme, to a focus on displayed emotions and their largely 
sympathetic narration, a range of elements are intended to signify authenticity. 
However, there appear to be widely differing opinions as to what extent audiences 
regard Reality TV as truthful representations of real life and to what degree 
authenticity even matters to the viewer. Corner (2002:264), for instance, claims that 
a ‘belief in the veracity of what you are watching is not a prerequisite to engagement 
and pleasure’. Also Skeggs and Wood (2012a) come to the conclusion that ‘fakeness’ 
is a problem for formats that claim to portray reality, but that viewers are ultimately 
not overly invested in the truthfulness of the respective programmes. ‘Truth’ for 
Skeggs and Wood (2011:94) is not found in transparency, but ‘rather in the social or 
the inter-subjective truths’ that can resist or even be created by the artificiality of a 
Reality TV setting.  
The popularity and broad variety of programmes and formats that are, in one way or 
another, based on notions of reality certainly not only changed the television 
schedules, they surely impacted on the audience’s readings of products of 
documentary filmmaking. Furthermore, as outlined in chapter five, the truthfulness 
of reality-based programmes has been, and is being, publicly debated. There are 
documented instances in which reality-based television programmes have been 
accused or found guilty of wilfully distorting the truth and misleading the audience 
(for a historic example see chapter six). However, the actual impact of these 
revelations and, more generally, the ways in which viewers nowadays trust or doubt 
reality-based programmes is not quite clear. Corner (2002:263) regards the ‘self-
display’ in docusoaps no longer ‘as an attempt to feign natural behaviour, but as a 
performative opportunity in its own right’. Not least, this performative element, but 
also the ‘new playfulness’ with which docusoaps engage with reality, ‘must have 
raised popular audience awareness of just how constructed audio-visual 
documentation can be’ (Corner, 2002:264). Also Hill (2005:57), claims that television 
audiences are aware that editing techniques can ‘create different degrees of reality’. 
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Therefore, trust in the authenticity of a docusoap is complex and dependent on the 
respective set-up and execution of an individual programme.  
These assessments largely confirm the findings of my own analysis of online debates 
around People Like Us (2013l). As I discussed in the chapter five, many discussants 
expressed general scepticism regarding the authenticity and truthfulness of reality-
based television programmes. However, this general scepticism was, by and large, 
not actually applied to the programme under discussion and its content was treated 
as real and discussed at face value by the vast majority of discussants. It appears that 
the participants in the analysed debates acknowledged the potential of television 
producers to represent reality in a distorted way, but found little or no evidence of 
misrepresentations in the actual programme. It could be argued that the latter is not 
too surprising, as distortions and misrepresentations are rarely evident.  
I would argue that truthfulness did not cease to matter to the audience. As I have 
discussed in chapter six, a lack of truthfulness can, if suspected or detected, be very 
damaging to programmes that claim to portray reality.80 Viewers appear willing to 
accept that docusoap settings are somewhat manufactured and controlled and that 
editing can be a powerful tool, but within these parameters, programmes and the 
behaviour of the people appearing in them must appear truthful. I would argue that 
this can be seen as the central reason why, as discussed above, markers of 
authenticity are heavily employed in People Like Us (2013l). It seems almost like the 
artificiality of the docusoap setting must be offset by the realness and credibility of 
its content. In a sense, it appears like the onus of truthfulness was transferred from 
the makers of a programme to the ‘characters’ appearing in them. Despite the 
artificiality of the setting, their behaviour and display of emotions must appear 
unpretentious and authentic. 
It can be asked why, if ‘realness’ is of no concern to the audience (any more), would 
the producers of docusoaps go to great lengths to signify authenticity? Audiences are 
generally willing to trust the ability of Reality TV to capture reality (Hill, 2005), but 
this trust is somewhat fragile and needs to be constantly re-established. If docusoaps 
                                                          
80 As Bruzzi (2006) shows, even very popular docusoaps like Driving School (1997b) and 
Clampers (1998c) suffered in popularity when it became obvious that their production 
relied on a greater degree of artificiality than the programme suggested. 
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and other reality-based programmes were, indeed, regarded as a playful and largely 
fictional interpretation of loosely ‘realistic’ occurrences and characters, docusoaps 
could be much more open about their respective set-ups and production conditions. 
As I demonstrate above, truth is claimed implicitly and explicitly, but this claim is not 
problematized in any sense. Reality TV, with the most notable exception of Big 
Brother (2000), does not signal its artificiality. On the contrary: what is in effect a 
highly constructed and controlled setting is meant to appear unconstructed and 
natural (Bruzzi, 2006). The question can be asked, why, if the viewer is aware and 
does not mind the ‘fakeness’ of Reality TV, is there not more openness about its 
constructedness.81  
Also in the empirical example under discussion, questions of authenticity and 
truthfulness are, as I have discusses in chapters five and seven, at the heart of 
reporting on and the debating of the programme (see: The Media Show, 2013a; 
Wheatstone, 2013; Brady, 2013; Hills 2013).  
To conclude, I suggest that the absence of ‘a making-of’ or generally a greater degree 
of openness regarding the production methods of a docusoap like People Like Us 
(2013l) cannot be interpreted as a lack of interest on the side of the audience that is 
cynical about and not too interested in the truthfulness of reality-based programmes. 
Quite the opposite – I would argue that the opaqueness about the production 
conditions of docusoaps stems from an unwillingness to undermine the carefully 
crafted notion of realness on the side of the producers and broadcasters. The 
discussed, genre-typical, use of markers of authenticity as well as the analysed 
perception of People Like Us (2013l) strongly point to this conclusion.  
                                                          
81 It is interesting, and maybe telling, that the authenticity of natural history programmes 
appears to be under much greater scrutiny than the authenticity of documentary 
programmes concerned with the human species. The controversy around the BBC 
programme Hidden Kingdoms (2014c) is exemplary in that respect. The use of blue screen 
technology, re-enacted elements and misleading editing forced the BBC to precede the 
screening of each episode with a message indicating the dramatized nature of the 
programme (Conlan, 2013). Ten minutes of the programme were dedicated to the 
production techniques that are also outlined on the BBC website (BBC, 2014a). A ‘making-of’ 
of a Reality TV programme could, in my opinion, be equally revealing, but is probably a rather 
remote possibility. 
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8.1.2 Examples of questionable authenticity 
 
In the following section, I want to point to examples of questionable authenticity in 
People Like Us (2013l). Here, I want to incorporate the views of participants of the 
programme. Their experiences and assessments are at the centre of this analysis. My 
intention is not to comprehensively list a large number of instances in which 
distortions and manipulations took place, but to present the views of the participants 
of the programme and to exemplarily depict a number of cases of questionable 
authenticity that can help to further develop the notions of authenticity in a 
docusoap context. 
For the purpose of this analysis, I will use the term authenticity in a rather narrow 
sense. This means that I will focus on possible distortions of what was being filmed 
as being caused by the filming process itself i.e. by the presence of cameras or specific 
demands of the makers of the programme. Authenticity, in this sense, refers to the 
supposedly spontaneous, unscripted and unstaged nature of the programme. 
Misrepresentations caused by misleading and unrepresentative editing or for 
instance by showing scenes out of context will be discussed in the following 
subchapter.  
All of the participants of People Like Us (2013l) that I interviewed agreed that the 
programme was an authentic depiction of them insofar, as, by and large, what they 
said on camera was not scripted, directly influenced or manipulated by the 
production company or the presence of the camera crews.  
Paul sums up this general view: 
 
Paul: It was us, that was us, being ourselves. What you got is what you saw. 
What you heard is what was being said. You know? What comments you 
heard me saying is what I naturally say. I wouldn't say it like I had a script put 
to me. There was no script.  
 
Also Sheryl is of the opinion that the programme matched her experience of the local 
area and that people in it ‘were quite true to life’ and that she ‘felt it to be quite 
factual’. 
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Donna and Amber confirm this view and make connections between their authentic 
display and their likeability as characters in a docusoap. 
 
Donna: Oh yeah, but to be honest with you, we did not get a lot of bad 
publicity. Even on the market. Actually, people said: ‘You are the natural 
people. There's no airs and graces with you’. People love the bit where I whack 
him on the chair with the remote. And shout and that. ... So people kind of 
liked us for our honesty and people liked us more for our funny side, how we 
laugh at life. 
 
Amber: Oh God, everything you see like is how we were. If you didn't like us, 
you didn't like us. If you did, you did. It's just the way they put it together.  
 
The last statement indicates that there is more to truthfulness than the absence of a 
script and that authenticity and representativeness cannot be discussed in isolation. 
I will come back to that shortly, but it can be stated that none of the interviewed 
participants of the programme claimed the events on camera and the dialogues to 
be scripted and fabricated in a very direct sense. However the presence of a camera 
(crew) at times had a significant impact on the filmed events. 
Even Paul, who, as the above quoted statement indicates, is very clear that he acted 
naturally in front of the camera, concedes that their presence, and in this particular 
case the interview situation, did slightly alter the way he expressed himself. 
 
Paul: With me, if you play the game fair with me, then I don't like to cheat. 
That's how I look at things, that's how I look at life. You know.  
 
BW: So you would say you are in front of the camera just the way you are… 
 
Paul: That is exactly how I was. 
 
Karen: You forget the camera's there, don't you? 
 
Paul: Yeah. 
 
BW: I found it particularly strong in these interviews, you make a number of 
very... 
 
Paul: ...funny? 
 
BW: Very male, witty, funny comments... 
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Paul: It's funny that you say that, cause like those sort of comments are 
comments I would naturally make. Because I have not seen them on the 
camera, that's what I normally say. I never really giggle at them. But when I 
have seen them back on the interviews, I thought, well that sounds funny to 
somebody else the way I said that, you know, so I have laughed at it. 
 
Karen: There is one false thing you did do though. He smiled on television and 
that's just against the rules, cause you don't smile in life. [laughs] 
 
So Paul’s awareness that what he says on camera will be watched by an audience has 
to a degree influenced his demeanour.  
This can be seen as a fairly benign interference that hardly damages the authenticity 
of the programme. However, I would argue that this exemplifies the unavoidable 
influence that the presence of a camera excerpts, even on a very unruffled person 
like Paul who, as he also expressed in this interview, did not even watch the finished 
programme in its entirety. 
A more significant and more serious example of the effect the presence of a television 
camera can have, was discussed by police officers Sheryl and Avril with reference to 
the above discussed large-scale disorder. 
 
Sheryl: ... Because they were being a bit aggressive, we were really aware that 
there was a camera man with us and I would feel guilty if he'd got hurt, so we 
kind of asked him to stay out that time. 
 
Avril: ... But there were times when we gotta be switched on about OUR 
security and safety. Like the night on the estate. What you DON'T see is glass 
going everywhere, what you don't see is Sheryl having to deal with an 
offender and then another offender tries to push Sheryl out of the way and 
grab the guy that she's got. We are dealing with reports of, you know, of glass 
going everywhere, fighting, we don't know what we are walking into and we 
are in a rat run and they don't show that. And it ended up being quite a few 
officers turning up. And you see the one minute you see things getting out of 
hand and the next minute, you see, 15, 16 officers turning up. You think: 
‘How's that escalated?’ and you don't see that bit in the middle where actually 
there was a point when Sheryl could have got herself hurt, I could have got 
myself hurt, we had to physically deal with people and then as well you have 
in the back of your mind to look after the camera man, because when he was 
running through the alley way there were people following him. And that's 
why we pulled in so many officers. I did not like that they did not show the 
continuity.  
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Sheryl: To be fair, he was just lucky on that incident. On a couple of incidents 
that he was just there when a job came in it just kicked off a little bit. Why 
they chose that one, I don't know.  
 
BW: I'm thinking, would you agree, or is there not the danger that the camera 
creates a situation as opposed to document? For instance when you took this 
young lad out of ASDA and you clearly can see that he tries to kick the camera. 
I was thinking: ‘Did that not wind him up even more?’. 
 
Sheryl: Certainly on the estate. You see that later part when the guy is 
arrested and I think I talk a little bit on camera. When we got there, the 
camera guy was with us. There was about 16 lads having a bit of a scrap. They 
calmed down when they saw me and Av and I think that might have been, you 
know, a little bit because of female officers and things like that. But you put a 
camera there and... It it got... 
 
Avril: Chests get puffed out, everybody... 
 
Sheryl: Yeah, so it did aggravate the situation. Certainly in that situation it did. 
And many things could have aggravated that situation, not just the camera, 
but certainly that did not help matters at that point. And to be fair, when we 
asked him to put the camera down ‘don't point it at them, because they kick 
off’ he did as he was told. He might still have been recording or doing the 
audio, but he did put the camera down at the point. I think because he 
realised there were 16 of them, three of us and we were getting a kicking had 
it got to that point [laughs], him included. To be fair. 
 
Avril: Yes, I'll have that. 
 
Sheryl: I don't think it was as intrusive as it could have been. I was expecting 
him to be a bit more aggressive with the camera work. Certainly in that 
situation, because it was getting out of control, but when we told him to put 
his camera down, he did. 
 
 
The scenes Sheryl and Avril are referring to, are both from episode three (2013j) and 
depict an arrest of two young men for shoplifting as well as large-scale disorder 
involving young people fighting and causing damage. Sheryl and Avril vividly describe 
how their concern for the safety of the cameraman played a role in their decision-
making and how the presence of a camera escalated an already very tense and 
dangerous situation for the police officers and the cameraman. Again, and Avril and 
Sheryl are very clear about this, there was nothing staged about either of the 
instances, but not only did some of the context get lost in the editing, the situations 
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themselves would have unfolded differently had the camera not been there. I would 
argue that the described events and their portrayal very well illustrate the complexity 
and somewhat contradictory nature of the notion of authenticity in a docusoap 
setting. The camera and camera crew are visible and influence events they are 
supposed to portray, however this effect is not addressed in the programme at all. 
As a final example of the filming process interfering with events, I want to quote 
Amber, whose decision whether to go to drama school or not is one of the central 
storylines of episode two (2013e). In the programme, Amber’s and her mother’s 
concerns appear to be whether both ‘are ready’ for Amber to leave home. As Amber 
points out in the interview, her actual thought-process did not revolve around her 
readiness, but around possible career opportunities arising from her involvement in 
the programme. 
 
Amber: I couldn't go to drama school at the moment because it looked like on 
the scene that I didn't wanna go cause I couldn't do my own washing. 
Absolutely rubbish! I could do my own washing, I know how to work a washing 
machine, I love doing my own thing. I am very independent. The only reason 
I didn't go is cause they said once the programme is up we gonna be asking 
you to do these jobs, these jobs, this job, this job. So I was thinking: ‘So why 
go to drama school to learn for three years when you gonna be putting me 
out there for my own life experience. I'm gonna be out there doing what I 
want to do. I didn't go through for that reason. As soon as it's over I'm like 
‘Uhhm... So I got no drama school and I have got no job’. So I had to do 
another course just for the meantime. 
 
BW: So had it not been for the programme you would have gone... 
 
Amber: ...I would have gone to drama school, yes of course I would have. 
 
... 
 
Amber: Everything, so why on earth would she [her mother] would want to 
push me not to go to drama school.  
 
BW: But it's 100% how it comes across, isn't it?  
 
Amber: 100%. They were, like, saying: ‘Your Mom didn't wanna push us’. My 
Mom would do anything.  
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So, according to Amber, her involvement in the programme and promises made by 
the makers of the programme were key in her decision not take up the offered place 
at drama school. So in this case it was not the presence of cameras, but Amber’s 
involvement in the programme that impacted on the events on screen. It seems like 
the actual reasons  for Amber’s decisions were misrepresented in order to keep the 
notion of an authentic, passive and disengaged representation intact. According to 
Amber, promises made by the production company created the initial conflict, 
whether to go to drama school or not, that was then, cynically one could say, 
misrepresented. 
 
Finally, I want to point to misrepresentations and distortions that were not accidental 
or (unavoidable) side effects of the production process, but appear to be caused by 
specific demands of the producers of the programme.  
First of all, on a number of occasions the participants of People Like Us (2013l) were 
asked to (re-en)act scenes or to use a prepared script. For instance, Amber’s 
contribution to the opening sequence (2013l:1min 17) was scripted. 
 
BW: In the opening sequence you say famously ‘Yous think you might know 
People Like Us...’. 
 
Amber: ‘...but you don't know nothing yet.’.  
 
BW: Exactly. Did you come up with that? 
 
Amber: No. 
 
BW: Yeah. 
 
Amber: Obviously not. There was so much, in a way, they made us say, but... 
 
Whereas the scripted nature of that particular utterance is somewhat obvious (hence 
the question), several scenes that appear very spontaneous and authentic were 
staged or re-enacted. One of the central storylines of episode one (2013b) is the 
development and eventual end of Lucy’s and Jamie’s relationship. As the actual 
break-up happened off camera, the production team requested that Jamie and Lucy 
meet up to produce filmic evidence of it. According to Jamie, the meeting was 
requested and set-up by the production team: 
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Jamie: Yes, when I was in the park with Lucy, doing, well, the break-up, the 
night before, I had already done the break-up, you see. We spoke about it. I 
said Lucy listen it’s not working, we both argue all the time, breaking into 
fights and I don’t want that for you. We called it a day, we were both happy 
with it, we both walked away as mates. We got pissed the same night and left 
it at that. The next day I got a phone call off the crew saying can you please 
come to Queen’s Park, that’s where it was filmed, saying can we please go 
over the break-up to confirm it on camera. And the minute I turned up, the 
way it was placed, I thought ‘fucking hell’ I knew what they were gonna do. I 
should have walked away, but I didn’t. You know, they just filmed this but 
when I walked off they nit-picked her until she started crying. You know like 
‘Aw, what do you think about that? What was good?’ and all this. 
 
Jamie states that he felt very uncomfortable about how the scene was set and felt it 
to be a rather one-sided and inauthentic and ultimately manipulated representation 
of what had happened. The viewer is left in the dark about the staged nature of the 
meeting.  
Another, less dramatic, staged scene was discussed by Avril and Sheryl. In episode 
three (2013j), a briefing of the local police is shown that according to Sheryl was ‘very 
staged’. She explains: 
 
Sheryl: We don't sit around the table like that. We basically have got a briefing 
room and our Sergeant stands at the front of the briefing room and says: 
‘Right, these are your duties today, these are the hot spot areas, and in 
particular we need to get this, we got this amount of appointments, off you 
go’. What they had done is, they got Jim to lead the briefing. That has 
happened, officers do that, but generally it is the supervisor that does it and 
we don't sit around the table in the kitchen and I am not allowed to eat grapes 
in general [laughter]. 
 
Sheryl adds that the nature of their work renders certain aspects of such a briefing 
off-limits, but that ultimately the intentions of the filmmakers were the decisive 
factor in the set-up of the briefing: 
 
Sheryl: A lot of it is intel-led stuff so they had to be a little bit careful about 
what they did record. They did want us to... There were certain topics they 
wanted us to discuss. It's not a world away from what we would have 
discussed, but I think it just helped them to link things within the programme. 
So they kind of wanted to do that a little bit more. But, yeah, it wasn't how 
we would normally do a briefing really.  
 
196 
 
Again, what was being shown in the programme was not ‘a world away’ from reality. 
Whether this, undeclared, staging of scenes is problematic will be discussed later, but 
it becomes clear from these statements that requirements regarding the narrative 
structuring of the programme directly impacted on the set-up of numerous, 
seemingly unstaged scenes. As I will show in the following, final example, what I 
called ‘requirements’ can, similar to the ‘confirmed’ break-up, put a spin on a story.  
Sheryl, referring to Pidge’s shared house that features in episode three (2013j) as the 
location of what is depicted to be a rather wild party: 
 
Sheryl: I'm gonna be honest with you - they wanted us to call that the ‘party 
house’ all the time. They asked us to call it. So they were obviously trying to 
make something of that. 
 
Avril adds to that: 
 
Avril: I mean I don't know whether they have spoken to Pidge and said: ‘Are 
you having a party?’ or encouraged him to do that. I don't know. 
 
Even if we assume that Pidge’s party was not staged, encouraged or sponsored by 
the producers of People Like Us (2013l), it is remarkable that it was attempted to use 
the authoritative voice of the police to emphasise the above discussed spin that was 
put on this particular narrative. As Sheryl puts it, the attempt ‘to make something of 
that’ indicates an attempt to emphasise and possibly exaggerate a particular aspect 
of a story. 
One final aspect that I want to discuss in the context of how the notion of authenticity 
is reflected in the production methods of the programme is the use of content that 
was produced by the participants in the programme. As touched on in the previous 
chapter, on several occasions material created by the participants is used in the 
programme. Amber as well as Avril talk about their respective experiences: 
 
BW: And when you went on holiday, erm, did they give you a camera? 
 
Amber: They gave me a camera. I filmed so much, I filmed so much and they 
just put in crap. ... I did some funny stuff like ‘we are just going off to the 
beach. Gonna get something to eat’ and it was some really nice stuff. But 
instead it was obviously the drink again. Do you know what, they were more 
upset we did not film our nights out. I didn't film them. I didn't film them. For 
one I didn't want the camera just being lost anyway and for another thing I 
thought ‘No, I'm not filming my nights out’. 
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As discussed above, the scenes of Amber on holiday with her friends were filmed by 
herself with a camera provided by the production company. What could potentially 
be a very authentic and autonomous way of producing material was in fact to a great 
degree controlled by the production company insofar as Amber was under the 
instruction to specifically film her nights out and, as we will come back to shortly, 
condensed and distorted by a very biased editing process. Apparently, Amber 
resisted these demands, but had not control over how her material was edited. So, 
again, it becomes very obvious that the relationship between authenticity (with 
regards to the used filming techniques) and truthfulness is a complex one. 
Police officer Avril was involved in the above mentioned drug raid. In the following, 
she explains that the scenes that are recorded from her point of view were not 
recorded by the body cams that police forces are currently being equipped with, but 
by shoulder cameras provided by the production team.  
 
BW: I found it remarkable that they could obtain the material and then... 
 
Avril: But they were their own cameras. The shoulder cams were the 
production company's own cameras. 
 
BW: Ah, I see. 
 
Sheryl: We wear body cams ourselves, but you were wearing a shoulder cam. 
 
Avril: They would never have access to police body cams. That's evidential. 
And you see a lot of officers wearing them now. What you have to do is to 
switch them on. But I was wearing a production company shoulder cam so 
they could use that footage.  
 
For the context of this research, it is interesting to point to Avril’s distinction between 
pictures produced by a body camera and the shoulder camera she was wearing. 
Whereas material produced by the police’s body camera could not have been used 
in the programme, the pictures produced by the production company’s shoulder 
camera could be and were used. This is somewhat ironic, as, due to their proximity, 
both cameras will have produced almost identical pictures. Still, as I will discuss in the 
next sub-chapter, the police had little or no control over the use of the material 
produced by the shoulder cameras their officers were wearing. Again, the control 
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over very authentically produced material lies completely with the production 
company. 
 
8.1.3 Authenticity and truthfulness 
 
In the following, I want to attempt to theoretically frame the above discussed findings 
by coming back to a question that was raised when comparing contemporary and 
historic forms of documentary filmmaking: how real can a documentary be? Holmes 
and Jermyn (2004:12) argue that the question ‘how real is reality TV’ is becoming 
‘increasingly tautological’ in the context of highly structured and artificial Reality TV 
settings. Nevertheless, I would maintain that this question is still relevant in the 
docusoap context, as programmes like People Like Us (2013l) claim to tell us truths 
about contemporary social life and contribute to relevant political discourses (around 
social security for instance – see chapter five) .  
Bruzzi (2001a:129) questions the notion of authenticity by asking whether filmic 
representations can ever be undirected:  
 
How can that film ever just be a ‘way of looking’ as opposed to a way of 
altering and manipulating the reality it is looking at? 
 
This conundrum is reflected not only in the aforementioned effect of the presence of 
cameras, but also in the casting, the choices of topic, the voice-over, and most 
notably in the editing of a programme. In the following, I will try to distinguish these 
general limitations and dilemmas of documentary filmmaking from specific 
requirements and rules of the genre to arrive at a discussion of different 
understandings of authenticity.  
Corner (2002:256) speaks with regard to observational documentaries of a ‘field 
naturalism’ that has always been full of contradictions and therefore has always been 
‘highly implausible’ (Corner, 2002:259). Skeggs and Wood (2011:93) come to the 
conclusion that Reality TV must be seen ‘more as a fiction of “presence” rather then 
re-presentation’. Documentary filmmaking has always faced the impossible challenge 
of capturing social life on camera and to then present it in a very condensed forms. 
As I have already discussed above, the ‘amorphousness of actuality’ (Coles, 2000:33) 
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can hardly be depicted by the means of documentary filmmaking. Events need to be 
condensed, feelings visibly displayed (and filmed) and thoughts to be uttered and 
recorded in interviews to present unfolding events in a comprehensible, meaningful 
and coherent way. Reality does not occur in a way that is easy to narrate and to 
dramatise and therefore, filmmakers need to resort to the aforementioned 
techniques. In the docusoap genre, the need for soap-opera-like condensed and 
dramatised storylines is even greater and, I would argue, very much reflected in the 
above discussed ways in which events in People Like Us (2013l) were stage (the break-
up), labelled (the party-house) or linked (the staged briefing). Couldry (2011:194) 
sums up this way of producing reality:  
 
Reality TV needs to be understood as a form whereby objects, mechanisms of 
representation and people (producers, participants, audiences) are arranged 
to sustain claims – plausible at some level - that social ‘reality’ is presented 
through these means. 
 
In this context, it is necessary to refer again to the material conditions of television 
productions. I will not repeat the arguments presented in chapter six, but it is clear 
that an arrangement of reality like People Like Us (2013l) is influenced by the 
requirements of the television market as much as by the working conditions it is 
produced under. Docusoaps are, in terms of production costs, relatively cheap 
television and therefore, as discussed, production teams are under the pressure to 
maximise their allocated resources. In this environment, authenticity is presumably 
of lower priority than the need to capture or create catchy narratives. Bruzzi 
(2001a:131) speaks in this context of a producer’s ‘shopping list’, meaning visual 
elements of a narrative that a filmmaker would need to ‘seek out, if not directly 
engineer’. Some of the above discussed examples indicate that the production of 
People Like Us (2013l) was to some extent also structured by a ‘shopping list’, most 
clearly with regards to the above mentioned attempted recruitment of a pregnant 
teenage girl and Amber’s instructions to film her and her friends going out.  
A final aspect that illustrates the complexity of the notion of authenticity in a 
docusoap context is the alleged performative character of the behaviour displayed in 
all forms of Reality TV. I have alluded to the impact the presence of a camera 
potentially excerpts, but of course this impact is not caused by the camera itself, but 
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by the knowledge of being recorded and eventually being broadcast and watched by 
a potentially very large number of people. Participants of docusoaps, and other forms 
of Reality TV, will have watched similar programmes and to some extent have an idea 
of what is expected of them or have expectations regarding the filming process and 
its outcomes. It would probably be an exaggeration to claim that there is an 
established way of talking and behaving on a Reality TV programme, but it must be 
assumed that not only in the game-based and overtly artificial, but also in more 
conventional docu-style settings, performativity nowadays plays a greater role than 
it did for the participants of the very early Reality TV productions. As the viewing 
habits and expectations of the audience have changed over two decades of Reality 
TV, so will people taking part in these programmes have been influenced by past 
experiences of Reality TV. Biressi and Nunn (2005:102) refer to shifting expectations 
in the field of Reality TV as a ‘new realism in the digital age’ in which self-revelation 
is a key element and a marker of authenticity. In a sense, participants of Reality TV 
play themselves or, as Žižek (2002:226) puts it pointedly:  
 
The distinction between real life and acted life is thus ‘deconstructed’: in a 
way, the two coincide, since people act their ‘real life’ itself, i.e., they literally 
play themselves in their screen-roles.  
 
Kavka (2012) seconds this view by stating that in a Reality TV setting the 
circumstances are more of display than of observation. Accordingly, performing in 
front of a camera is generally associated with acting and therefore unnatural 
behaviour. I have discussed this supposed split between ‘true self’ and ‘performed 
self’ already, but, perhaps this spilt is not as dichotomous as suggested. By this I mean 
that any sort of, also off-camera, behaviour possibly has a performative element. It 
could be argued, that different ‘selves’ emerge in different contexts and that, in this 
respect, the Reality TV context is just another arena of performance. Lawler 
(2008:102) shows that this ‘social and cultural preoccupation with authenticity’, that 
pits performance against being true to one’s identity, is a phenomenon of the 
Western world. Lawler (2008) challenges this dichotomy by questioning the hierarchy 
of authenticity and truthfulness of the respective performed roles in the sense that a 
version of the self that is displayed in a more intimate and private setting is not 
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necessarily a truer version of the self displayed in a more official or professional 
setting.  
In my own research with participants of People Like Us (2013l), there is little evidence 
that the participants felt like they were performing a different version of themselves 
for the benefit of the camera or to support specific narratives. It certainly can be 
argued that this might not be an entirely conscious process, but of the interviewees 
only Sheryl and Avril talked about how the awareness of being part of a docusoap 
shaped their behaviour in front of a camera: 
 
BW: But you were quite mindful of that with the editing they could portray 
you... 
 
Sheryl: I was extremely mindful. It was the thing, I've actually said it before, if 
I had got asked again, I think I wouldn't do it. Purely on the basis that I was 
just so nervous all the time and I am not a particularly... I don't swear all that 
much, I think I'm quite a decent cop. I certainly don't do anything that breaks 
the law and I treat everyone with respect. But even then you just feel under 
pressure all the time that the media can really make things look different, I 
am really aware of that and I got aware of it about two weeks in. It just hit me 
and I thought ‘Oh, if they take something out of context or...’. Yeah, I was very 
aware of that all the time.  
 
And later: 
 
Sheryl: He [the camera man] was always trying to have a laugh and a joke with 
us. We were really wary of that. You know when someone is laughing and 
having a joke with us, we were wary that he was trying to set us up. 
 
Avril: We had conversation with him about this, because you become very 
suspicious as a police officer, you cannot help it, it goes with the territory. You 
question so much more than you would, had you been an ordinary member 
of the public who have a different job. We did, we were very conscious of it 
and we were very conscious that the police has been portrayed in a very bad 
light in the past, and quite rightly so in some circumstances. Secret Policeman 
- completely, yes, it changed the way this force dealt with diversity, and other 
forces as well. But we had been portrayed in a really bad light because people 
sometimes just don't know how we have to deal with certain incidents in a 
certain way.  
 
In a sense, their knowledge of the potential of Reality TV to manipulate and 
misrepresent, influenced their behaviour. The performance they put on for the 
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camera was characterised by a great degree of wariness and guardedness. This 
holding-back was clearly influenced by their role as police officers representing their 
force and by an awareness of previous negative representations of the police. The 
question as to whether their way of consciously keeping a safe distance in their roles 
of representatives of the police is authentic and true to their ‘true selves’ becomes 
somewhat self-defeating. Avril and Sheryl were aware that they were not part of a 
police documentary and that the programme was interested in their personalities as 
well as their professional roles in the community. The need to act as a representatives 
of the police force, possibly more generally of female police officers and certainly of 
their own personality for the benefit of a mistrusted camera, clearly demonstrates 
the complexity and messiness of the notion of authenticity in a docusoap context. 
Before I discuss possible frictions between a professional and a lay understanding of 
authenticity, I want to briefly come back to the classed nature of the term. As 
discussed in chapter three, questions of authenticity and its counterpart 
pretentiousness are often framed in class terms. Lawler (2005) points to the cruel 
irony of the working class being expected to aspire to take on or imitate middle-class 
taste, but if doing so, risks being branded as pretentious. Middle-class norms are 
seemingly universal standards that are normatively and morally loaded and can 
therefore not be refused without sanction (at least not by the working class). The 
conception of working-class people as behaving authentically is therefore, despite 
appearing as a positive attribution, problematic. Not only are attempts to deviate 
from essentialised attributions readily branded as pretentiousness, there is also the 
underlying assumption that working-class people lack the capacity to act in any other 
way than being authentic. As Skeggs (2004) shows, stereotypical representations of 
members of the middle class tend to revolve around aspirational and reflexive selves 
that are in control of their lives, whereas working-class selves tend to be presented 
as incapable of such degrees of psychological depth and control. Clearly, there is 
more to be said about this linkage and some of its aspects and repercussions will be 
picked up in the following sub-chapter, but at this point it shall suffice to state that 
the notion of authenticity is a deeply classed one.  
Coming back to the difficulties of docusoaps to capture reality, I want to raise the 
question whether there is possibly a disconnect between a lay understanding of 
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authenticity and the professionals’ view on the subject. Unfortunately, Dragonfly, the 
production company behind People Like Us (2013l), did not reply to my inquiries and 
therefore I have to rely on official guidelines regarding acceptable production 
techniques in a docusoap context. After the BBC’s admission that scenes in Driving 
School (1997b) were staged or re-enacted, guidelines were developed by the BBC. 
The key points were: 
 
- Programmes should be truthfully and fairly depict what has happened 
- Programmes should never do anything to mislead audiences 
- Contributors should not be asked to re-enact significant events, without this 
being made clear in the film 
- If significant events have been arranged for the camera that would not have 
taken place at all without the intervention of the programme-makers, then 
this must be clear to the audience 
(Bruzzi, 2006:131) 
 
The difficulties in putting these rather general guidelines into practice are apparent. 
In particular, the first two guidelines can be read as a commendable, but rather vague 
aspiration. However, even the third and fourth guidelines that I chose to quote are, 
as discussed above, not as clear-cut as they might appear. The above mentioned 
examples (the break-up, the police briefing, the disorder - just to name the most 
apparent instances) would have unfolded differently or not taken place at all without 
the presence of a camera. Whether this qualifies as a re-enactment or an artificial 
interference and set-up is debateable. The discussed scenes might, from a 
professional point of view, be regarded as acceptable use of legitimate production 
techniques. It is however very questionable as to whether they are compatible with 
a lay understanding of authenticity and truthfulness. As discussed, the participants 
themselves did explicitly express the feeling of having been set up (Jamie) or being 
part of a ‘very staged’ (Sheryl and Avril) set-up. However, to be clear, Jamie as well 
as Sheryl and Avril were very much of the opinion that the majority of the scenes 
involving them had little or no degree of artificiality.  
Either way, I would argue that my analysis of the content of the programme and the 
interviews with participants illustrate that the truthfulness and fairness that are 
referred to in the first two of the quoted BBC guidelines cannot be reduced to being 
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a technical problem. The difficulties of representing actuality and reality can however 
only partly explain why docusoaps are routinely accused of misrepresenting 
communities and individuals taking part in them. Questions of performativity clearly 
have a relevance, ultimately, their significance pales in comparison to the power of 
the editing process. To put it simply, the technical difficulties of achieving a truthful 
representations are academic if there is no intention of doing so. J. Jones (2014) 
discusses the potential for deception of authentic pictures with reference to a picture 
taken at a protest in Ferguson (USA) in the aftermath of the fatal shooting of a black 
teenager by a white police man. The picture depicts a black, sobbing boy hugging a 
white police officers. He comes to the conclusion that ‘a picture does not have to be 
staged to be a lie’. In the context of this research this means that questions of 
authenticity and its technical realisation are only one aspect of the truthfulness of 
(media) representations. Authenticity does not necessarily equal truthfulness. In the 
following, I will therefor turn to the question whether People Like Us (2013l) can be 
seen as a truthful depiction with regards to its representativeness.  
 
8.2 Representativeness 
 
Docusoaps and Reality TV more generally are often accused of portraying a skewed 
picture of the real world by focussing on stereotypical images and foregrounding 
them in a way that does not mirror their occurrence in real life. I have described what 
I regard as an over-presence of working-class clichés in People Like Us (2013l) above. 
I now intend to turn to the assessments of the participants of the programme and 
then frame those insights theoretically.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, I have identified the following issues of the 
programme as the central issues in People Like Us (2013l):  
 
Anti-social behaviour / criminality 
Alcohol & drug consumption 
Parenting (with an emphasis on single-parenthood) 
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Work / career / individual fulfilment  
Racism / nationalism 
 
However, as discussed, the programme is very much centred on characters rather 
than issues. The above mentioned themes are central to a number of storylines, but 
not so much narratively depicted in an explicit or systematic way. The arguably 
skewed and clichéd representation of the area is reflected as much in the casting and 
editing as it is in the central narratives of People Like Us (2013l). In the following, I 
want to present and discuss views of the participants of the programme regarding 
the representativeness of the programme.  
First of all, the view that People Like Us (2013l), like many docusoaps, is very 
character-centred is confirmed by Sheryl: 
 
Sheryl: There are so much more things they could do with Harpurhey as a 
programme and really, like, to get to the nitty-gritty stuff, but I just think that 
that's not what they were trying to achieve with this particular programme. 
And you are right, they probably sold it wrong by saying this is what real 
people are like. They should have said: ‘we picked some people who have 
some interesting lives and some interesting stories’. 
 
Sheryl challenges the claim of the programme of representing Harpurhey instead of 
presenting a small number of somewhat unusual and entertaining characters. At the 
same time, she makes a clear distinction between docusoaps and more serious and 
sober forms of filmic representations: 
 
Sheryl: I think you have to be realistic about what channel the programme 
was on. It was on BBC Three and the audience that the BBC goes for... If you 
wanted to make a programme about deprivation and issues and 
communities... 
 
Avril: ...on Panorama.  
 
Sheryl: Yeah, BBC Four is the place for you, isn't it? And I think that's what 
people need to be a bit realistic about.  
 
206 
 
Again, genre-typical frictions and contradictions come to the fore. However, none of 
the interviewees regarded People Like Us (2013l) as a gross misrepresentation of the 
local area and most expressed mixed feelings regarding its representativeness: 
 
Jamie: I'd say 50:50 in terms of representation.  
 
BW: Overall, would you say that it is a fair representation of you as a family 
and of the area as a whole? 
Karen: Well, I would and I wouldn’t. 
 
Amber: I don't know, it's quite a difficult because in a way it's true and in a 
way it's not.  
 
Again, I would argue that this ambivalence to some extent reflects the incapability of 
filmic representations to capture truth. However, I would also argue that these 
limitations can only partly explain misrepresentations and certainly do not account 
for their classed nature.  
Several interviewees felt that the editing of the programme and the choice of 
presented narratives was very selective. Avril and Sheryl offer some insights into the 
mechanisms of editing: 
 
Avril: And in the end, out of an hour being in that studio, we got ten seconds. 
 
Sheryl: And it was a joke.  
 
Avril: It was. We had jeans, we were wearing jeans. We had the top uniform 
bit on, but we were wearing jeans underneath and I was on holiday.  
 
Sheryl: It was funny actually, because for what they have shown. They showed 
that silly little joke at the end. I can't even remember having that 
conversation... 
 
BW: You said something along the lines of... 
 
Avril: I like a drink or two.... 
 
Sheryl: I was really shocked that they played that bit. I was glad of it, but the 
type of questions they had been asking up to that point just did not link in 
with it. Because they were asking us questions like ‘Why did you become a 
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police officer? How much police involvement did you have in your life as a 
child?’. Really quite emotive things and then they just showed us having a 
laugh. And I didn't... 
 
Avril: It wasn't like that. We said some good stuff about Harpurhey. That's 
where we work, I have always worked in Harpurhey. I have never been off this 
division and I have always covered the Harpurhey area. I asked to go there in 
my probation and I said that. I said that in my interview. Because we said a lot 
about the variety of the job and the people we go to in Harpurhey. And we 
said some good stuff and I was genuinely gutted that some of that stuff wasn't 
put across because I thought it could have done loads to improve the 
relationship between the police and the locals in the area.  
 
Avril and Sheryl refer to an interview that was recorded in a studio. Of the whole 
conversation, only a very short sequence was picked (2013j:27min 22): 
 
Sheryl: It has been known that I have gone out in town and had a glass of wine 
or two in the past and I have never got myself into a fight. So I do ask the 
question why these people constantly find themselves – because we do 
generally come across the same people time and time again – so I do ask the 
question why are they constantly in these situations. And I don’t know why 
that is. Can you offer an answer to that? 
Avril: No. 
 
This short interview sequence is cut between the aforementioned (allegedly alcohol-
fuelled) disorder and the (seemingly out of control) house party. So clearly, this short 
interview sequence was used as a structuring device and its content appears to 
confirm the inability of some residents of Harpurhey to consume alcohol without 
causing trouble. The decision of the makers of the programme to choose this 
particular utterance was puzzling and disappointing for Avril and Sheryl who felt that 
it was shown out of context and was not representative of the opinions they 
expressed in the hour-long interview. 
The tendency of docusoaps to overemphasise the extraordinary and spectacular (in 
ordinary contexts) and to therefore paint a rather skewed picture is discussed by 
Amber and Karen as well as Sheryl.  
 
Amber: We had so many good scenes. Just so many loving-family-time erm 
just doing things like really nice things. 
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Karen: We allowed them to come out with us to the restaurant. It was your 
birthday. They could film us, having a birthday meal. They refused, didn't 
they? And went ‘Ah we are leaving that now’. That would be so nice, watch 
us as a family going out for a meal.  
 
Amber: A nice family meal for my birthday rather than the drunken birthday. 
They could have a bit of both maybe.  
 
Sheryl comments on the representativeness of the programme: 
 
Sheryl: You are right, there was a lack of, sort of, I don't want to use the word 
normal, but everyday sort of people, getting up at 7 o’clock in the morning to 
go to work, there was a lack of that, definitely.  
 
And later: 
 
Sheryl: I don't think it's completely away from the truth. Those people that 
they recorded that exist and I've seen them exist and I have come to work in 
GMP [Greater Manchester Police BW] for six years and I worked in Harpurhey 
for 2 1/2 year and I was busy every day dealing with people they portrayed, 
that they showed so I know that that does exist. To the extent that they have 
shown it? Proportion wise? In a ratio? Is that right? Probably not, it is probably 
not right in the ratio. 
 
However, both Karen and Sheryl point to the requirement of a docusoap to be 
entertaining and therefore to focus on the extraordinary: 
 
Karen: I think the editing and that. I think they make it look worse for 
entertainment. Otherwise, it’d be boring. Because if they showed the library… 
It would be boring watching someone going into the library…  
 
Sheryl: But I guess that wouldn't make good TV if it just had, you know, Joe 
Bloggs getting up in the morning and going to work, eat egg on toast and then 
going to bed after... Do you know what I mean? I understand that it's a TV 
programme it is made for entertainment purposes and they want ratings. 
 
Again, the conflicting remits of a docusoap come to the fore and both participants 
accept the focus on the extraordinary as legitimate. Furthermore, it lies in the nature 
of a docusoap, and any documentary filmmaking, that events need to be condensed 
and specific narratives need to be focused on to create a somewhat coherent and 
watchable programme. However, I would argue that it needs to be asked whether 
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the requirement to create entertaining narratives fully explains the editorial choices 
made in People Like Us (2013l). As I have discussed above, an analysis of the content 
of the programme suggests that its makers intentionally employed working-class 
stereotypes to build and structure the central narratives of the programme. The 
questions needs to be asked whether the focus on the unusual and extraordinary was 
driven by a specific, possibly classed, agenda. 
As shown above, excessive drug and alcohol consumption are a central underlying 
themes of many storylines. One of the protagonists, Amber, expressed that she could 
not recognise or identify with her portrayal as a somewhat promiscuous party-girl. 
 
Amber: I do remember watching the first one when I was drunk and fair 
enough, yeah it was my 18th birthday, I did go a bit wild, there was a little bit 
in the toilet that made me laugh. But then there was a point where erm, it 
sounds awful but I kissed a boy on it and he is one of my friends from college 
and we are not anything, we are friends. And when he had seen he was like 
‘Oh my God’ like laughing and I thought: ‘Why have they put that in?’. Fair 
enough, put that in, but then there was another scene with another scene and 
I thought ‘Crap’, he was a friend again and I am not the type of person who is 
‘all look at me everyone, come to me’. I like to keep myself to myself, so they 
show me kissing another boy and people have thought like ‘God, she must get 
round a bit’ and I thought that's so horrible to put in. And on the show I am 
trying to make myself out like ‘I wanna study, I wanna go to drama school’, 
but now they are showing this wild side of me but too wild it was just too 
much.  
 
And later: 
 
Amber: It annoyed me that, cause I thought that's my friend, a college mate. 
There's a part in it people saying Happy Birthday and stuff and giving me a 
hug, like my friends, it could have been so much nicer. Instead they have me 
going ‘I'm gonna need some water’.  
 
Amber refers to a sequence of scenes filmed on her 18th birthday (which was not 
made clear to the viewer and therefore appears like a regular night out) that were in 
her opinion edited in a very biased way. The scene culminates in a shot of a clearly 
intoxicated Amber stating to the camera that she needed water. As discussed above, 
Amber felt that also her holiday with a group of friends was misrepresented as 
drinking and partying was vastly overrepresented in the programme: 
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Amber: So the only bit [of partying BW] I got [on camera BW] in was the boat 
party, so yeah they made sure they put that in.  
 
There are several more examples of participants feeling misrepresented in a way that 
builds on stereotypical images of the working class. As discussed above, Harpurhey is 
presented as a rather chaotic, unruly place. Karen recalls one incident that illustrates 
the techniques used to establish and reaffirm this picture of the area:  
 
Karen: Yeah, it was actually on the way to Sticky Fingers when we were 
driving. They put like outside dragging settees down the street and we did not 
pass anything like that. They put us in this really scummy area, going past with 
the music going. And lads on bikes and all throwing things and I thought, that's 
wrong.  
 
The brief sequence Karen refers to is a very telling example of manipulative editing 
and it is therefore worth sketching (2013c:34min 00): 
 
[After Paul and Karen discover a theft when watching CCTV tapes they decide 
to pay the alleged thief a visit and confront her.] 
Karen [next to Paul in the office of the laundrette watching the CCTV images]: 
Got ya, you sweaty, old, funny-arse. I’m right round her house.  
[Cut to Paul’s and Karen’s car setting off] 
[dramatic music sets in] 
[cut to Paul’s and Karen’s view from inside the vehicle] 
[sweeping shot of poorly-lit streets] 
[hooded youths filmed from behind, walking] 
[shot of two hooded people pulling a large object (settee?) in a poorly-lit 
street] 
[cut to Paul’s and Karen’s view from inside of the vehicle, busy, well-lit, main 
road] 
[shot of a group of teenagers, several motorbikes noisily driving past] 
Karen (on the phone, from the off): Hi Stacey, do you know what’s happened? 
[shot of a woman in an ill-lit street playing with a dangerously looking dog 
snapping at something]  
Karen (on the phone, from the off): Just took a service wash back, right, all his 
cloths are missing. We watched the CCTV. Sticky-fingered Lil has been at it 
again. She took all his cloths.  
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[Karen getting out of the car at their destination and walking towards a house] 
Karen (on the phone, from the off): I’m furious, so I’m going round there now.  
 
The short and uneventful journey of Paul and Karen to the house of the alleged thief 
is intercut with five different scenes that all signal potential dangers. As Karen stated, 
none of these street scenes were filmed during the actual journey. Combined with 
the dramatic music, the impression is created that Harpurhey at night is a very 
dangerous place. The short sequence is littered with emotive pictures that signal 
danger, anti-social behaviour and criminality (hooded youths, motorbikes, dangerous 
dog, poorly-lit streets etc.). What makes this sequence so powerful, and for the 
context of this analysis so revealing, is the fact that an unsuspecting viewer would 
reasonably believe that all those shots were taken on the actual journey. 
Furthermore, the individual shots do not portray any illegal, anti-social and 
threatening behaviour as such, but due to their brevity the viewer is hardly able to 
notice that. The fast-paced editing and the emotive nature of the pictures work on 
an emotional level and create a threatening aura. I would argue that this is a clear 
example of manipulative editing, that pieces together scenes from different contexts 
in a wilfully misleading way.  
Similar to the aforementioned discussed portrayal of Amber, there appears to be an 
agenda behind these portrayals. Further examples of misrepresentation that were 
mentioned by the participants of the programme support this assumption: 
- Jamie is referred to as ‘market trader Jamie’ despite actually selling goods 
online. In the programme, the impression is created that Jamie is a stall holder 
on Harpurhey market. 
- Amber and Cody are portrayed shopping at Harpurhey market. According to 
Amber this was requested by the makers of the programme and the market 
is not a place where they would normally shop. 
- The aforementioned shots of people wearing pyjamas in public is according 
to Amber a very clichéd and unrepresentative image of the area 
- Donna was aggrieved that her wedding was misrepresented in a way that 
fitted into the main narrative of episode one (the break-up of Lucy and Jamie) 
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but had little to do with the actual events of what she felt should have been 
her big day. 
I would argue that, in particular the first three examples underline the classed agenda 
of misrepresentations in People Like Us (2013l). The portrayal of Jamie as a market 
trader (as opposed to doing business online) and Amber and Cody as customers there 
(as opposed to shopping on the high-street) paints a picture of them that is in line 
with an image of the working class as lacking sophistication and not being in tune 
with technological developments or mainstream shopping habits. The portrayal of 
English white working class people as being bound to ‘anachronistic spaces’ is 
explored by Lawler (2012:409).  
In the following, I want to further explore the classed nature of the editorial choices 
in People Like Us (2013l) by pointing to extraordinary and potentially telegenic 
narratives that were not addressed and which participants felt underrepresented by 
the programme.  
As discussed above, the programme very much appears to be staying clear of serious 
issues, or of too negative and serious aspects of the portrayed subjects. Several 
interviewees felt that the omission of health issues and disability and the impact on 
their lives contributed to a very skewed representation of them.  
 
Donna: Well, I'm not well myself, I try to do some work to better my life. 
Unfortunately, health battered me. Could no longer work. Do you 
understand? But this was never portrayed. This was never said. It was just all, 
there she's on the market. Loads of money. 
 
And later: 
 
Donna: But then they did not show when I come home and I had to take my 
painkillers and I couldn't move for a few days. I worked two days a week with 
permission of the benefits. ... I still got permission. I did not earn enough, it 
was therapeutic, to get me out and stuff like that. None of that was ever 
mentioned.  
 
Karen: It did not mention that my spine is crumbling. It did not mention that I 
was disabled because of my spine, it did not mention any of that. I got a lot of 
hassle because of that, really bad slander.  
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Also Amber felt that the failure to mention her Mom’s disability lead to a very 
distorted picture of her Mom and her relationship with her partner.  
Again, it can only be speculated why, despite being a central part of the participants’ 
lives, health issues and disabilities were not mentioned in the programme. It very 
much appears that the makers of People Like Us (2013l) tried not to disrupt the 
generally upbeat and light-hearted tone of the programme too much and address the 
more serious repercussions of deprivation. Apart from that, the programme very 
much avoids issues around social security. The omissions of disability as an issue can 
also be seen in this context of a reluctance of going near potentially contentious 
questions of deservedness or undeservedness of state welfare.  
The assumption that class stereotypes were used as narrative devices is underpinned 
by the fact that more telegenic aspects of live in Harpurhey that were captured on 
camera also did not make the final cut.  
Police officers Sheryl and Avril refer to two instances that were filmed, but, to their 
surprise, were not included in the programme. 
 
Sheryl: Was I surprised by the editing? 
 
BW: Yeah. 
 
Sheryl: Erm... 
 
BW: About the choices that they did make. 
 
Sheryl: Yeah, I mean, there was some elements that, like, there were some 
topics that we covered. It just so happened that we had an indecency job 
come in. It's a sexual sort of crime and so everyone tends to find that a little 
bit more interesting. And they did, they recorded a lot of that, and sort of set 
it up a little bit so they could record some more stuff. And they never played 
anything to do with that. I did not really work out why. I was glad if I am 
honest, because I think it was quite a sensitive subject. But, I think they 
recorded it thinking that it's a ‘sexy’ topic, so to speak, and that people would 
enjoy that and it never ran. 
 
And, as mentioned, with reference to the discussed disorder: 
 
Avril: And you see the one minute you see things getting out of hand and the 
next minute, you see, 15, 16 officers turning up. You think: ‘How's that 
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escalated?’ and you don't see that bit in the middle where actually there was 
a point when Sheryl could have got herself hurt, I could have got myself hurt, 
we had to physically deal with people ... I did not like that they did not show 
the continuity.  
 
In these instances, extraordinary, spectacular and presumably telegenic events were 
not included in the programme or portrayed in a shortened and sanitised way that 
does not convey the dramatic nature of the disorder incident.  
Several participants of the programme come to the conclusion that the portrayal of 
Harpurhey is sensationalised in some respects, but also toned down and sanitised in 
other respects.  
 
Karen: Definitely could have made it look a lot worse. I have seen years on 
this lane, we are here all the time, even sometimes until 3 o’clock in the 
morning. We see the gory details and everything. I could have made it look a 
lot worse.  
 
Jamie: What you see in Harpurhey and Moston, people pissing up walls and 
crack dens. That is that is the real Harpurhey. 
 
Poverty as an issue is almost completely absent from the programme. As discussed 
in the descriptive part of this analysis, poverty very rarely enters the discourse and is 
not explored in any depth. In one single storyline poverty is a central element. 
However, it is framed more as a cash-flow problem than as hardship, and the 
portrayed negative impact of it is offset by plenty of scenes in which the protagonists 
of this storyline, Aaron and Mikee, are seen drinking and partying. Of the 
interviewees, Donna was most aggrieved about this from of misrepresentation: 
 
Donna: It supposed to show how Manchester people are. It wasn't, it was 
more about the gay scene which I have nothing against, druggies, alcoholics, 
everybody else. It was nothing about how mine and Jamie's life revolved 
around each other, how I'm supporting him, how I was always there for him.  
 
And later: 
 
Donna: It was a lot of lies and deceits and not true to us Manchester people. 
They did not show our lives. ... Alright, I'll tell you where they get this shit 
from. If you film my flat, right? My flat looks great for someone who is on 
benefits. Telly on the wall, nice sofa. But what you don't see is the rips in the 
carpet. So people go ‘Oh, they are on benefits and they can afford that?’. But 
what people need to think, do you understand where I'm coming from, I've 
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had the telly five years, I had this lino down three years, all my furniture is 
scratched up to fuck and breaking. ... People don't look at that side of things. 
Do you understand? People get in debt for things. Is there any food in the 
freezer?  
 
 
Poverty, like social security and state benefits, is largely absent from the programme 
and Donna does not agree with this superficial and one-sided way of presenting her 
life. People Like Us (2013l) was shot in and around Harpurhey which, as the narration 
in the opening sequence points out, is formerly the most deprived neighbourhood in 
England. It appears, however, that deprivation is only addressed in a rather 
superficial and stereotypical sense. A few alleged symptoms of deprivation are used 
to structure the narrative of the programme (substance abuse, single-parenthood, 
anti-social behaviour etc.), but the more serious repercussions of inequality and 
poverty are avoided even if they are central to the lives of the protagonists and have 
been captured on camera. It could be argued that People Like Us (2013l) is 
comparatively restrained in its choice of topics and did not set out to demonise a 
poor community. However, the point could also be made that a partly sanitised 
representation that avoids the portrayal of suffering is equally exploitative. I will 
come back to this question later in the context of symbolic violence, but now want to 
attempt to frame the presented insights theoretically.  
The ‘marginalisation of issues’ (Bruzzi, 2006:122) in favour of the micro-social is fairly 
typical for the docusoap genre. There are, as discussed, a number of recently aired 
docusoaps that seemingly break the mould by focussing on a specific social issue, like 
social security in the aforementioned Skint (2013i) and Benefits Street (2014d). 
However, even these more issue-centred docusoaps very much foreground rather 
personal aspects and individual stories as opposed to exploring wider, more general 
dimensions of the relating issues. Even in Benefits Street (2014d) and Skint (2013i), 
‘big issues’ like poverty, inequality, deprivation etc. are rarely explicitly discussed. It 
is again more the ‘small dramas of life’ (Kilborn, 2000:113) that docusoaps revolve 
around. The settings of these dramas have certainly changed over time and gone 
through different phases (from airports to vets practices to poor neighbourhoods), 
but the narrative structure and the level of analysis appears to have remained the 
same. Serious social or political issues tend to be off-limits. In that respect, People 
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Like Us (2013l) appears very typical for the genre. What is however remarkable, is 
that this effort to avoid seriousness and depth is not only reflected in the choice of 
characters, topics, in the tone, structure and style of the programme, but also 
appears to render supposedly telegenic and spectacular scenes off-limits. Most 
notably the discussed large-scale disorder was portrayed in a way that seemingly 
confirmed the image of Harpurhey as unruly and chaotic, but stayed clear of a too 
graphic depiction of violence and threat to the involved people. As discussed, 
deprivation as a topic is used as a label that suggests social commitment, 
documentary integrity and investigative interest, but this label largely remains a label 
and is only explored in the most micro-social and superficial terms and furthermore 
in a rather sanitised way. The effects of deprivation and poverty are largely absent 
from the programme. In this sense, the representativeness of the programme must 
be questioned. A lack of representativeness is, I would argue, reflected in a very 
limited framing of the presented issues. Docusoaps are keen to portray drama, 
extraordinary characters and unusual events, but, as it appears, only within narrow 
and well-defined limits. These limits are reflected in the choices of what appears on 
screen and what does not. Furthermore, I would argue, these choices are very much 
structured by stereotypical perceptions of social class. Harpurhey and its residents 
are portrayed as stereotypically working-class and this image is not interrupted. 
Aspects of life in Harpurhey that are too close to middle-class normality (shopping on 
the high street, doing business online, family meals etc.) are as absent from the 
programme as are depictions of poverty and serious symptoms of deprivation.  
This bias is indicative of general tendencies within media portrayals of the working 
class in Reality TV contexts. In particular, the depiction of excess is central to many 
representations of the working class. As Skeggs (2005) argues, excess is associated 
with the working class with regards to consumption (alcohol, food etc.), (hetero-) 
sexuality and (excessively uncontrolled and loud) behaviour.82  
                                                          
82 These themes are, as discussed, very present in People Like Us (2013l) and the parallels to 
Skeggs (2005:965) analysis of the portrayal of hen-parties are obvious ‘…we now have the 
loud, white, excessive, drunk, fat, vulgar, disgusting, hen-partying woman who exists to 
embody all the moral obsessions historically associated with the working class now contained 
in one body; a body beyond governance. 
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As discussed, there are many examples where the excessiveness of behaviour is 
portrayed and emphasised in People Like Us (2013l). From the allegedly promiscuous 
Amber and the ‘gigolo’ Jamie to drunken street fighting and out-of-control house 
parties. In particular the latter two signal a lack of governability. As the over-
representation of single-parenthood, these portrayals stand in contrast to the self-
restrain and alleged moral integrity of the middle class. Harpurhey market, that 
features heavily, not least in the unconnected and uncommented shots that are used 
to mark a switch from one storyline to the next, can be seen as a symbol of local 
attachment and backwardness that clashes with the ‘cosmopolitan modernity’ 
(Skeggs, 2005:972) displayed by the middle class. As discussed, nationalism and 
racism are central to one storyline and are suggested by the implied ubiquity of 
England flags that is in the programme not put into any context but is a powerful 
signifier of old-fashioned, redundant nationalism. The oversimplified narratives of 
People Like Us (2013l) that appear incapable of acknowledging that the participants 
of the programme behave in a way not consistent with stereotypical perceptions of 
class, essentialise the portrayed attributes and add a morally loaded judgement to 
the narratives.  
 
8.3 Symbolic violence 
 
In the following, I want to discuss how these skewed, stereotypical representations 
are exploitative and, in a Bourdieusian sense, are a form of symbolic violence against 
individuals, a community and ultimately against a whole social class. Furthermore, I 
will use the concept to make sense of the above-described (classed) 
misrepresentations in a wider, political sense. The significance of media 
representations will be discussed alongside questions of access, control and 
exploitation. Again, I will draw on the experience of participants of the programme, 
but also locate the discussed processes in a wider political context and to point to 
their significance.  
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8.3.1 Control & Exploitation 
 
In the chapters three and six, questions of access to the media field and control over 
its representations have been raised. As discussed, Reality TV formats have clearly 
expanded access to the television screens for previously underrepresented 
demographics (Murray, 2010). In the following, I want to exemplarily discuss on 
whose terms this widening of access happened. More specifically, I want to explore 
to what extent the participants of People Like Us (2013l) felt in control regarding their 
own representation. Taking into account the class background of media workers, I 
intend to frame these specific struggles over access and control as wider (class) 
struggles over recognition and legitimacy. 
I have already discussed that a number of interviewees felt that aspects of their lives 
as well as the area they live in were misrepresented in the programme. These 
grievances regarding the finished programme already indicate a lack of control on the 
side of the participants. Now, I want to explore the relating process a bit further by 
presenting and discussing statements of the interviewees that refer to their 
involvement and decision making (or the lack of it) in the production process. 
Exploitation will be addressed in a rather direct sense as experienced by the 
individual participants. 
With regards to the control over the content of the programme, the central finding 
of the conducted interviews is that most participants of People Like Us (2013l) did not 
get to see the programme before it was broadcast. In the interviews only members 
of the Wakefield family, who feature by far the most prominently, stated that they 
were given the opportunity to watch the edited programme beforehand and to 
request changes. All of the other interviewees stated that they only got to see the 
programme as the individual episodes were broadcast on BBC Three. This of course 
means that they were not in a position to influence the content in any way. Equally, 
they were left in the dark concerning the choice of scenes, the narration, the context 
their storylines were put in etc. This is illustrated in the following quotes: 
 
BW: So you didn’t get to see it beforehand? 
219 
 
Jamie: No, we didn’t get told nothing about it. We were promised a lot of stuff 
like we would see it, like we would be taken to places in London… But, no we 
never watched… 
BW: So that means that there was no chance to have any influence on the 
editing or… 
Jamie: Exactly. We just got a phone call saying that it’s gonna be out on this 
date. And we got a phone call on the day as well saying it would be aired out. 
But we did get no warning or nothing. 
... 
BW: So you had no influence, no say in that… 
Jamie: No, we did not know what was gonna be put out. Obviously we had an 
idea, but we could not say, ‘well that’s gonna go out but take that out cause 
we don’t like it’. We didn’t have a choice over anything, no.  
 
This experience is mirrored by Donna’s. 
 
BW: So did you then have ANY IDEA what of those hundreds of hours they 
would actually pick for the programme. 
 
Donna: No. No idea at all.  
 
BW: And you did not have a say in that either? 
 
Donna: No. They just put on what they wanted to put on. It was all shit.  
 
Sheryl was not certain whether her employer, Greater Manchester Police, was given 
opportunity to influence the content of the programme, but she personally did not: 
 
BW: Alright, so that means that you couldn't have any say in what went on 
the programme? 
 
Sheryl: Not personally. I don't know if GMP as an organisation had a little bit 
of say over it. I personally didn't. 
 
A few interviewees already sensed during the filming process that the way the 
programmes was produced meant that there was an inherent risk of being 
misrepresented, but did not feel that they were in a position of control: 
 
Donna: And I said to him: ‘What the fuck is going on here?’ and he said, ‘I 
haven't got a clue Mom’, until we'd seen it. 
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Donna refers to the aforementioned re-enactment of the break-up of her son Jamie 
and Lucy.  
 
Sheryl: … we were wary that he was trying to set us up. 
 
So despite sensing the potential for misrepresentations due to the way the filming 
process unfolded, neither Donna and Jamie nor Sheryl and Avril felt like they could 
request more transparency from the production team.  
The Wakefield family were, from what could be established in the interviews, the 
only participants who were given the opportunity to preview an edited version of the 
programme. However, according to Karen, the changes they requested were only 
partly realised: 
  
BW: And you said you had something changed? 
Karen: I had them change one of the, number three, because it said that Paul’s 
left the family. ... 
BW: And they were quite happy to make that change? 
Karen: They changed it, but they did not change it as much as I wanted to. 
 
To conclude, participants of People Like Us (2013l) were generally not in a position to 
influence the editing of the programme and had very little control over their 
representation on screen. This is particularly noteworthy as the participants of the 
programme granted its makers access to their lives on a very intimate level and over 
a long period of time.83 So despite opening their lives to the scrutiny of cameras in a 
private and extensive way, the participants of the programme were not given the 
opportunity to influence the editing of the programme and therefore had no control 
over which aspects of their lives would be shared with the viewing public. Amber, 
                                                          
83 Camera crews followed the lives of the Wakefield family for 18 months and, as stated in 
the interviews with family members, a camera crew was even given a key to their home. 
Also other participants expressed that ‘hundreds of hours’ of material was produced 
(Donna and Jamie) and that the filming stretched over a significantly longer period than 
anticipated and initially agreed (Avril and Sheryl). 
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who was particularly unhappy with the choices that were made in the editing process, 
expresses her frustration as follows: 
 
Karen: And then instead of acting, it's getting bladdered and throwing 
milkshakes at people in McDonalds.  
 
Amber: Cody's very like... It never really explained what why. But to be honest 
it didn't even have to be explained cause it didn't have to be shown. It did not 
have to be shown. So no one needs to know about that.  
 
Karen refers to the skewed portrayal of Amber that treated her ambitions as an 
actress as a side-show to her daughter’s alleged partying and, in this particular 
instance, being banned from a McDonalds branch. Amber, in the interview stopping 
herself from providing an explanation for the incident, criticises the lack of context, 
but also, crucially, is of the opinion that there was no need to even include a reference 
to this insignificant incident which contributed to the portrayal of her holiday as a 
wild, out-of-control binge. This might appear like a relatively minor and benign case 
of misrepresentation, but it clearly illustrates the power of the editing process and 
the lack of control over it on the side of the participants. Granting television crews 
access to their lives, did not give the participants any say in the naturally highly 
selective and potentially manipulative editing process. 
In this context, it needs to be pointed out that the participants of People Like Us 
(2013l) did not get paid for their involvement in the programme. Apart from a small 
allowance of £30 for each interview recorded in studios, no payments were made. 
Most participants were invited to the studio once and even the family members of 
the Wakefield family only had a total of nine appearances in the studio between 
them.84  
A number of interviewees referred to the success of People Like Us (2013l) and 
expressed that they felt like they were part of this success, but did not benefit from 
it. Amber sums this sentiment up with the words: ‘They did well out of us’. 
                                                          
84 So it very much appears that the docu element of the docusoap was leaned on and 
participants were treated like (unremunerated) participants of a documentary and not like 
(paid) actors of a soap opera. This non-payment of participants is of course among the 
reasons for the relatively low production costs of docusoaps. 
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The word ‘exploitation’ was not used by any of the interviewees, but most expressed 
the opinion that promises from the production company were not kept and that their 
involvement in the programme did not have the desired impact on their lives. This is 
illustrated by the following quote of Jamie:  
 
Jamie: We got promised the world when we signed up for that show. We were 
promised we were going like TV shows, like Chatty Man and This Morning, we 
was gonna be in papers, stuff like that. They never did anything. Karen was 
promised they'd help her in case people were starting to have a dig, and they 
did. They received nothing. They received absolutely nothing.  
 
Jamie clearly expresses that he felt promises regarding promotion, exposure and 
fame were made to him and other participants. What he describes as ‘help in case 
people were starting to have a dig’ refers to the promise of counselling for the 
protagonists of the programme. The lack of support once the filming had finished, 
angered and disappointed all the interviewed members of the Wakefield family who 
expressed their views in separate interviews:  
 
Karen: ...we stuck up for them through thick and thin, didn't we?  
 
Amber: We did. We tried to think of the good side, but when we think about 
it. It's not about the money, it's not about the fame. It's more about that they 
promised us that we'd have counselling at the end of it all. And they didn't. 
They just left us like a piece of meat, just ready to just face, face the world on 
our own. They promised to get us help to talk to people. 
 
Paul: We got just like cut off. Do you know what I mean? Left to fight the battle 
on our own.  
 
Karen: No, there are no serious regrets. The only thing is: they promised they 
would look after us after the show and they abandoned us. They told us we 
would get counselling. I thought ‘We don’t need counselling’ and they said 
‘Karen, believe me you will’. And this woman from the BBC said ‘We are 
staying in touch, I’m not leaving you’ and they promised this and we got any 
of it. Dragonfly. They just used us and they just… That was is. Dumped us.  
 
What was particularly disappointing for the Wakefield family was that members of 
the production team they came to regard as friends cut all ties with them: 
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Paul: ... So he said ‘leave that with me, get it dealt with. Instead of texting me 
or phoning me, can you email me?’. 
 
Karen: He was a good friend… 
 
Paul: He was a good friend. Yeah, I think a text or a phone call is more 
personal... And he said ‘in the future can you email me?’. Do you know what 
I mean? It's like - what happened? What's wrong? 
 
Karen: He was really friendly with us.  
 
Paul: Do you know what I mean? Once they have got what they wanted, all 
ties were cut.  
 
It appears that the genre-typical process of getting close to people and then ‘distance 
yourself in the cutting-room’ (Gardman cited in Fiddick (1999:23)) that was discussed 
in the media chapter, was well and truly put into practice.  
Finally, it must be mentioned that several participants felt that their involvement in 
the programme had a negative impact on their lives. Much of the anger about the 
misrepresentation of the area was directed at them personally and there were 
instances of bullying as a result of the programme. Some interviewees spoke of 
positive repercussions and generally positive feedback, but the hoped-for career 
boost (in the cases of Amber and Jamie for instance) did not materialise. 
The issue of exploitation in Reality TV can be framed in class terms. Walkerdine (1996) 
for instance asks why it is that ‘everything ever written about class is always targeting 
one class, (usually written by the other)’. There is compelling empirical evidence that 
working-class people are vastly underrepresented in the UK film and television 
industry (Grugulis and Stoyanova, 2012) and therefore, it does indeed appear that 
working class people are usually the objects, but seldom the subjects in the 
production of Reality TV programmes. As mentioned, I would argue that this 
outsider’s perspective (of the production team) is indeed one of the reasons for the 
prevalence of stereotypical and one-dimensional representations of the working 
class. However, I would also argue that the actual class background of television 
workers is less significant than ideological, doxic thinking that structures perceptions 
of class and through that the content of media representations. The demand to 
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produce easy-to-recognise, stereotypical narratives has been discussed so I will turn 
to the function of these ongoing classificatory struggles. 
People Like Us (2013l) is clearly a very character-centred representation that neglects 
social issues in favour of personalised and individualised narratives. At the same time 
however, it is a programme about class, more specifically about the working class. 
The setting in a working-class community, the shared class background of its 
participants and the use of common class stereotypes as structuring devices make 
the programme a representation not only of individuals or the community they live 
in, but a programme about the British working class in general. In the following, I 
want to discuss the significance of these classed media representations and argue 
that, in a Bourdieusian sense, exploitation and symbolic violence was not only 
suffered by the participants of the programme, but by their social class as a whole.  
As discussed in chapters three and six, People Like Us (2013l) is not a unique, isolated 
example of a class-based docusoap that exploits class conflict (in a cultural more than 
in a political or militant sense) for entertainment purposes. In a Bourdieusian sense, 
these representations are dimensions of classificatory struggles that are very 
significant in the reproduction of hierarchies and class inequality. Bourdieu 
(1984a:481) sums this view up as follows: ‘The fate of groups is bound up with the 
words that designate them’. Media representations like People Like Us (2013l) that 
very much appear to repeat (and therefore reinforce) common, value-loaded 
perceptions of the working class, help to sustain doxic images that legitimise 
inequality.  
However, I would add that media representations should be understood as a key 
dimension, but not the origin of classed perceptions. Media representations, in 
particular if they relate to contemporary social issues, need to resonate to some 
degree with existing attitudes and real-life experience of the audience. Bourdieu 
(1984a) argues that it is the hierarchical nature of the social order that structures the 
experience of the social world and is therefore inscribed in people’s minds. ‘Social 
divisions become principles of division’ (Bourdieu, 1984a:471) and media 
representations that repeat the attributions of this seemingly natural order of things, 
contribute to the consolidation of these divisions. However, media representations 
also have the potential to disrupt and to challenge social doxa and there are, as 
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discussed in chapter six, examples of documentary filmmaking that very much appear 
to have done just that. The analysis of the perception of my chosen empirical example 
does not indicate that this is necessarily the case in People Like Us (2013l), but it 
became apparent that the readings of the programme are bound up with the viewers’ 
class position. Media production and media perception happens in a social context 
and the ideological processes that doxa describes are by no means restricted to the 
media field. I will return to the question of the significance of representations in the 
following, concluding chapter, but at this point it is important to point out that 
representations and cultural aspects of inequality can, in a Bourdieusian sense, not 
be seen in isolation from material and economic conditions of inequality. This 
becomes apparent with regards to the working conditions in the media field and the 
market demands that structure its output (Bourdieu, 1998), but also with regards to 
the content of reality-based programmes that often incorporate the above 
mentioned ‘principles of division’ (despite not being their root cause).  
Docusoaps, as discussed above, often exploit class-based conflicts around taste, 
consumption, attitudes and practice and do so in a normative and dichotomous way. 
The above described artificial and constructed overemphasis on different forms of 
excess exemplifies the stereotypical nature of portrayals of the working class that 
imply a negative normative judgement. Bourdieu (2005:38) argues that  
 
… opposition between ‘unique’ or ‘rare’ and ‘common’ or ‘vulgar’ ... draw 
from ordinary class racism – ‘distinguished’ people and ‘vulgar’ people’.  
 
The ‘particular-universal’ (Savage, 2003:536) practice and taste of the middle class 
are norm-setting beyond the boundaries of this particular class. I will shortly expand 
on the tendency of stereotypical representations to ascribe and essentialise 
characteristics and to naturalise the arbitrariness of hierarchical orders, but it needs 
to be pointed out that Bourdieu regards these processes as highly significant, as social 
classes, as discussed in chapter two, come into being through discursive processes 
that mirror the economic and material structures to some extent, but are not totally 
determined by them. However, as the above quoted considerations regarding 
designating words indicate, 
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... a class is defined as much by being-perceived as by its being [emphasis in 
original], by its consumption ... as much by its position in the relations of 
productions (even if it is true that the latter governs the former) (Bourdieu, 
1984a:483).  
 
‘Being perceived’ is therefore a dimension of the class struggle. At stake is the 
meaning of the social world. Systems of classification mirror material and economic 
divisions. They do not cause inequality, but are central in its reproductions and 
legitimation. A docusoap like People Like Us (2013l) offers therefore, regardless of its 
intentions, an interpretation of the social world, and its classed hierarchies. I would 
argue that from a class perspective, hierarchies are reflected in the division of labour 
or more specifically in the allocated roles as objects and subjects of a discourse. As 
discussed above, those contributors to the programme that were shown on screen 
were in a much less powerful position than the invisible makers of the programme. 
In People Like Us (2013l), members of the working class get to talk on camera, but 
they do so under conditions they have little control over. As discussed, most of the 
interviewed participants did not feel grossly misrepresented, but from a class 
perspective, the stereotypical nature of these misrepresentations is significant. To 
further develop this argument, I will now turn to the related process of stereotyping 
and othering.  
 
8.3.2 Othering and stereotyping  
 
Class stereotypes are employed in People Like Us (2013l) as a structuring device and 
inform the presented narratives in numerous ways. As I have discussed, the choices 
of characters and storylines rely heavily on stereotypical images of the working class 
and extensively feature appearances, virtues and attributions commonly associated 
with the working class. In the following, I will briefly summarise the relating findings 
to discuss their political implications. Processes of ‘othering’ and stereotyping will be 
at the core of this debate and used to make sense of and to theoretically frame the 
central misrepresentations in People Like Us (2013l). 
As I have discussed, many storylines in People Like Us (2013l) revolve around 
stereotypes that are commonly associated with the working class. These range from 
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many forms of excess (in terms of consumption and sexuality) to crime and anti-social 
behaviour, from racism to single-parenthood and educational difficulties.85  
As it became clear in the interviews conducted, stereotypes were not only achieved 
by selective casting and editing, but also manufactured trough the manipulation of 
several storylines. Despite having no relevance for the development of their 
narratives, Amber and Jamie for instance were portrayed as selling or buying at the 
local market despite doing business online (Jamie) or shopping in high street fashion 
shops (Amber). Participants were asked to use particular terms (see the ‘party house’ 
example) to validate the stereotypical portrayal of another participant. These 
examples indicate the classed nature and the intentionality of misrepresentations in 
the programme.  
Furthermore, the heavy use of emotive, yet uncommented shots of unnamed people 
(man swinging a dog on a rope, youths sitting behind barbed wire, girls running across 
a multilane road with horses etc.) are loaded with classed associations. Who the 
depicted people are or in what context the filmed sequences took place is not 
mentioned in the programme and neither do they seem relevant for any of the 
storylines. Those shots are employed as morally charged visual signifiers of class. The 
makers of the programme further advance into ethically problematic territory by 
intercutting an uneventful car journey with emotive street scenes that did not take 
place on the actual journey. Again, it is not obvious at all in what way this would 
contribute to the narrative or the portrayed storyline, and the purpose of this 
manipulative and misleading editing appears to be the validation of the alleged 
dangerousness and unruliness of the local area. 
The combination of skewed casting, selective editing and bending of storylines that 
all revolve around stereotypical images of the working class structures the narratives 
of the programme. Since the production company ignored all interview requests, the 
                                                          
85 These themes are central to a number of storylines, but also implied by the discussed use 
of a large number of uncommented and emotive pictures that were not put into any 
context. These pictures are used to enhance the credibility of the portrayed narratives and 
to validate the stereotype-ridden representation of Harpurhey and its residents. Pyjamas, 
track-suits, hooded young men, attack dogs, litter and noisy motorbikes do not constitute 
anti-social behaviour or criminality, but are, at least from an outsider’s perspective, strong 
signifiers of unruliness and potentially of threat. Furthermore, they are all associated with 
the working class and its alleged deficient taste. 
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reasons for this can only be assumed. Following on from the discussed logic of the 
media field in general and characteristics of docusoaps more specifically, I would 
argue that the creation of easily identifiable narratives is more likely the reason for 
class bias than a political agenda as such. The usual narrative structure of docusoaps 
means that only very few aspects of the participants’ lives are presented in an ultra-
condensed and dramatized way. The participants of People Like Us (2013l) are 
therefore, in a sense, used as characters who embody a specific trait. The 
requirements of the genre explains the reductive nature of the portrayals and also, 
to some extent, their stereotypical nature. The very limited amount of airtime that is 
available for the portrayal of each character86 makes resorting to stereotypical 
characterisations a very tempting shortcut. Very few participants appear in more 
than one episode and are portrayed with any sense of continuity. The participants of 
People Like Us (2013l), I would argue, are set up to embody specific working class 
clichés like: the alcoholic, the single mother, the neighbour from hell, the party girl, 
the rapper with a criminal past etc. As mentioned, this single-issue reductionism does 
not apply to all of the participants and in particular not to those who were portrayed 
more extensively. However, even the Wakefield family who appear in each of the six 
episode felt that certain aspects of their lives were portrayed in an extremely 
exaggerated, disproportional way.  
 
8.3.2.1 Othering 
 
Before I frame the process of stereotyping theoretically, I want to briefly discuss a 
closely related yet distinguishable discursive device. People Like Us (2013l) heavily 
uses a process that Hall (2013) describes as ‘othering’. In my empirical example this 
means that Harpurhey and its residents are portrayed in a way that makes them 
appear as fundamentally different from mainstream society. What difference in that 
sense refers to will be explored shortly, but for now I want to point to empirical 
evidence of this process. Speaking of empirical evidence is somewhat problematic in 
this context, but I would argue that there is not only a suggested reading of the 
programme, but also a suggested perspective: the perspective of an outsider looking 
                                                          
86 Four main storylines, usually involving several participants, per 60 minute episode. 
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in. This perspective is reflected in the production process and is shared by the makers 
of the programme and (the majority of) its viewers. This assumption can be 
substantiated by an analysis for the aforementioned stereotypical portrayals, but is 
also reflected in the title and the narration of the programme. The title of the 
programme indicates distance between the maker and the viewers of the programme 
on the one side and the people appearing in it on the other side. ‘People Like Us’ 
clearly refers to the participants of the programme and implies distance. For people 
of different geographical and class background ‘People Like Us’ translates into 
‘People Like Them’. The title of the programme implies particularity and difference.  
This alleged difference is also expressed through the narration of the opening 
sequence of the programme (2013l:0min 02 of each episode): 
 
Just north of the city centre is a little-known Manchester suburb called 
Harpurhey. 
Ten years ago, a Government report branded it the most deprived 
neighbourhood in England.  
Things have got a bit better since then, but life round here is still no bed of 
roses.  
Half the people have no qualifications and anti-social behaviour is rife.  
People round here might not be the poshest but they are not lacking in spirit.  
They just try to get on with life, be themselves and follow their dreams.  
For one long summer, the young people of Harpurhey let us into their secret 
world sharing the good times and the bad. 
This is how it really feels growing up the hard way.  
 
It is not evident why Harpurhey should be referred to as a ‘little-known’ suburb and 
therefore I would assume that this wording is intended to underline the alleged 
difference of Harpurhey. When the narrator expresses that ‘People round here might 
not be the poshest but they are not lacking in spirit. They just try to get on with life, 
be themselves and follow their dreams’ it is clear that an outsider, somewhat 
patronisingly, comments on a community that is alien and significantly different from 
mainstream society. Finally, ‘the young people of Harpurhey let us into their secret 
world’ clearly adds to the aura of mystique and difference that is created by the 
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narration and visual language of the opening sequence. Finally, the above discussed 
focus on many forms of deviant behaviour, that is visualised in an extremely 
condensed form in the opening sequence, contributes to the ‘othering’ of Harpurhey 
and its residents.  
The above quoted narration of the opening sequence of People Like Us (2013l) 
strongly resonates with Stuart Hall’s (2013:255) introductory remarks to ‘The 
Spectacle of the ‘Other’:  
 
How do we represent people and places which are significantly different from 
us? Why is ‘difference’ so compelling a theme, so contested an area of 
representation? What is the secret fascination of ‘otherness’? 
 
Otherness is clearly a notion that People Like Us (2013l) extensively works with and 
which is very much foregrounded and emphasised, presumably to increase the 
appeal of the programme. Hall (2013) bases his arguments on racial and ethnic 
differences, but explicitly expresses that his findings can be applied to other areas of 
inequality and difference like gender, disability and class. As shown above, People 
Like Us (2013l) does not mention social class explicitly, but is clearly based on class 
difference and emphasises a few of its (actual as well as imagined) aspects and 
exploits them for entertainment. Hall (2013:216) adds to this that:  
 
Representation is a complex business and, especially when dealing with 
‘difference’, it engages feelings, attitudes and emotions and it mobilizes fears 
and anxieties in the viewer, at deeper levels than we can explain in a simple, 
common-sense way.  
 
Again, I would argue that in the case of my chosen empirical example this is very 
much true, but certainly not in the sense of an unavoidable by-product. Class 
stereotypes are used as a structuring devices and on countless occasions (middle- 
class) fears are intentionally elicited with regards to morality as well as with regards 
to what constitutes acceptable behaviour. The above-discussed extensive use of a 
large number of very emotive, anxiety-provoking shots illustrates the intentionality 
with which perceptions of difference were exploited on an emotional level. However, 
it also needs to be pointed out that, as I have discussed with reference to the online 
debates around the programme, there is a multitude of possible readings of media 
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representations and, as other research confirms convincingly (Skeggs and Wood, 
2012a), readings of class-based Reality TV are bound up with the class position of the 
viewer. Processes of othering work not in a universal and straight-forward way. Hall 
(2013:218) therefore speaks of a ‘preferred meaning’ of media representations that 
employ or contribute to processes of othering. What is required, is a certain point of 
reference against which difference is constructed. If othering is comprehended as 
part of the wider classificatory struggle in a Bourdieusian sense, it becomes clear that 
this reference point is not fixed and clearly defined, but needs to constantly be re-
established and confirmed. As discussed, the particular practices and tastes of the 
middle class have come to be regarded as universally binding, Savage (2003:536) 
speaks of the ‘particular-universal’ which can be seen as the reference point from 
which value judgments are made. However, ongoing classificatory struggles shape 
the meaning of middle-class norms and othering plays a significant role in defining 
them. Norms are not only positively defined, but also very much defined against 
deviations. One of the central functions of othering is therefore the establishment of 
normalcy (Dyer, 1984). Bhabha (1983) makes the point that otherness is always 
necessarily an ideological construction. The other is fundamental in the construction 
of the self and, if portrayed as inferior, in the legitimation of inequality. The group 
identity of dominant groups needs to be ascertained against what is constructed as 
outside of normalcy. Identity, Hall (1996) argues, is constructed through and not 
outside difference. Bourdieu (1984a:479) seconds this view by stating: ‘Social identity 
lies in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents 
the greatest threat’. Furthermore, the alleged homogeneity of (dominant) groups is 
not a natural occurrence and needs to be constructed and reconstructed on a 
constant basis. Othering is central to this process and is employed to give credibility 
to a largely illusory homogeneity and to define the limits of normalcy.  
Again, I do not suggest that the political function of processes of othering played a 
defining role in the conception of People Like Us (2013l), I would however suggest 
that it partly explains the appeal of the programme. The willingness or maybe more 
the perceived need to make classed judgements is to a great degree reflected in the 
discussed online debates around the show. Distancing oneself from the portrayed 
tastes and (to a lesser degree) practices was a central element in many of the 
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contributions. I will come back to this argument shortly, but I believe to have shown 
how the representation of Harpurhey as significantly different is clearly reflected in 
many aspects of the programme and used as a key selling point. The analysis of online 
debates around the programme indicates that othering also played a significant role 
in the perception of the programme. However, I would also argue that this point 
should not be overstated with regards to the chosen empirical example. The binary 
form of representation that Hall (2013) talks about can, in my opinion, only partly be 
attributed to People Like Us (2013l). Despite the emphasis on difference and the 
exoticising of Harpurhey, the participants, or at least those that feature more 
prominently, are not portrayed in a completely one-dimensional way that lacks any 
nuances which a binary representation implies. As discussed, most participants could 
identify with their portrayal to a large degree. Of course, this does contradict the 
argument made above, but I would point out that it is important to acknowledge 
gradual differences between individual programmes and to distinguish People Like 
Us (2013l) from more polarised and polarising representations.  
To sum up, the TV programme under consideration clearly uses strategies to other 
and to exoticise the portrayed local area and its residents. I would argue that the 
main function of this process is to ascertain middle-class identity and identifications. 
Class division and difference is not explored explicitly in the programme, but clearly 
is employed to increase its appeal. The ongoing re-establishment of difference, as 
explored by Lawler (2005) and Skeggs (2004), is a central element of Reality TV in 
general and People Like Us (2013l) in particular. In the following, I want to further 
explore the problematic implications of othering and stereotyping. I will try to make 
the point that it is not the emphasis on difference in itself that is problematic but the 
way in which difference is framed.  
 
8.3.2.2 Stereotyping 
 
Acknowledging difference in a capitalist, unequal and classed society could be 
regarded as a positive contribution to discourses of inequality, and Reality TV 
programmes have indeed taken credit for widening access to television screens for 
previously underrepresented groups of society. However, as discussed, this widening 
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of access needs to be analysed critically with regards to questions of power and the 
potential for misrepresentation and exploitation. In the following, I want to discuss 
the concept of stereotyping to explore whether these distortions can indeed be 
comprehended as acts of stereotyping and framed theoretically in this sense.  
Bourdieu (1984a:479) speaks of ‘social stereotyping’ as ‘attributing certain properties 
to members of the different social class’. This attribution creates distance and tends 
to reduce and oversimplify perceived characteristics and can be seen as ‘swallowing 
up all distinctions’ (Hall, 2013:225). Stereotypes reduce the complexity and 
heterogeneity of social groups to a small number of simple and supposedly essential 
characteristics. These attributed characteristics appear as fixed and therefore as 
natural. Brown (cited in Dyer, 1984:30) speaks of ‘inborn and unalterable 
psychological characteristics’. This naturalisation fixes meaning in the sense that 
attributes that are perceived as ‘inborn’ are not open to change (Hall, 2013). 
Stereotypes are therefore, according to Dyer (2002:131), always ‘images of stasis’. As 
discussed above, from a Bourdieusian point of view the content of stereotypes is the 
result of discursive struggles and therefore principally subject to change. However, 
this change or a lack of it, is a result of changing social power structures and it can be 
questioned whether working-class stereotypes have in recent years been challenged 
to the same degree than for example stereotypes based on gender or ethnicity. The 
underlying social structure that informs discursive practices appears largely 
unchanged with regards to social class. Furthermore, I would argue that working-
class stereotypes are static both in terms of structural changes as well as their specific 
content. As discussed in the literature review, members of the working class are often 
portrayed as remaining fixed to places and outdated practices. In contrast to 
members of the middle class, they are portrayed as lacking the required mobility, 
agency and control to move on from obsolete traditions (Skeggs, 2004). In People Like 
Us (2013l) this stereotypical perception is for instance reflected in the over-
emphasised and manufactured significance of Harpurhey market to the lives of 
Amber and Jamie. It is a general characteristic of stereotypes that change and the 
developments in the respective stereotyped groups are kept to a minimum (Dyer, 
1984) in order not to disrupt their alleged naturalness. However, with regards to 
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working-class stereotypes, this lack of change is a defining feature of the stereotype 
itself.  
Dyer (1984:31) analyses how filmic representations work with, exploit and reinforce 
stereotypes:  
 
Films use a certain set of visual and aural signs which immediately bespeak 
homosexuality and connote qualities associated, stereotypically, with it.  
 
Whereas Dyer (1984) refers to signs that indicate the homosexuality of fictional 
characters, People Like Us (2013l) is very explicit about its setting in a working-class 
area from the off (without using the word class). However, as discussed above, a 
whole range of strong signifiers of class, some of them rather artificial and 
manufactured, are used throughout the programme. Dyer’s (1984:32) argument that 
‘iconography is a kind of short-hand – it places a character quickly and economically’ 
was derived from the analysis of representations of homosexuality, but, I would 
argue, can seamlessly be applied to classed representations. Again, People Like Us 
(2013l) appears relatively unsubtle in that respect as most participants of the 
programme are employed as characters that are set to embody a specific, narrowly 
defined type. This pigeonholing of individuals and their very condensed and often 
distorted representation is, as discussed, exploitative. I would however argue that 
these often wilful and manipulative misrepresentations constitute an injustice not 
only in an individual, but also in a collective sense. The repetition of stereotypes fixes 
not just the portrayed individual, but also the group (or class) the specific stereotype 
refers to. The function of stereotypes is to fix boundaries and to exclude. Stereotypes 
split the normal from the deviant and define what belongs and what does not belong 
(Hall, 2013). They shape perceptions and expectations both internally and externally. 
I have discussed with reference to (class) habitus how social structure and individual 
and collective attitudes are linked in a way that is rarely open to conscious analysis. 
The impact of stereotyping becomes, therefore, all the more damaging. Defining 
specific characteristics as essential and natural to a group or social class makes these 
characteristics, positive as well as negative ones, within the logic of the stereotype 
incontestable. Without overstretching this argument, I would argue that also the title 
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of the programme and its introductory narration point to an essentialised 
understanding of class difference.  
Stereotypes are a central element of doxa (see chapters three and five) and therefore 
central in the obscuring and reproduction of (power) inequalities. Dyer (2002) points 
out that one of the key functions of stereotyping is to reassure and to control. 
However, he also acknowledges that their ‘endless repetition’ (Dyer, 2002:131) 
indicates the need to constantly reassert their meaning in order to uphold their 
validity. The alleged essential nature of stereotypical attributions needs to be 
constantly revalidated.  
 
8.3.3 Social class misrecognised as individual characteristics and personal choice  
 
The above discussed conception of class stereotypes very much resonates with 
Bourdieu’s concept of doxa as both acknowledge the political dimension of shortened 
and normatively loaded representations and their significance in the reproduction of 
power structures. These processes own their power and persuasiveness to their 
opaqueness. As discussed, doxa, like stereotypes, are reproduced in a way that is 
generally not open to conscious analysis. The underlying judgements are based on 
assumptions around morality and taste that are rarely made explicit. Bourdieu 
(Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991) sees the reproduction of doxic thinking through 
stereotyping as framed in the wider context of classificatory struggles that are bound 
up with material conditions and economic inequality. In the following, I want to 
discuss how stereotyping can be framed as symbolic violence and in which ways 
classificatory struggles are fought out in People Like Us (2013l). 
For Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991), struggles over the legitimacy of 
categories take place in every field.87 I would argue that stereotypes solidify and fill 
these categories with meaning.88 Stereotypes in this context represent a 
                                                          
87 These struggles may be fought out in the open, like for instance to some degree in the 
political field, or in a less public manner, in less explicit terms and with even more unclear 
fault-lines. I would argue that processes of class-making fall more in the latter category. 
 
88 Categories are, for Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:236), ‘the stakes par 
excellence (emphasis in original) in of the political struggle’. These categories of perception 
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condensation of doxic thinking that take assumptions about social role allocations for 
granted. In that sense, stereotypes hinder challenges to power distributions within 
the respective fields.  
Bourdieu argues that in contemporary capitalist societies these forms of symbolic 
domination are much more central to the reproduction of social inequalities than 
physical force (Schubert, 2008).89 Processes of distinction are regarded as legitimate 
and therefore provoke little frictions and resistance. For Bourdieu (1990a:127),  
 
symbolic violence, gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such ... presents 
itself as the most economical mode of domination because it best 
corresponds to the economy of the system. 
 
So symbolic violence is in itself misrecognised and, like stereotypes, perceived as the 
natural order of things. However, as discussed above, stereotypes as well as the 
legitimacy of attributions and divisions need to be constantly reaffirmed or risk 
becoming obsolete.  
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:234) speaks of a ‘labour of representation’ 
that agents need to ‘continually perform in order to impose their own vision of the 
social world’. As the considerations regarding the legitimacy of langue use show, 
structural inequalities clearly have the tendency to reproduce themselves. However, 
classificatory struggles, in some fields more than in others, are fought out between 
different active agents. Clearly, representations, like the ones under consideration, 
do not just happen, they are produced by agents, who, consciously or not, put their 
interpretation of the social world forward. Institutional contexts (for instance in the 
media field) are reflected in these interpretations as well as the objective and 
                                                          
are crucial in our understanding of the legitimacy of the social structure and the potential 
for social change. 
 
89 I would argue that this assumption can be illustrated by Bourdieu’s conception of 
language. As discussed in the methodology chapter, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 
1991) sees language as a form of domination and an instrument of symbolic social power. 
Language reproduces inequalities by distinguishing legitimate forms of language use that 
are rewarded from illegitimate ones that are penalised (arguably most clearly and 
consequentially in the educational system). Educational institutions reproduce social capital 
and make it transferrable into economic capital. Therefore, inequalities are reproduced 
without the use of what is commonly regarded as oppression and without physical force. 
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material conditions they are produced under. But not only that, interpretations of 
the social world also, to some extent, reflect the class position of the respective 
agents. As I have discussed above, the reading and the interpretation, of a media text 
is in itself bound up with the class position of the recipient. As shown, this relationship 
is however anything but straight-forward. A disadvantaged or oppressed class 
position does not automatically lead to a reading of class representations that 
questions inequality and its underlying power structures. Form a Bourdieusian point 
of view, the economic structure of a society informs the perception of the social 
world: ‘relations of power are also present in people’s minds in the form of the 
categories of perception of those relations’ (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:236). 
Established inequalities therefore appear as generally legitimate and taxonomies 
need to be actively challenged if the status quo affirming images of the social world 
are to be put into question.  
Agents (and groups of agents) in positions of power are in a very privileged position 
to make their view of the social world the legitimate one. The concepts of doxa and 
habitus offer a convincing account of the reproduction of power and of the above 
discussed normativity of the factual. However, also in a more direct and active sense, 
agents who are rich in economic, cultural and social capital have greater access to 
respected and legitimate channels. Interpretations of the social world that favour the 
powerful are therefore much more likely to be heard and to gain recognition and 
legitimacy. This linkage will be further discussed in the following chapter, but it is 
clear that distinctions between speaking and being heard (Lawler, 2013) and speaking 
and being spoken for (Tyler, 2008) are crucial in this context.  
In this context, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:236) speaks of the ‘magical 
power of naming’ as a key element of political power. Again, the power to impose an 
interpretation and ‘visions of the divisions of the social world’ (Bourdieu and 
Thompson, 1991:239) is key in the legitimation of (or challenges to) the established 
social order. The legitimacy of the speaker, either based on personal or institutional 
authority, determines the recognition of attempts to name and to categorise.  
I would argue that the discussed portrayal of a working-class community in People 
Like Us (2013l) contributes to the ongoing reproduction of class categories. In 
particular the described process of othering is central is this respect. The programme 
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employs a range of visual and discursive signifiers of social class. I have discussed how 
the programme foregrounds the alleged otherness of the portrayed area and its 
residents. The selectiveness and classed nature of this process could be empirically 
evidenced. Acknowledging and portraying difference is not in itself problematic, 
quite the opposite it could be argued, but the hyper-individualised, naturalising and 
essentialising nature of the portrayal can in my opinion be seen as an affirmative form 
of stereotyping. Difference is used as a narrative device that is set to confirm class 
categories without acknowledging the relational nature of them let alone questions 
of social inequality and social justice. Harpurhey is portrayed as a micro-cosmos with 
no connections to other, more privileged communities and no connection to wider 
political processes. The arbitrariness of the social order90 is not addressed in the 
programme. The programme portrays some (alleged) symptoms of deprivation, but 
fails to put them in a wider context and certainly shies away from any explorations of 
the flip-side of the coin: privilege.  
I have extensively covered how the programme is narratively structured by class 
stereotypes91, but at the same time shies away from any explorations of too negative 
symptoms of poverty92. In a Bourdieusian sense, such a portrayal must be seen as 
symbolic violence in the sense that suffering is misrecognised. Of course this does not 
mean that working-class life can only be portrayed as a state of constant exploitation, 
oppression and suffering, but I would argue that the, for whatever reasons, wilful 
omissions of these aspects in People Like Us (2013l) constitutes symbolic violence.  
People Like Us (2013l) works with class categories and exploits class difference, but 
at the same time ignores the significance and the impact of the social order on the 
portrayed community and on the lives of the participants. As is typical for the genre, 
People Like Us (2013l) uses a hyper-individualised mode of storytelling that disregards 
                                                          
90 reflected for instance in Manchester’s very own North-/South-divide 
 
91 and how categorisations are employed as narrative short-cuts to produce easily 
recognisable characters. 
 
92 social security for instance rarely enters the discourse. And, despite being central to 
participants’ lives and also of huge relevance to the portrayed storylines, the disabilities of 
two participants were not addressed at all. Material poverty and hardship are almost 
completely absent from the programme and only alluded to in a rather humorous and 
extremely superficial way. 
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collective, social and political aspects of the portrayed phenomena. Class 
membership is reduced to questions of choice, taste and consumption.93 Class 
differences are, in the programme, only comprehended in an individualised sense, as 
deprivation and, therefore, as cause for the ‘otherness’ of the residents of Harpurhey, 
but neither as material conditions nor in a collective, let alone political sense. Of 
course, it can be argued that a docusoap is hardly the place for complex explorations 
of class habitus, social structures and power inequalities. However, the mode of 
storytelling, the very selective casting and editing and the reluctance to go near 
serious consequences of inequality and poverty point to a wilfully sanitised and 
depoliticised portrayal of a poor community. Class difference is acknowledged and 
exploited as a structuring device and narrative short-cut, but ignored in any other 
sense. People Like Us (2013l) claims to be a legitimate representation of Harpurhey 
but, through its narrative structure and content, is set to confirms the legitimacy of 
the social structure.  
Finally, I would argue that People Like Us (2013l) can be seen as confirming the 
legitimacy of the social order as its own (disguised) power structure mirrors the 
prevailing social order. Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991:239) speaks of the 
‘monopoly of legitimate naming’ of agents rich in symbolic capital. In People Like Us 
(2013l) it is clearly the producers who are in a position of control to present their 
interpretation of the social world. The programme claims to be an unbiased, 
authentic, almost empowering representation of an underprivileged community. 
However, the people in front of the camera were clearly not in a position to control 
their own representations. The underlying role allocation in People Like Us (2013l) 
confirms the above referenced monopoly94. What makes this particularly 
problematic is the opaque nature of media production. As discussed, the truthfulness 
and authenticity of the programme is strenuously, and I would argue rather 
convincingly, claimed throughout the programme. The selective and agenda-driven 
                                                          
93 I have explored how, for example, the area of work is not portrayed as an economic 
necessity or problematized as potentially hard to come by in a deprived area. Work is 
portrayed as a playful means of self-fulfilment and the lack of paid work in a largely 
deindustrialised city does not enter the discourse. Structural aspects of the portrayed 
phenomena are neglected in favour of psychologised, almost therapeutic discourses. 
 
94 the makers of the programme, rich in economic as well as symbolic capital, are in a 
privileged position to put forward their vision of the social world. 
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nature of the casting and editing is not apparent to the viewer. In a sense, this 
imbalance of power remains in the dark and is misrecognised as an inclusive, 
collaborative, authentic and sympathetic representation. In some respects People 
Like Us (2013l) is indeed accurate and, as confirmed by the interviewed participants, 
authentic, but in other respects, namely with regards to questions of power, privilege 
and suffering, it, crucially, is not. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
I have demonstrated how People Like Us (2013l) revolves around class without using 
class terminology. The programme’s interest in class is rather lop-sided as it focuses 
on difference in terms of taste and consumption and foregrounds narratives that are 
set to underpin negative and stereotypical perceptions of the working class. There 
are numerous examples of manipulative editing that reflect the classed and 
stereotypical nature of the process. I have explored some of the specifics of the used 
techniques and hence the practicalities of manipulation that I comprehend as 
expressions of the logic of the forces at play in the field of popular television 
production as well as wider (internalised) ideological assumptions. I argue that a 
depoliticised, supposedly benign and light-hearted entertainment programme like 
People Like Us (2013l) has a political impact. It is naturally difficult to isolate and pin 
down this impact, but, with reference to my own small-scale audience research, I 
have demonstrated how the programme can be located in wider, politically relevant 
classificatory struggles. I applied the concepts of othering and stereotyping to a 
Bourdieusian framework and have demonstrated how both can be seen as 
expressions of doxic thinking and elements of symbolic violence by fixing meaning 
and reproducing inequalities. Power imbalances and the according capacities to 
speak are reflected in the production processes of the programme. Arguably, 
imbalances in terms of control and instances of exploitation are not uncommon in 
the field of cultural production, from a class perspective however, the docusoap 
genre is insofar problematic as the power to control and the potential to be exploited 
appear largely divided along class lines. To summarise this research, I want to move 
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on from my empirical explorations and to come back to the question of significance 
of media representations in a wider sense to locate their role in the political process.  
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9. Conclusion 
 
To conclude this thesis, I want to summarise my findings, point to gaps, open 
questions and further lines of inquiry and, once more – from a different angle though 
– discuss the significance of media portrayals. Throughout this thesis, I have referred 
to Bourdieu’s (1998) line of argument that the media field is instrumental in the 
reproduction of power by legitimising existing power relations. In the following, I 
want to pursue this argument further and discuss the relation between material and 
symbolic domination in a more systematic way. Therefore, I want to come back to 
Nancy Fraser’s (1995) distinction between cultural and economic dimension of 
injustice that was introduced in chapter two of this thesis. Further exploring the 
central arguments of this debate is relevant in the context of my research, as I have 
naturally focused on the cultural aspects of injustice. Of course the relatedness of 
cultural and economic dimensions of class inequality is at the heart of the 
Bourdieusian concepts that frame my empirical analysis, but, to conclude, I now want 
to discuss this interconnectedness of cultural and economic dimensions of class in a 
more explicit way. Therefore, I intend to link Fraser’s main arguments to 
Bourdieusian distinctions.  
Following on from that, I want to point to gaps in this research. I will discuss issues 
that were beyond the scope of a doctoral thesis as well as issues that only emerged 
while conducting the research and therefore could not be incorporated.  
 
9.1 Significance of classed media representations 
 
Media representations are neither a very central concern for Fraser nor for Bourdieu, 
however, both acknowledge their role in the reproduction of power. I hope to have 
made the point that class-based media representations are bound up with and also 
tend to exploit difference and inequality. In the following, I want to use Fraser’s and 
Bourdieu’s considerations regarding the linkage of cultural and economic injustices 
and analyse how this linkage can be applied to the empirical example under 
consideration.  
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Fraser (1995:71) states that cultural or symbolic injustice ‘is rooted in social patterns 
of representation’. Misrepresentations happen not only in the form of 
nonrecognition (‘being rendered invisible’), but also by disrespect (for instance 
through negative stereotypical representations). I would argue that both forms of 
misrecognition are very evident in People Like Us (2013l). I demonstrated how 
stereotypical perceptions of the working class inform the narratives in the 
programme and it also became obvious that a large number of filmed stories and 
potential topics were rendered invisible by its makers. And, most importantly, it could 
clearly be shown that a very unequal distribution of power led to these skewed and 
censored representations. Fraser (as cited in Fowler, 2009:145) makes the point that 
a lack of recognition ‘springs from damaging cultural representations, that is, from 
the “othering” of a certain group’. As I have discussed in chapter two, recognition is 
a precondition for redistribution and an acknowledgement of the principal equality 
of actors, a precondition for redistributive action to take place and for it to be 
perceived as deserved and legitimate. If, however, a groups (or class) is portrayed as 
fundamentally culturally different it leaves the door open to denying this group equal 
treatment and to perceive them as undeserving of redistributive action. This linkage 
is very much reflected in the analysed online debates sparked by the programme: 
many discussants made a connection between the supposed deficiencies of the 
protagonists and the deservedness of alleged welfare payments. Of course, and I will 
come back to this shortly, it is methodologically and logically difficult to prove that 
misrepresentations are the cause for negative attitudes towards welfare, but it can 
nevertheless be stated that at the very least the skewed and stereotypically classed 
representations in People Like Us (2013l) do not challenge doxic assumptions about 
inequality and social justice. McNay (2008) adds to this that representations of the 
social world inform action and interaction as the perceptions actors have of the social 
world cannot just ‘be deducted from social structures’ (McNay, 2008:12). The way in 
which social reality is determined by its underlying structures is not open to 
immediate experience. McNay (2008:13) cites Bourdieu who sums this nexus up as 
follows: ‘the visible, that which is immediately given, hides the invisible which 
determines it’. The empirical example under consideration can be characterised 
along these lines. The preoccupation with a small number of (alleged) symptoms of 
deprivation leaves no room for more general considerations let alone a critique of 
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underlying structures. Furthermore, many viewers will have no personal experience 
of a deprived urban community and for parts of the audience the misrepresentations 
in People Like Us (2013l) will not clash with personal experiences and therefore be all 
the more believable. The somewhat sanitised picture of poverty and the sympathetic, 
humorous and light-hearted tone of the programme in all likelihood contribute to an 
individualised, soap-opera-like and depoliticised perception of the programme. 
When McNay (2008) claims that representations are determined by structures, I 
would argue that this is true for People Like Us (2013l) in a dual way. Firstly, in the 
sense that class differences structure the programme narratively and secondly that 
structures within the field of popular cultural production impact on the format and 
content of the programme. People Like Us (2013l) reflects the power structures of 
wider society in its content as well as in regulating access to and allocating power 
within the production process itself. For Bourdieu (1984a), systems of classification 
mirror material and economic divisions. They do not cause inequality, but are central 
in their reproduction and legitimation. ‘Being perceived’ (Bourdieu, 1984a:483) is 
therefore part of the class struggle. Recognition and material distribution are 
interlinked, but, as shown, they are so in a dialectical way. Recognition is bound up 
with class positions, but also the discursive process of assigning respect through 
representations is structured by unequal access to and control over the field of 
cultural production. It is therefore key to go beyond the acknowledgement of cultural 
aspects of class difference, by pointing to the classed character of the cultural 
reproduction of inequality.  
To conclude these considerations of the significance of (classed) representations, I 
want to discuss how the impact of media representations can be made sense of 
theoretically. Therefore, I will explore the relevance of recognition by relating the 
term to central Bourdieusian concepts. It is somewhat obvious that Fraser’s 
distinction between the two forms of injustice fits well with Bourdieu’s distinction 
between the different interrelated, yet distinguishable forms of capital. Not only is 
the distinction between economic and cultural capital useful in this context, Bourdieu 
also points out that any capital needs to be transferable into (recognised) symbolic 
capital to become meaningful and effective. Accordingly, misrecognition in Fraser’s 
sense appears very compatible with Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence. 
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However, there are also clear differences that are relevant in the context of this 
research. Most importantly, the way that power translates into consciousness and 
action, how power impacts on subject formation appears underdeveloped in Fraser’s 
conception. McNay (2008) very convincingly makes the point that power remains 
rather abstract in the recognition vs. redistribution debate. I would add, that a 
simplified, largely discursive understanding of power risks overstating the 
significance of media representations without however, at the same time, grasping 
their full impact. McNay (2008:8) makes the point that the ‘pervasive nature of social 
domination’ is underplayed in the recognition vs. redistribution debate. She refers to 
the way that structures and one’s place in the social hierarchy are perceived and 
internalised. This process is only partly conscious and does certainly not take place 
on the discursive level alone. Media representations are, as discussed in chapters four 
and six, embedded in wider social and political structures. Their actual impact is 
therefore naturally impossible to isolate and difficult to assess. On a theoretical level 
however, the habitus concept is a very useful tool to grasp the complex nature of 
subject formation as inevitably bound up with the social hierarchy. As discussed, with 
the habitus concept, Bourdieu links the psychological with the social and 
demonstrates how structures become embodied (Wagner and McLaughlin, 2015). An 
understanding of power that is largely based on (political) discourse is bound to 
overlook subconscious, psychological and emotional aspects of the internalisation of 
power structures. As I have discussed with regards to the content as well as the 
perception of my empirical example, emotional and subconscious aspects play a key 
role in the production and the consumption of the programme. I could demonstrate 
that shame and disgust as well as sympathy and positive identification were devices 
the audience of People Like Us (2013l) used to make sense of the programme. Also, 
on the side of the participants, exploitation for instance was more comprehended on 
a personal and emotional than on an economic level. McNay (2008) makes the point 
that the subjective dimension of oppression needs to be taken into account. In the 
literature review I have pointed to numerous pieces or research that have put this 
demand into practice. Skeggs (1997a), among others, demonstrates how the habitus 
concept is of great relevance to the sociology of class. The individual and collective 
experience of inequality is crucial in understanding oppression and resistance 
(McNay, 2008). Habitus as a research tool allows us to explore the subjective 
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dimensions of inequality in connection with structural conditions. Furthermore, the 
habitus concepts helps to comprehend collective aspects of class culture relationally 
without essentialising them. However, admittedly, this piece of research has not 
quite succeeded in contributing a great deal to the understanding of class habitus. Of 
course this never was the objective of the analysis and I would argue that the habitus 
concept was indeed used as a way of comprehending class and as a research tool and 
no so much a concept to be substantiated empirically. Other, more pertinent, gaps 
shall be pointed out in the following. 
 
9.2 Gaps 
 
The methodological challenges of this research have already been discussed in the 
according chapters. In particular the intention to relate the analysis of the chosen 
empirical example to wider social and political developments proved problematic. 
Similarly, the actual impact of People Like Us (2013l) is difficult to assess. I would 
however argue that this is not a particular flaw of this piece of research, but a much 
more general problem. If media representations of class are comprehended as an 
expression of and as informed by the wider social order and the hierarchical nature 
of contemporary capitalist societies, their impact is difficult to isolate and to assess. 
This piece of research therefore constitutes more a theoretical exploration than an 
attempt to empirically prove the impact of media representations. I have 
nevertheless attempted to conduct a small-scale audience research of the 
programme and the logical and methodological limitations of my chosen approach 
have been discussed in chapter four. Even this limited analysis indicates however that 
a variety of possible readings exist and that a class-based Reality TV programme is 
clearly made sense of in a classed way. Taking class positions into account, like for 
instance Skeggs and Wood (2012a) do in their focus-group-based research, therefore 
seems necessary and very beneficial. Furthermore, I would suggest not to only 
comprehend impact as a change in attitude. Media representations, as I have shown, 
can be impactful exactly by confirming stereotypical perceptions or even in ways not 
intended and anticipated by their makers. Equally, it is in my opinion useful to analyse 
what contemporary representations of class do not provide. I have pointed to (rather 
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telling) omissions that characterise classed representations in a docusoap setting. As 
I have demonstrated, People Like Us (2013l) largely revolves around well-established 
images of the working class and largely repeats those stereotypical images. In a sense, 
this can, at the very least, be seen as a missed opportunity and it generally can be 
stated that the widening of access of (formerly) underrepresented communities that 
Reality TV brought about did not extend to production side. Representations of the 
working class still exploit rather than represent. It certainly is difficult to fathom in 
the current political climate and the current state of the television landscape, but 
there are, as discussed, historical and contemporary examples of documentary 
filmmaking that challenge stereotypical perceptions of class and successfully expand 
their focus to wider social and political structures and issues. I would therefore 
suggest that it might be illuminating to also attempt to assess the impact of cultural 
products that challenge rather than confirm the established order. If we attempt to 
measure impact, contrasting the perceptions of different examples of documentary 
filmmaking could be a fruitful line of inquiry.  
Contrasting a number of different docusoaps could however not only be beneficial 
with regards to their impact. This research has only made a small number of 
references to similar programmes like Benefits Street (2014d), however, analysing a 
larger number of programmes would not only point to differences and 
commonalities, but also possibly reveal patterns and systematic differences. With 
regards to my specific research question, an analysis of the ways in which the 
portrayals of the different social classes differ would be very intriguing. In the 
literature review I point to findings that indicate that docusoap portrayals of the 
middle class are significantly different in style, tone and content compared to 
portrayals of the working class. In particular comparing issues around casting and 
control could prove very insightful. Furthermore, it could be analysed in what ways 
roles are assigned to the participants of these programmes and whether the 
established role-allocation is identical for representations of the middle class. As 
discussed, the default position the viewer of docusoaps is put in is the position of a 
judge. It would be beneficial to explore whether the same applies if the protagonists 
are members of the middle, or upper class.  
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In 2014 the second series of People Like Us (2014a) was aired and Benefits Street 
(2014d) was followed up by a second series (2015b) and its spin-off Immigration 
Street (2015a) in 2015. In particular the latter two were met with resistance and also 
the second series of People Like Us (2014a) is recognisably different to the first series 
in terms of tone as well as scope. An intriguing line of inquiry therefore could be how 
public debates around and resistance to exploitative docusoaps has impacted on 
their production process, their content as well as their perception. 
Another gap in this piece of research is the lack of a systematic conceptual foundation 
of contemporary class stereotypes. I have relied on those conceptions of class 
stereotypes that are outlined in the literature review and focused on those working-
class stereotypes that structure the docusoap under consideration in terms of 
content and perception. Further explorations of classed representations however 
could attempt to systematically explore what constitutes contemporary class 
stereotypes and how these are perceived by members of the respective classes. In a 
sense, speaking of working-class stereotypes is a generalisation, and a useful line of 
inquiry could be an analysis of the increasingly popularised distinction (in the political 
field at least) between ‘hard-working people’ and (suspected and actual) recipients 
of state benefits. I would argue that the aforementioned generalisation is, in the 
context of this research and considering the nature of my chosen empirical example 
a legitimate one, but a more detailed and systematic analysis of the nature of 
contemporary class stereotypes could be useful.  
Another term that in relation to my research question clearly warrants a more 
thorough exploration is the term doxa. Of course, there is a considerable amount of 
research on how (class) inequalities are perceived and how they become distorted, 
disguised, misrecognised and internalised. I have pointed to research along these 
lines in the literature review; however, doxa remains a somewhat elusive concept. 
What is taken for granted is naturally difficult to pin down and, presumably, there is 
in the academic sphere a degree of reluctance (of being perceived as) to attest to 
false consciousness. Nevertheless, I would argue that the analysis of media 
representations of social class can offer a very rich way of exploring viewers’ 
perceptions of social class and inequality by discussing how these representations 
resonate or clash with viewers’ opinions. Furthermore, discussing media 
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representations of class can open up important debates around the (moral) value 
attached to images of class.  
One final gap in this research has already been referred to on several occasions: the 
rather limited explorations of the production side of media representations. As 
discussed, Dragonfly, the makers of People Like Us (2013l), did not reply to my 
numerous attempts to make contact and therefore I had to rely on secondary 
sources. Consequently, the motifs and intentions of the production company could 
only be alleged. Whereas the intended function of some visual and narrative devices 
appear quite obvious, other conclusions are more based on plausibility. I have made 
the point that in a Bourdieusian framework, the focuses on the respective field logics 
are much more central concerns than individual motivations and intentions, but 
nevertheless it is regrettable that the production company’s view is missing from my 
analysis. I attempted to empirically underpin the assumptions around the principal 
functioning of the media field by referring to statements of people working in the 
field. It appears however that the actual internal functioning of the media field is 
somewhat underresearched. The same can be said about external pressures and 
influences that largely remain in the dark despite occasional, rather isolated, 
revelations (like for instance Oborne, 2015). Similarly, the connections and 
dependencies of the media field with other centres of power, most notably 
advertisers as well as corporate and political players, warrant further analysis. Of 
course, also media ownership and the self-interest of the major players in the field 
will impact on the output it produces. Whether an interview with the production 
company behind People Like Us (2013l) would have contributed a great deal to our 
understanding of these matters will never be known, but I would argue that the 
Bourdieusian critique of the journalistic field could benefit from further empirical 
underpinning. Research along these lines could shed a light on the impact of 
advertising, political dependencies and the different forms of media ownership on 
the conception and realisation of individual programmes. I have pointed to some 
potential and actual areas of conflict and to the benefits of a Bourdieusian conception 
of the field of cultural production that combines an analysis of outside pressures with 
the acknowledgement of the specific, particular field logic of media production. 
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However, more empirical analysis of the praxis of cultural production is clearly 
needed. 
 
9.3 Central findings & future lines of inquiry 
 
I have summarised my findings in each of the respective chapters, so I will only briefly 
discuss the most central findings and then point to one final potential future line of 
inquiry.  
Class divisions are clearly reflected in the media field. This rather general statement 
refers to questions of access to, and power over, the production of media output as 
well as to a division of labour that divides people into subjects and objects of 
representations largely along class lines. In particular in the Reality TV genre and the 
docusoap subgenre, working-class people rarely find themselves in positions of 
control, but frequently as the object of portrayals they have little control over. In the 
analysis of my empirical example I have explored the exploitative nature of this 
constellation. Bourdieu makes the point that media representations are part of a 
wider class struggle. The analysis carried out in this research very much confirms this 
assessment, however, it appears that in the field of large-scale cultural production 
these battles are fought with very unequal weapons. The discourse analysis of my 
chosen empirical example could, in connection with the conducted interviews of 
participants of the programme, expose a number of instances of very manipulative 
editing that cannot just be explained by the genre-typical requirements and the 
intention of the programme to entertain. To what extent the underlying agenda of 
this process is determined by unquestioned stereotypical assumptions, by the 
working conditions in the media field, by the need to reach a large number of viewers 
or by specific (class) interests requires, as discussed, further analysis. What seems 
clearer, however, is who is exploited and who benefits from the prevalent structure 
and composition of the media field.  
Finally, I hope to have demonstrated that representations of class matter and have 
an impact. I have discussed the methodological and logical difficulties of isolating the 
impact of a single television programme and the limitations of the small-scale 
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audience research conducted in this research. Nevertheless, I would argue that the 
way questions of moral value and (classed) taste were at the centre of the debates 
around People Like Us (2013l) and how readily the deservedness of state welfare was 
made the central issue (unprompted by the programme itself), points to the 
relevance of media representations for political discourses and classificatory 
struggles. Beyond the damaging repetition of (largely negative) working-class 
stereotypes, docusoaps are insofar problematic in their impact as their narrative style 
contributes to a depoliticised and individualised discourse of inequality. Structural 
aspects, let alone class terms, are absent and replaced by psychological, almost 
therapeutic discourses. Removing class from structures of production and portraying 
class membership as largely revolving around choices based on consumptions 
contributes to a depoliticised understanding of inequality. 
Above, I have pointed to potentially fruitful future research questions and to the 
possibility of exploring how resistance to stigmatising portrayals has an impact on the 
way docusoaps are produced and structured. One final suggestion, with which I want 
to conclude this research, is to explore counter discourses. By this, I mean 
representations of class that challenge doxa and that reverse the established 
allocation of power (in the media field). In addition to that, future academic research 
could encourage a debate around the question of what progressive representations 
of class could look like. Of course, it could be argued that this is less the responsibility 
of academics and more the right and responsibility of people and communities who 
are involved in cultural productions that represent the working class. Nevertheless, I 
am of the opinion that academic research can play a role and at the very least 
contribute to an analysis of existing misrepresentations against which counter 
discourses can be established. I hope to have pointed to the cornerstones of the 
debate. Of course, there are already numerous examples of documentary filmmaking 
that are not exploitative and deal with class issues in a critical and political way. To 
redress the (power) imbalances in the field of large-scale cultural production, 
progressive film-making could however aim to produce a docusoap along these lines 
which could call itself, with some justification, ‘People Like Us’.  
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Appendix: 
 
I, Published word: 
 
Wagner, B. and McLaughlin, K. (2015) 'Politicising the psychology of social class: The 
relevance of Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus for psychological research.' Theory & Psychology, 
25(2) pp. 202-221. 
 
II, Interview Questions: 
 
General questions: 
 
In each of the seven interviews, I started off by asking questions about the interviewees’ 
involvement in the production of the programme with regards to time scales as well as the 
decisions making and editing process. I therefore asked questions like the following: 
 
When was the first time you actually saw the finished programme? 
How long did the filming take? Over what period of time would you say? How many 
hours a week would you say? 
 
Generally speaking, you said they filmed for 18 months, sometimes many many 
hours each day. So in the end, are you happy with the editing of the programme and 
what they picked? 
 
So in the end, was the programme very much like you expected it to be or were you 
maybe surprised by the choices that they made? 
 
Were you then in any way surprised by the editing? 
 
So, generally speaking, would you say that you were happy with the editing? 
 
 
In all of the interviews, questions about the authenticity and representativeness of the 
programme were discussed: 
 
Overall, would you say that it is a fair representation of you as a family and of the 
area as a whole? 
During the filming were you mindful of the editing process or... 
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Furthermore, the impact of the participation in programme on the lives of the interviewees 
was discussed: 
 
You already indicated that it had quite an impact on your lives... 
If you look back at it now over the last year or something. How would you say did it 
change your lives? 
 
Finally, perceptions of the programme were discussed: 
 
I don't know whether you had a look on the internet about the reaction that the 
programme caused... 
 
 
Specific questions: 
 
As I conducted semi-structured interviews, the respective conversations explored different 
aspects of the participants' involvement in the programme. Whereas Paul for instance 
referred to the disappointment that he felt when people he regarded as friends cut all ties 
after the filming was finished, Donna on the other hand was aggrieved that the city she 
lives in was misrepresented. In the interviews with Jamie, Amber as well as Sheryl and Avril 
the power of the editing process and the intentionality of some misrepresentations come 
to the fore. The complexity of the notion of authenticity was discussed in connection to 
specific scenes and occurrences and, in some interviews, on a more general level. Here are 
examples of more specific interview questions that capture the specifics of the respective 
conversations: 
 
I wonder, at some point, did you forget that there was a camera around? Because it 
appeared very much like that on the programme? (Interview with Karen) 
When it was filmed were you aware that you would be the main characters, the 
main family? (Interview with Karen) 
Coming back to the reaction of the local community, how would you say that was? 
(Interview with Karen) 
 
And when you went on holiday, erm, did they give you a camera? (Interview with 
Amber) 
You appear to defend the area quite a bit on the programme. (Interview with 
Amber) 
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With hindsight, would you again to agree, I mean, would you still give your consent 
to take part in the programme or for your wedding to be filmed? (Interview with 
Donna) 
 
 
Was there any point after the programme got broadcast that you thought, where 
you considered taking up this offer of getting counselling? (Interview with Paul) 
Great stuff, just one last question then: there are a number of very personal scenes I 
would say. For instance I remember the one scene where take Madison fishing by 
the canal, erm, did you have any regrets over these rather personal scenes? 
(Interview with Paul) 
 
 
You already mentioned it, but this break-up scene was incredibly personal with 
loads of tears… (Interview with Jamie) 
 
 
Because when I watched it, and like I said before I watched it a number of times, 
and when I watched it maybe for the third or fourth time it occurred to me that 
after the break-up scene you have another chat with your Mom and she said “well, 
you were never really in love with her” and I thought that was a bit of “unfortunate” 
editing. (Interview with Jamie) 
Because I definitely remember that they said or that they refer to you as "market 
trader Jamie". (Interview with Jamie) 
 
 
But you were quite mindful of that with the editing they could portray you... 
(Interview with Sheryl and Arvil) 
 
So there was no, sort of, internal casting, it was basically the decision of you 
whether you wanted to take or not. (Interview with Sheryl and Arvil) 
 
But how did this come about then. Did they say: "Well, we would like to film the 
briefing but we want it to look a bit less formal"? (Interview with Sheryl and Arvil) 
 
I did not mean that it was staged, because it does not look staged, at all. I just 
thought: "why is the camera there?". (Interview with Sheryl and Arvil) 
 
I'm thinking, would you agree, or is there not the danger that the camera creates a 
situation as opposed to document? For instance when you took this young lad out of 
ASDA and you clearly can see that he tries to kick the camera. I was thinking: "Did 
that not wind him up even more?". (Interview with Sheryl and Arvil) 
 
And it appears that erm... I mean, do you wear cameras for these raids? Because it 
appears like there are these shoulder cameras. (Interview with Sheryl and Arvil) 
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III, Portraits of Interviewees: 
 
Karen: 
Karen and her family are the main ‘characters’ in People Like Us (2013l) and as the only 
participants they appear in every single episodes. Karen is involved in numerous storylines 
that portray her family as well as her professional life. Together with her partner Paul, she 
runs the local laundrette.  
 
Paul: 
Like Karen, Paul appears in every episode of the programme although is a slightly less 
prominent role. He is seen working in the laundrette and the family home and the 
storylines he is involved in revolve around his own upbringing and his role in the family. 
 
Amber: 
Amber is Karen’s daughter and appears in every episode of the programme. Most centrally, 
she is involved in two storylines that portray her thought-process whether to go to 
university or not as well as her holiday in Mallorca. On numerous occasions, Amber 
provides commentary on the portrayed family life as well as the local area. 
 
Jamie: 
Jamie appears in two episodes (2013b; 2013g). The programme portrays his professional 
life (somewhat misleadingly as a ‘market trader’) as well as his love life and his interest in 
music. Jamie is involved in a number of very emotionally charged scenes as well as rather 
humorous and entertaining portrayals of his efforts as an aspiring singer. 
 
Donna: 
Donna is Jamie’s Mom and, like him, appears in two episodes (2013b; 2013g). In the 
programme, she comments on Jamie’s behaviour and is seen as playing a big role in his life. 
Donna’s wedding is portrayed in episode one (2013b), however, very much to her 
disappointment, the wedding is a sideshow to Jamie’s and Lucy’s developing relationship. 
Sheryl and Avril: 
Sheryl and Avril work as police officers for Greater Manchester Police. In the programme it 
is more their professional than their personal live that is being portrayed. In episode three 
(2013j) Sheryl and Avril are involved in a number of dramatic storylines. Avril and Sheryl 
comment on their police work well as the local area as a whole.  
 
